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Holocaust Memory for the Millennium fills a significant gap in existing 
Anglophone case studies on the political, institutional and social construction of the 
collective memory of the Holocaust since 1945 by critically analyzing the causes, 
consequences and ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual and institutional context for 
understanding the Stockholm International Forum on Holocaust Education, 
Remembrance and Research (26th January-28th January 2000).  This conference was a 
global event, with ambassadors from 46 nations present and attempted to mark a 
defining moment in the inter-cultural construction of the political and institutional 
memory of the Holocaust in the United States of America, Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe and Israel.  This analysis is based on primary documentation from the London 
(1997) and Washington (1998) restitution conferences; Task Force for International 
Cooperation on Holocaust  Education, Remembrance and Research primary sources; 
speeches and presentations made at the Stockholm International Forum 2000; oral 
history interviews with a cross-section of British delegates to the conference; 
contemporary press reports, as well as pre-existing scholarly literature on the history, 
social remembrance and political and philosophical implications of the perpetration of 
the Holocaust and genocides.  It is through the mediation of these interdisciplinary 
sources that, Holocaust Memory for the Millennium explores the inter-
relationships between the global and the national, offering a specifically British 
political, cultural and historical perspective on the organization, implementation, impact 
as well as ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual and institutional context for the Stockholm 
International Forum 2000.  For this was a conference of global significance, which 
simultaneously promoted the remembrance of the Holocaust as a specific historical 
event, as well as drawing attention to the ‘universal’ lessons of the Jewish catastrophe 
for a contemporary world still wracked by the anguished political, legal, philosophical 
and above all, human questions posed by the continuing recurrence of genocide at the 
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Some of the most commonly cited abbreviations used throughout this thesis are: 
AROE  Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Raphael Lemkin, 1944) 
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HMGA  The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (Levy and Sznaider, 2002)  
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OSCE Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe 
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SIF Stockholm International Forum, followed by year (2000, 2001, 2003, 2004). 
UNDHR  United Nations Declaration on Human Rights 
UNGC United Nations Genocide Convention 
USHMM United States Holocaust Memorial Museum  
WCHA Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets 




  Terms and Definitions  
 
In this historical analysis of the causes, consequences and intellectual context for 
understanding the Stockholm International Forum 2000 (SIF 2000), the term 
‘Holocaust’ refers to the Nazi regime and its collaborators mass murder of almost six 
million Jews in the ghettos, concentration camps and extermination sites of Nazi 
occupied Europe and the Soviet Union during the Second World War.1  As Gerd 
Korman has noted it was not until 1957-1959 that the Third Reich’s extreme physical, 
spiritual and cultural assault on the Jews was widely referred to as the ‘Holocaust’,2 a 
word from an ancient Greek translation of Hebrew Scripture meaning a sacred, burnt 
offering to God.3   Prior to this time, Jewish communities across the globe had used a 
number of different terms to refer to the ‘Holocaust’ or Nazi Germany and its 
collaborators mass murder of six million Jews.  For example, in American Jewish 
communities between 1945 and 1962, Hasia R. Diner has observed a diversity of names 
including, ‘the Six Million’, ‘the Great Catastrophe’, ‘the Concentration Camps’ and the 
‘Hitler Holocaust’.4  Furthermore, in Yiddish, the Nazi mass murder of Jewry was often 
called the ‘Hurban’ (‘the Destruction’) or ‘Hitler Zeiten’ (‘Hitler Times’) whilst in 
Hebrew it was named ‘Sheshet Hamillionim’ (‘the Six Million’) or the Biblical term 
                                                           
1
 Michael R. Marrus, ‘Series Preface’ in The Nazi Holocaust. Historical Articles on the Destruction of 
European Jews: Perspectives on the Holocaust, ed. Michael R. Marrus (Westport; London: Meckler, 
1989).  
2
 Yehuda Bauer, The Holocaust in Historical Perspective (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1978), p. 31. 
3
 Zoë Waxman, ‘Testimony and Representation’, in The Historiography of the Holocaust, ed. Dan Stone 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 305; J. Petrie, ‘The Secular Word Holocaust’, Journal of 
Genocide Research, Vol. 2 (2000), p. 62. 
4
 Hasia R. Diner, We Remember with Reverence and with Love: American Jews and the Myth of Silence 
after the Holocaust, 1945-1962 (New York; London: New York University Press, 2009), p. 21. 
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‘Shoah’ was used.5 
 
Whilst the word ‘Holocaust’ will be used to specifically describe the Jewish catastrophe 
perpetrated by the Germans and their collaborators, this thesis will also place the Third 
Reich’s murderous racial anti-Semitism within the context of the Nazi regime’s broader 
racial ideology and atrocity crimes.  These atrocity crimes included the systematic mass 
murder of handicapped individuals’ designated racial ‘life unworthy of life’ during the 
Aktion T4 ‘Euthanasia’ campaign.6  The mass racial killing of what Ian Hancock has 
named the Porrajmos of Europe’s Roma and Sinti populations in among other killing 
sites Auschwitz-Birkenau and Chelmno.7   Furthermore, the Third Reich’s atrocity 
crimes also included the mass executions and deaths through brutal conditions of Soviet 
Prisoners of War; the aggressive ‘Germanization’ of native populations in Nazi 
occupied territories such as Poland, the Baltic States and the Ukraine;8 as well as the 
incarceration in concentration camps and even death through neglect and mistreatment 
of political dissidents (Communists, social democrats, trade unionists), Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and homosexuals.9  Finally, there was also the suffering of foreign workers 
from the Nazi occupied territories in the East who were pressed into service as forced 
and slave labor for the Third Reich’s industrial and military requirements.10   
                                                           
5
 Diner, We Remember with Reverence and with Love, p. 22.  In the Hebrew Bible, the word ‘Shoah’ 
referred to the consequences of a natural disaster such as a flood or an earthquake.  However, by the mid-
1940s and not un-controversially it had come to mean ‘annihilation’, ‘destruction’ or ‘catastrophe’ in 
Israeli public discussions of Nazi anti-Semitic atrocities.  See Stuart Liebman, ‘Introduction’, in Claude 
Lanzmann’s Shoah: Key Essays, ed. Stuart Liebman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 7.   
6
 Henry Friedlander, ‘Euthanasia and the Final Solution’, in The Final Solution: Origins and 
Implementation, ed. David Cesarani (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 51-61.  
7
 Ian Hancock, ‘Romanies and the Holocaust: A Re-evaluation and Overview’, in The Historiography of 
the Holocaust, ed. Dan Stone (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 383-397.   
8
 Yehuda Bauer, Re-thinking the Holocaust (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 56-
57. 
9
 Michael Burleigh, and Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
10
 Ulrich Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Worker Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  Although a controversial issue and subject to 
recalculations as more evidence emerges from the archives, Michael Berenbaum, has cited the following 
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However, this is by no means an exhaustive list of those who suffered Nazi persecution.  
Recent research by scholars at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 
(USHMM) in archives from the Jasenovac concentration camp in Croatia have also 
suggested that the Nazi collaborationist and fascist Ustasa regime was responsible for 
the murder of between 330,000 and 390,000 Serbs, approximately 26,000 Roma and 
32,000 Jews, a figure that does not include those Jews who were deported to the 
extermination camps in Nazi occupied Poland.  Furthermore, the Ustasa also persecuted 
and murdered political dissenters of Croatian descent as well as Bosniaks (Bosnian-
Muslims) for religious and political reasons.11   
 
The second term to be used extensively in this thesis is ‘Genocide’.  Ratified in 1951, 
the United Nations Genocide Convention (UNGC) defines ‘genocide’ as the intent to 
destroy national, racial, ethnic or religious groups in whole or in part through killing 
and other forms of physical or mental assault.  The UNGC also defines ‘genocide’ as 
the prevention of births within a group as well as the infliction of living conditions on a 
collective that are designed to bring about that group’s destruction.12 In line with this, 
the Third Reich and its collaborators can be called perpetrators of ‘genocide’ in their 
efforts to destroy collectives in whole or in part, such as, but not necessarily limited to, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
figures in relation to the Third Reich’s estimated number of victims in The World Must Know: The 
History of the Holocaust as Told in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2007): Approximately 200,000-250,000 German, Soviet and Polish individuals 
were murdered in the T4 campaign (p. 61); an estimated 90,000-220,000 of Europe’s Roma and Sinti 
were brutally killed (p. 126); approximately 2-3 million Soviet prisoners of war perished (p. 125); up to 
5000 German male homosexuals were imprisoned and maltreated in the German concentration camps, 
whilst approximately 7 million foreign workers from the eastern occupied territories were made to 
perform forced or slave labor for the Third Reich.  However, the number of Roma and Sinti victims cited 
by Berenbaum has been contested by Porrajmos scholar Ian Hancock, who has proposed that between 
half and 1.5 million Roma and Sinti were murdered.  Furthermore, Hancock has stated that he believes 
this to be a conservative estimate.   See Hancock, ‘Romanies and the Holocaust: A Re-evaluation and 
Overview’, p. 392.  
11
 ‘Holocaust Era in Croatia, 1941-1945: Jasenovac’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 
(http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/online/jasenovac//).  Accessed: 30/06/2010. 
12
 Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State Volume 1: The Meaning of Genocide (London; 
New York: IB Taurus, 2005), p. 45. 
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the Jews, the Roma and the Poles.  Furthermore, whilst the UNGC is problematic in its 
exclusion of political groups, in its omission of the categories of ‘cultural’ genocide and 
‘developmental’ genocide as well as in its failure to prevent the perpetration of 
genocides since 1951,13 this thesis will use the UNGC’s definition of ‘genocide’ on the 
grounds that although flawed, this categorization of ‘genocide’ continues to be 
recognized as a cornerstone of international law on the punishment and prevention of 
the destruction of collectives in whole or in part. 
 
 The final set of terms to be used throughout this thesis relate to post-conflict issues of 
compensation for survivors of mass atrocities.  Within this context, cultural studies 
scholar, Elazar Barkan has observed that the term ‘apology’ denotes a declaration of 
misconduct by the agencies responsible as well as an admission of duty by these 
agencies to make amends to the victims.14  Furthermore, in strict legal terms, 
‘restitution’ refers to attempts to return confiscated or looted property, whilst 
‘reparations’ denotes a type of material compensation for losses which cannot be 
restored, such as human lives and a group’s culture and identity.15  However, like 
Barkan, this thesis will not always use the term ‘restitution’ in the strict legal sense but 
rather as an indicator of collective political, institutional and cultural efforts to 
apologize, restitute and provide reparations to the victims of mass atrocities.  For whilst 
these mechanisms of restitution can never redeem past injustices, if efficiently and fairly 
implemented they can help survivors rebuild their lives after catastrophe.16
                                                           
13
 See Chapter 5 of this thesis for more detail on the UNGC. 
14
 Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2000), p. xix. 
15
 Ibid., p. xix. 
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Holocaust Memory for the Millennium 
 
Anglophone case studies on the political, institutional and social construction of 
collective memories of the Holocaust since 1945 currently lack a critical examination of  
the causes, consequences and intellectual and institutional context for interpreting the 
Stockholm International Forum on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research 
(26th January-28th January 2000).  This is a significant omission because the SIF 2000 
was a worldwide event, with ambassadors from 46 nations present and its organizers 
wanted the conference to symbolize a watershed moment in the inter-cultural 
construction of the political and institutional memory of the Holocaust,  particularly 
although not only in the United States of America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and 
Israel.  The SIF 2000 was also important because alongside its specific agenda of 
promoting Holocaust research, remembrance and education globally, the Stockholm 
Declaration (2000) or the manifesto of the conference, also acknowledged broader Nazi 
atrocity crimes and encouraged the political representatives, academics, educationalists, 
Holocaust commemoration experts and survivors present to support more 
‘universalistic’ objectives in the international arena, such as working to prevent 
contemporary forms of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and 
xenophobia.”1  
 
The convening of the SIF 2000 thus marked a significant moment by Western leaders in 
trying to ensure that nations across the world confronted their Nazi era pasts; as well as 
                                                           
1
 ‘Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust’, in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. 




rhetorically invoking the memory of the Holocaust as a so called ‘universal’ imperative 
to prevent the transgression of human, group or minority rights in the present.  
However, key questions remain.  Who was responsible for organizing the SIF 2000 and 
why did it happen when it did?   How was the SIF 2000 and initiatives that it promotes 
received by different national societies?  To what extent did the SIF 2000 on the 
Holocaust actually succeed in drawing attention to broader Nazi crimes as well as other 
past and present genocides and mass atrocities?  Furthermore, how far did the legacies 
of the SIF 2000 encourage the contemporary prevention of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia”? 2  And in what ways did the SIF 2000 promote 
research, remembrance and education about the Nazi past through the ongoing policies 
of the Task Force for International Co-Operation on Holocaust Education, 
Remembrance and Research (ITF)?  Finally, in the aftermath of the conference what has 
been the intellectual and institutional context for interpreting the broader historical and 
cultural significance of the SIF 2000?   To orientate the reader this introduction will 
give a brief overview of what happened at the SIF 2000 as well as why its causes and 
consequences merit such intense analysis.  This introduction will then relate the themes 
of this thesis to the current literature on collective memory studies of the Holocaust and 
the recent ‘transnational turn’.  The last sections of this introduction will include a 
summary of the chapters comprising this thesis, as well as a description of the research 
methodology and primary and secondary sources which have been used in Holocaust 
Memory for the Millennium (HMM).  
 
                                                           
2
 ‘Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust’, in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. 





The SIF 2000 
 
For Göran Persson, the Swedish Prime Minister responsible for convening the SIF 
2000, the millennial timing of the conference after the founding of the Living History 
project (1997), the establishment of the ITF (1998) and in reaction to the European 
Union’s focus on Maastricht and the politics of monetary union during the 1990s were 
crucial factors shaping the SIF 2000’s project of Holocaust research, remembrance and 
education within the nexus of Western liberal values:   
 
There was also the temptation of the millennium.  After all, by its nature, the issue is universal 
and – alas – timeless.  In view of our success in Sweden and the response from the Task Force 
group, it felt natural to organize a conference as well, right at the start of the new millennium.  I 
remember Prime Minister Jospin saying, both to me personally and also in his conference 
speech, that it was remarkable how we had devoted the whole of the 1990s to international 
conferences about economics, and now it was the new millennium and the first big conference 
was about ideology, humanism and values.3  
 
The main components of the SIF 2000 consisted of opening and plenary sessions in 
which high profile national politicians were expected to pledge their support to 
Holocaust research, remembrance and education as well as their commitment to fight 
against contemporary manifestations of anti-Semitism, racism, ethnic cleansing and 
genocide.  Illustrating the global prestige and perceived political pertinence of the SIF 
2000 among Western nations, some of the high profile heads of state and government 
representatives at the SIF 2000 included the already mentioned Prime Minister of 
France, Jospin, the Federal Chancellor of Germany Gerhardt Schröder, the President of 
Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, 
the Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Barak, the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook as 
well as a video message addressed to the conference from President of the United States 
of America, Bill Clinton.  To these political representatives Persson reaffirmed the 
                                                           
3
 Göran Persson quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried, p. 125. 
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centrality of the remembrance of the Holocaust at the SIF 2000, whilst simultaneously 
acknowledging the importance of commemorating broader Nazi atrocities: 
 
The Holocaust was no accident of history.  The systematic murder of the Jews did not happen by 
chance. Nor the genocide of the Roma.  Nor the mass murder of disabled persons and the 
persecution and murder of homosexuals and dissidents.4  
 
Furthermore, illustrating the SIF 2000’s primary objective of proactively promoting the 
intergenerational transmission of the public memory of the Holocaust within the 
framework of Western liberal values, whilst concurrently showing an awareness of 
broader Nazi atrocity crimes, Persson also articulated his hope for the legacies of the 
SIF 2000 that, “Learning the lessons of the past is a task without end. There will always 
be a new generation to win over to knowledge, democracy and humanity.”5   
 
In line with these objectives, which sought to not just politically utilize Holocaust 
memory but also responsibly deal with issues relating to Holocaust research, 
remembrance and education, the second part of the SIF 2000 mirrored the central focus 
on the Jewish Catastrophe and was based around three panels of experts and survivor 
witnesses.  The first panel addressed the future of Holocaust education (Ben Helfgott, 
Samuel Pisar, Hédi Fried, Dalia Ofer, William L. Shulman and Stuart E. Eizenstat); the 
second dealt with the challenges faced by Holocaust remembrance (Franciszek Piper, 
Anita Shapira, Serge Klarsfeld), whilst the third, reflected on the process of historically 
researching the Holocaust in archives and the classroom (David Bankier, Ulrich 
Herbert, Michael Marrus).6  These panels were followed by a number of workshops led 
by academics (for example, John K. Roth, James E. Young and Deborah Dwork) and 
                                                           
4
 Göran Persson, ‘Stockholm International Forum 2000: Opening address by the Prime Minister of 
Sweden at the Ceremonial Opening’, Stockholm International Forum Conference Series CD-Rom in 




 ‘Stockholm International Forum 2000: Workshops, panels and seminars’, Stockholm International 
Forum Conference Series CD-Rom in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried. 
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remembrance experts (Teresa Swiebocka, senior curator of the Auschwitz-Birkenau 
State Museum; Jan Munk, the Director of Terézin Museum and Myra Osrin, Director of 
the Cape Town Holocaust Centre).  Furthermore, in a similar way to the composition of 
the panel sessions, a number of workshops also included presentations by Holocaust 
survivors such as Ben Helfgott, Kitty Hart Moxon and Hédi Fried.7  
 
The subjects covered in these workshops included sessions on Holocaust education 
(teaching and pedagogy, the use of testimony and the challenges posed by the Internet 
and Holocaust denial); Holocaust remembrance (the role of historical sites, museums, 
art and other media) as well as workshops on Holocaust Research (pedagogy at the 
university level; researching and teaching genocide in comparative contexts).8  That 
comparative genocide was discussed in a session with Robert Melson, Kristian Gerner 
and Christian P. Scherrer illustrates both the SIF 2000’s more ‘universalistic’ objectives 
as well as the conference’s political relevance in the wake of genocides in Sri Lanka 
(September 1989 - January 1990), Bosnia (May 1992 - November 1995), Burundi 
(October 1993 - May 1994), Serbia (December 1998 - July 1999), Rwanda (April 1994 
- July 1994) and the Congo (1998 onwards).9  Indeed, the renewed focus on the 
Holocaust and the prevention of genocides at the SIF 2000 seemed particularly pertinent 
given the return of genocide to the European continent in the 1990s.  For example, 
Serbian ethno-nationalists had brutally murdered approximately 225,000 Bosnian 
Muslims between May 1992 and November 1995, whilst NATO military intervention 
had been provoked in March 1999 by the Serbian perpetrated mass murder of 10,000 
                                                           
7
 ‘Stockholm International Forum 2000: Workshops, panels and seminars’, Stockholm International 




 Barbara Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political 
Mass Murder since 1955’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (February 2003), p. 60. 
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Muslim Kosovar Albanians between December 1998 and July 1999.10 
 
Another key component within the Stockholm agenda was to draw attention to the work 
of the recently established ITF and its mission that after a decade of political focus on 
Holocaust restitution issues (for example, at the London Conference on Nazi Gold, 
1997 and the Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets, 1998) it was now 
necessary to promote ongoing Holocaust research, remembrance and education 
initiatives and combat Holocaust denial.11  As part of this session a number of 
presentations were given by representatives such as Hans Westra (Anne Frank House, 
the Netherlands) as well as Suzanne Bardgett (Imperial War Museum, London) on 
Holocaust research, remembrance and education projects which were already being 
carried out in the ITF’s member states.12  Furthermore, during this session the Clinton 
administration’s special envoy on Holocaust era issues, Stuart E. Eizenstat also briefed 
the Task Force.  He stated that the importance of the SIF 2000 resided in the fact that, 
“Financial restitution, while critical, cannot be the last word on the 
Holocaust…[this]… conference assures education, remembrance and research will 
be.”13  He also noted that the SIF 2000 and the ITF should encourage open access to 
Holocaust era archives, promote inter-generational knowledge about the Jewish 
catastrophe, combat neo-Nazism and Holocaust denial as well as contributing to 
international efforts to record and make publically available the names of both Jewish 
                                                           
10
 Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust?’, p. 60. 
11
 ‘Stockholm International Forum 2000: Task Force Declaration’, SIF Conference Series CD-Rom in 
Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried. 
12
 Hans Westra, ‘Stockholm International Forum 2000: Presentation by Mr Hans Westra, Anne Frank 
House, The Netherlands’, SIF Conference Series CD-Rom in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried; 
Suzanne Bardgett, ‘Stockholm International Forum 2000: Presentation by Ms Suzanne Bardgett, Imperial 
War Museum, UK’, SIF Conference Series CD-Rom in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried. 
13
 Stuart E. Eizenstat, ‘Stockholm International Forum 2000: Task Force Briefing’, SIF Conference Series 
CD-Rom in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried.  
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and non-Jewish victims of the Third Reich.14   
 
Furthermore, whilst acknowledging the international community’s failures in relation to 
Rwanda (1994) where over just one hundred days the Hutu Power regime had murdered 
between half a million and 800,000 predominantly Tutsi civilians with blunt 
instruments and machetes;15 Eizenstat built on the sober, proactive mood of the 
conference in arguing that against the backdrop of the establishment of a UN Rwandan 
Tribunal in Tanzania, the operation of an International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia as well as recent NATO military intervention in Kosovo: 
 
I am absolutely convinced that continued Holocaust education and awareness will continue to 
raise our sensitivity and consciousness to mass slaughter and genocide, and impel us to prevent 
them or to try and stop them as early as possible.16   
 
 
Finally, Eizenstat noted that a key outcome of the SIF 2000 was the furthering of the 
Task Force’s current ‘Liaison Project’ with the Czech Republic as well as its 
encouragement of potential future ‘Liaison projects’ with Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Argentina.17  These ‘Liaison Projects’ were planned to take place between 
Holocaust NGOs in America, Israel and Western Europe and Holocaust organizations 
which were often located in the post-Communist states of Central, Eastern, South-
Eastern Europe and the Baltic states.   These international ‘Liaison Projects’ would be 
designed to support national and local efforts in terms of Holocaust research, 
remembrance and education as well as tackling ideological distortions of Holocaust 
memory as a result of Soviet narratives of Nazi atrocity, continuing indigenous anti-
                                                           
14
 Eizenstat, ‘Stockholm International Forum 2000: Task Force Briefing’. 
15
 Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass 
Murder since 1955’,  p. 57 and p. 60; Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State Volume 1, pp. 73-
76. 
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Semitism as well as competing national narratives of suffering under Nazism and 
Communism. 
 
Within this context, the purpose of the SIF 2000 and the long-term aims for the ITF 
were articulated in the eight-point Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on 
the Holocaust (2000).  Despite its significance as the manifesto of the SIF 2000, the 
Stockholm Declaration had quickly been put together in 1999 by the committee whom 
Dr. Stephen Smith (co-founder of the Holocaust Centre, Beth Shalom, UK and the 
Aegis Trust for Genocide Prevention), cites as the academic advisors to the conference:  
 
… the Stockholm Declaration… like a lot of statements was not particularly well prepared, I 
remember there was myself, Yehuda [Bauer], Jonathan Cohen from the American Embassy, 
were drafting it, David [Cesarani] was involved.  There was the four of us drafting it behind the 
scenes, and to be honest we didn’t think that the Declaration would be accepted.  So, we thought 
about it and thought about definitional issues and thought about the general thrust of what was 
required.  I can also tell you there was virtually no political or ideological steer on that at all.  It 
emerged out of again a pragmatic question of what should… what would we like as a general 
base for universal remembrance of the Holocaust.  How should we define that to make sure it’s 
specific enough to represent the mass murder of European Jewry but also to make it universal 
enough to make it absolutely clear that this is about moral and ethical standards within our 
current society.  And we were pretty well left to our own devices with that.18   
 
The final published copy of the Stockholm Declaration was centrally focused on the 
Holocaust (Shoah) or the mass murder of European Jewry, whilst simultaneously 
demonstrating an acknowledgment of the broader victims of Nazi atrocities as well as 
articulating the ‘universal’ ethical imperative to politically work to prevent genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the present:    
 
We, High Representatives of Governments at the Stockholm International Forum on the 
Holocaust, declare that: 
 
 1.  The Holocaust (Shoah) fundamentally challenged the foundations of civilization.  The 
 unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold universal meaning.  After half a 
 century, it remains an event close enough in time that survivors can still bear witness to the 
 horrors that engulfed the Jewish people.  The terrible suffering of the many millions of other 
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 victims of the Nazis has left an indelible scar across Europe as well. 
 
2.  The magnitude of the Holocaust, planned and carried out by the Nazis, must be forever seared 
in our collective memory.  The selfless sacrifices of those who defied the Nazis, and sometimes 
gave their own lives to protect or rescue the Holocaust’s victims, must also be inscribed in our 
hearts.  The depths of that horror, and the heights of their heroism, can be touchstones in our 
understanding of the human capacity for evil and for good. 
 
3.  With humanity still scarred by genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and 
xenophobia, the international community shares a solemn responsibility to fight those evils.  
Together we must uphold the terrible truth of the Holocaust against those who deny it.  We must 
strengthen the moral commitment of our peoples, and the political commitment of our 
governments, to ensure that future generations can understand the causes of the Holocaust and 
reflect upon its consequences. 
 
4.  We pledge to strengthen our efforts to promote education, remembrance and research about 
the Holocaust, both in those of our countries that have already done much and those that choose 
to join this effort. 
 
5.  We share a commitment to encourage the study of the Holocaust in all its dimensions.  We 
will promote education about the Holocaust in our schools and universities, in our communities 
and encourage it in other institutions. 
 
6.  We share a commitment to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust and to honor those 
who stood against it.  We will encourage appropriate forms of Holocaust remembrance, 
including an annual day of Holocaust Remembrance in our countries. 
 
7.  We share a commitment to throw light on the still obscured shadows of the Holocaust.  We 
will take all necessary steps to facilitate the opening of archives in order to ensure that all 
documents bearing on the Holocaust are available to researchers. 
 
 8.  It is appropriate that this, the first major international conference of the new millennium, 
 declares its commitment to plant the seeds of a better future amidst the soil of a bitter past.  We 
 empathize with the victims’ suffering and draw inspiration from their struggle.  Our commitment 
 must be to remember the victims who perished, respect the survivors still with us, and reaffirm 
 humanity’s common aspiration for mutual understanding and justice.19  
 
 
Mirroring the precedent set by the consensually accepted although non-binding 
Washington Principles on Nazi era looted art (1998), the Stockholm Declaration was 
“Adopted rather than signed” by the forty-six nations in attendance at the SIF 2000.  
This meant that the normative manifesto announced at Stockholm possessed the 
flexibility of “a voluntary declaration”, which needing no ratification by state legal 
bodies quickly became “the statement of intent” of the ITF.20  Despite the potential for 
tensions between the rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, broader Nazi atrocities 
and the more ‘universal’ aspirations of the Stockholm Declaration as well as the risk of 
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severe cleavages in the document’s implementation as a result of its flexibility, many 
commentators have perceived the Stockholm Declaration as a significant rallying point 
in encouraging Holocaust research, remembrance and education in different national 
contexts.  For example, Paul Levine, author of the Swedish publication Tell Ye Your 
Children (1997),  summarized the possible consequences of the SIF 2000 and the 
Stockholm Declaration in a CNN World Report broadcast on 13th February 2000:  
 
If it works, it will be like a stone on the water, it will create – have a ripple effect that the 
decision makers, the bureaucrats, the educational authorities, will go home to their countries and 
be convinced that, yes, this subject is important.  It needs to be supported in terms of education, 
in terms of research, in terms of remembrance.21   
 
From a different perspective, and specifically placing the convening of the SIF 2000 
within the European context, Jens Kroh, a German scholar has gone as far as to describe 
the significance of the Stockholm Declaration in the following words: 
 
The Stockholm Declaration can thus be conceived as the starting point for a new political 
interest to interpret the past and even regularize remembrance.  It is a very important step 
towards the formation of a European politics of history and for the international boom to 
commemorate negative pasts.  And coming to terms with such a negative past has almost turned 
into an informal criterion for accession to the European Union.22    
 
This thesis will excavate the causes of the SIF 2000 and the impact of the Stockholm 
Declaration in more depth.  As part of this analysis it will look at how the Stockholm 
Declaration’s objectives of promoting Holocaust research, remembrance and education 
was implemented in different international and national contexts; the degree to which it 
did indeed function as an “informal criterion for accession to the European Union”;23 
as well as the extent to which the Stockholm Declaration also encouraged state agencies 
to acknowledge broader Nazi atrocities and fight, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, 
                                                           
21
 Paul Levine quoted in CNN Transcript, ‘World Report: Stockholm International Forum Remembers 
Crimes of Nazism’ (http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0002/13/wr.03.html).  Accessed: 
16/08/2009. 
22
 Jens Kroh quoted during Symposium: 10 years with the Stockholm Declaration, 26 January 2010 





anti-Semitism and xenophobia”,24 in the first decade of the new millennium.  Finally, 
this thesis will also address a key intellectual and institutional context for understanding 
the historical lineage and broader political and cultural significance of the SIF 2000 and 
the ‘universalist’ rhetoric of the Stockholm Declaration.  Namely, the ideas that 
underpin ‘cosmopolitanism’ as a set of intellectual values and concepts which advocate 
human and minority rights, and which formed the seedbed for the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ 
interpretation of the SIF 2000 offered by social scientists, Daniel Levy and Natan 
Sznaider.   
 
However, this analysis of the historical causes, consequences and intellectual and 
institutional context for interpreting the SIF 2000 does not operate in an academic 
vacuum.  Rather it works in dialogue with a pre-existing literature on the Holocaust, 
collective memory studies and issues relating to the transnational.  Within this context, 
defining the differences between ‘history’ and ‘memory’ is crucial.  Namely, that 
whereas the academic practice of ‘history’ is concerned with trying to perform a 
detailed, critical and ‘objective’ reconstruction of past human events through archival 
and testimonial research; ‘memory’ is about how individuals as members of social 
groups such as the family, the cultural community, the religious congregation or the 
nation, perceive the past, often in order to fulfill collective social, political, religious or 
cultural needs and objectives in the present.25  Bearing these definitions in mind, the 
next section will show how HMM attempt’s to contribute something new to this pre-
existing literature on the Holocaust, collective memory and the transnational. 
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Collective Memory Studies of the Holocaust and the ‘Transnational Turn’ 
 
This thesis is also a companion piece to existing case studies on the ‘history’ of how 
national societies have attempted to politically and institutionally construct the public 
‘memory’ of the Holocaust since 1945.   These case studies have been written by among 
others, Steven Cooke, Tony Kushner and Andy Pearce on Britain;26 Hasia R. Diner on 
America,27 Dirk Moses on West Germany,28 Tom Segev on Israel,29 and Thomas C. Fox 
on the history of the remembrance of the Holocaust in the U.S.S.R. and in the post-
Communist states.30 These studies on the history of how societies have constructed the  
remembrance of the Holocaust often directly or implicitly draw on the ideas of the early 
twentieth century Durkheim inspired sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945) who 
argued that social frameworks of ‘collective memory’, are constructed by groupings 
such as the family, organized religion, class based affiliations and nation states.  
Furthermore, for Halbwachs these often ‘overlapping’ frameworks of collective 
memory are important because they play a key role in determining how socialized 
individuals remember or perceive the past.31   
 
This case study of the SIF 2000 will both build upon and depart from the ideas of 
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Halbwachs and many current national case studies on the historical construction of the 
social memory of the Holocaust, by focusing on how political and institutional 
developments at the international inter-state level have specifically impacted upon the 
institutional construction of the memory of the Holocaust at the national and local 
levels, as well as analyzing how different national social groups have perceived, 
responded or remained oblivious to international interventions in national and local 
forms of Holocaust memory work.  In short this thesis is concerned with analyzing what 
Claudio Fogu and Wulf Kansteiner have called the ‘institutional construction’ (through 
museum exhibitions, educational curricula and state memorial days) and diverse ‘public 
reception’ (in the print media, television and online press) of public forms of Holocaust 
memory work within nation-states who have ascribed to the Stockholm Declaration.32   
 
Whilst advocating the ideal that national societies should take responsibility for the 
remembrance of past atrocities, this case study of the inter-cultural institutional 
construction of Holocaust memory at the turn of the millennium, will mark an 
intervention in the current literature on the collective memory of the Holocaust in a 
number of key ways.  Firstly, while acknowledging the canonical importance and 
influence of many psychoanalytically infused collective memory studies such as 
Alexander and Margaret Mitscherlisch’s The Inability to Mourn (1967) and Henry 
Rousso’s, The Vichy Syndrome (1991),33 as well as maintaining that these 
psychoanalytic approaches can be particularly useful in analyzing the individual’s 
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response to trauma;34 this case study of Holocaust memory work in the international 
arena will rarely use psychoanalytically inspired grand narratives in order to explain the 
institutional construction of the collective memory of the Holocaust in different nation 
states since 1945.   
 
This is because these psychoanalytic narratives of the collective memory of the 
Holocaust have tended to suggest that the social memory of the Jewish Catastrophe was 
‘repressed’ by nation states and Jewish communities in the immediate post-war period 
before undergoing an ‘uncanny’ process of the ‘return of the repressed’ since the 1960s. 
However, HMM rejects this approach because the use of psychoanalytic grand 
narratives of ‘repression’ and ‘the return of the repressed’ within the global reach of this 
thesis might risk subordinating the diversity and complexity of regional, national, 
international and Diasporic dynamics in Holocaust commemoration since 1945 to meta-
narratives of  collective ‘pathology’, which a new historiography is suggesting bears 
little relation to the historical development of international inter-state restitution 
processes and Jewish communal responses to the Holocaust, particularly in the West 
since the Second World War.   
 
As a result,  in opposition to such diverse scholars as Peter Novick, Norman Finkelstein, 
Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider whose historical periodization broadly structurally 
reproduces  although does not reference psychoanalytic ‘repression’/ ‘return of the 
repressed’ narratives,35  HMM  is influenced by the current wave of memory studies 
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(Hasia R. Diner, Kirsten Fermaglich, Michael Marrus, Dirk Moses and Roni Stauber),36 
which does not perceive the period between 1945 and 1962 as largely marking an 
overwhelming ‘silence’ in relation to discussions of the lessons and legacies of the 
Jewish catastrophe and the Nazi past in America, Germany or Israel.  This 
historiography is particularly pertinent in relation to chapter one’s historical 
contextualization of admittedly inadequate Cold War precedents for the restitution 
campaigns of the 1990s, as well as chapter five’s analysis of post-1945 ‘cosmopolitan’ 
intellectual and institutional developments which can be seen as forming a key context 
for understanding the broader historical and political significance of the SIF 2000.  
Moreover, if the memory of the Holocaust was broadly ‘repressed’ in the Soviet bloc 
from the late 1940s until the 1980s, this arguably had less to do with a ‘collective 
unconscious’ and more to do with Soviet policies and the eventual liberalizing influence 
of Perestroika.37  As a result, this thesis will support Iwona Irwin-Zarecka’s opinion in 
relation to collective memory dynamics that, “…we are best advised to keep 
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psychological or psychoanalytic categories at bay and to focus rather on the social, 
political, and cultural factors at work.”38    
 
Secondly, in looking at how an international event such as the SIF 2000 has impacted 
upon the construction of Holocaust research, remembrance and education initiatives at 
the national and local levels this thesis also builds on a burgeoning literature which 
seeks to understand the construction of institutional forms of Holocaust commemoration 
within the nexus of contemporary international relationships or what Arjun Appaduri 
might describe as global inter-cultural ‘flows’.39  Most recently this has taken the form 
of Jens Kroh’s analysis of the ITF as a ‘transnational network public’ operating as a 
‘policy network’ between nation states affiliated with the ITF.40  This thesis will take 
Kroh’s transnational research forward by using oral history interviews with British 
delegates to the SIF 2000 and the ITF, in order to offer a distinctly British perspective 
on the lessons and legacies of the events of 2000.  In so doing, HMM will also be 
building upon Kushner and Pearce’s analyses of Holocaust memory in the UK,41 by 
more strongly foregrounding the role of global dynamics and inter-cultural ‘flows’ in 
contributing to developments such as the IWM’s ‘Holocaust Exhibition’, the 
establishment of UK Holocaust Memorial Day (UK HMD), as well as offering the first 
Anglophone analysis of Britain’s ITF ‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania. 
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Equally, in terms of the transnational turn in memory studies this analysis is also aware 
of Andreas Huyssen’s recent conceptualization of ‘screen memory’.  This is the 
Freudian inspired idea that local and national traumas are sometimes communicated 
through international discourses associated with the commemoration of the Holocaust, 
whilst at other times they can be potentially elided by claims emphasizing the non-
comparability of the Holocaust with other mass atrocities.42  For example, in Huyssen’s 
essay on Argentinean ‘collective memory’ of the desparecidos or the approximately 
30,000 citizens who were subjected to state terror under the Argentinean military 
dictatorship (1976-1983),43 Huyssen points to the use of titles such as Nunca Mas 
(‘Never Again’),44 as well as the Daniel Libeskind ‘Jewish Museum’ inspired design for 
the Monument to the Victims of State Terror in Buenos Aires;45 in order to suggest how 
phrases and visual codes conventionally associated with the commemoration of the 
Holocaust have been re-appropriated by other discourses which structure the 
contemporary remembrance of atrocity crimes and human rights violations.  In this way, 
Huyssen demonstrates how the return of the symbolic in architecture since the 1960s, 
has been used to simultaneously register collective memory tropes of social trauma and 
mourning, whilst negotiating the particularity of experience that communities endow to 
site-specific topographies of political repression, brutality and mass atrocity.46    
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Although this thesis will explore the extent to which the Stockholm Declaration’s 
discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ encouraged or limited the SIF 2000 and the 
ITF’s engagement with broader Nazi atrocity crimes and more recent instances of 
genocide, unlike Huyssen, this thesis will shy away from using psychoanalytically 
loaded binary terms such as the extent to which the representation of the Holocaust at 
the SIF 2000, ‘screened in’ or ‘screened out’ the awareness of other genocides and mass 
atrocities.  However, Huyssen is not alone in perceiving contemporary symbols of 
Holocaust commemoration as sometimes operating or alternatively being re-
appropriated as signs of transnational human rights agendas. For example, Jeffrey C. 
Alexander has utilized the deeply problematic rhetoric of ‘pollution’ in relation to the 
role of Holocaust remembrance in American public life, by describing the emergence of 
the representation of the Holocaust as a supra-territorial symbol of ‘moral 
universalism’.  For Alexander, the symbolism of the Holocaust acts as a kind of 
‘pollution’ impelling the United States to tackle its own shameful histories of what 
began as English settler colonial violence and became U.S government sanctioned 
atrocities against Native American Indians, acts of slavery and segregation against 
African Americans as well as American perpetrated human rights abuses during war-
time conflicts.47 Furthermore, building on this idea of the Holocaust as a symbol of 
‘moral universalism’ at the turn of the twenty-first century but applying this to a 
specifically European context, Helmut Dubiel has described the SIF 2000 as an attempt 
to utilize the symbolism of the Holocaust as a “European foundation myth” which in 
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“sublimating the Holocaust to an abstract concept releases the moral potential of its 
remembrance”.48   
 
Sharing certain similarities with Dubiel but from an altogether more political 
perspective, late historian, social democrat and controversial critic of Israel, Tony Judt 
(1948 - 2010) offered a far more politically orientated analysis and critique of the 
transnational significance and contemporary symbolism of the Holocaust in Europe.49 
First published in 2005, Judt argued in Post-War: A History of Europe since 1945 that 
after many years of inadequate redress by European governments, recent historical 
shifts have meant that, “Holocaust recognition is our contemporary European entry 
ticket.”50  Although Judt maintained that European nations recent confrontation with 
negative pasts remains, “…one of the unsung achievements and sources of European 
unity in recent decades”;51 he also argued that the political use of the memory of the 
Holocaust and its seeming ‘ubiquity’, especially in contemporary Western European 
societies is also potentially problematic because of, “…the danger of backlash”;52 as 
well as risking a new form of historical distortion based on, “…putting anti-Semitism at 
the centre of European history”;53 when for Judt it is only, “In retrospect, [that] 
‘Auschwitz is the most important thing to know about World War II.  But that is not how 
it seemed at the time.”54  Lastly, Judt also drew attention to what he saw as the 
fundamental ‘asymmetries’ at the heart of European memory politics between Western 
and Eastern Europe, owing to the fact that in the post-Soviet states, the public memory 
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of Communist atrocity crimes is often perceived to compete for public recognition with 
the remembrance of the Holocaust.  For Judt this means that, “Europe might be united, 
but European memory [has] remained deeply asymmetrical.”55  
 
Whilst Judt does not directly reference the SIF 2000 or the ITF, many of his 
observations are pertinent to the causes and consequences of the conference as well as 
the subsequent challenges faced by the ITF in the first decade of its existence, which 
will be explored in HMM.  This is because as sections on the founding and development 
of the ITF in chapters two and three will show, although the first leaders of the ITF 
were the Swedish, British and American governments as opposed to the leaders of 
specific European institutions, many prospective and new members of the ITF 
particularly after 2000, saw ITF ‘Liaison Projects’ and membership of the organization 
as a step towards gaining affiliation to Western bodies such as the EU and NATO.56  
Equally, in his histories of the Holocaust, co-author of the Stockholm Declaration 
(2000), Yehuda Bauer does centre anti-Semitism as the root cause of the Holocaust and 
perceives the Holocaust as an ‘unprecedented’ event residing at the core of both 
European and World history.57  Lastly, some of the projects that the ITF sponsors do 
meet resistance and backlash from ultra-nationalists in various European states, some of 
whom in Eastern and Central Europe as well as the Baltic States particularly resent what 
is perceived as the ‘secondary’ status accorded to the crimes of Communism, a 
phenomenon of ‘competitive victimhood’ that will be explored in more detail in chapter 
four’s analysis of the political background for the British/Lithuanian ITF ‘Liaison 
Project’.   
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However, the analysis found in HMM will also nuance and supplement Judt’s 
interpretation of the centrality of the memory of the Holocaust to European identity 
after the Cold War in two key ways.  Firstly, it will be shown in chapters one and two 
on the historical background for the establishment of the ITF and the convening of the 
SIF 2000, that far from naively stimulating nationalist backlash, the ITF and the SIF 
2000 were self-consciously organized to try and proactively battle forms of ultra-
nationalist backlash through the support of indigenous forms of Holocaust research, 
remembrance and education, particularly in post-Soviet states, where the public 
presence of the Holocaust was sometimes far from ubiquitous.  Thus, the early founders 
of the ITF and the SIF 2000 had a self-perception of themselves as part of the ongoing 
liberal educational ‘solution’ to the problems posed by distortive post-Soviet 
historiographies and ultra-nationalist hostility to Holocaust remembrance, as opposed to 
part of the inadvertent stimulation of indigenous forms of nationalist ‘backlash’ that 
Judt has ascribed to certain types of politically motivated Holocaust remembrance.  
Secondly, if Holocaust recognition has become central to European membership in 
political terms, then it is highly ironic that European institutional support of Holocaust 
restitution and remembrance during the 1990s and early noughties, by transnational 
bodies such as the EU, has often been ambivalent and contradictory.  This phenomenon 
will be explored in more depth as part of chapter five’s critique of the ‘New 
Cosmopolitan’ interpretation of the SIF 2000.58   
HMM  
In substantiating these research findings, this thesis will be divided into five chapters 
and will use official documents, oral history interviews, relevant press reports as well as 
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pre-existing scholarly literature on the history, social remembrance and institutional and 
intellectual context for the SIF 2000.  Chapter one will focus on the immediate 
historical, political and cultural causes of the establishment of the Living History 
Project (1997), the ITF (1998) and the subsequent convening of the SIF 2000 by the 
Swedish government.  It will show that whilst the inadequacies of Maastricht and the 
return of genocide to the European continent were important factors, the specific choice 
of the Jewish catastrophe as the central subject of the work of the ITF and the SIF 2000 
was also the result of a number of particular challenges and opportunities posed to 
Holocaust research, remembrance and education during the 1990s.  These included the 
conviction expressed by commentators such as Eizenstat that alongside other victim 
groups and in the wake of restitution campaigns in relation to the Third Reich, 
“…money ought not to be the last memory of the Holocaust”;59 whilst liberal concerns 
had also been raised by the Europe-wide threat posed to Holocaust remembrance by 
resurgent forms of populist and far-right wing politics, ethno-nationalism and Holocaust 
denial.  Finally, chapter one will also tentatively suggest that while building on 
important Cold War precursors, the groundwork for the ITF and the SIF 2000 was also 
facilitated by an intensifying sense of intercultural cooperation in the institutional 
construction of some important Holocaust commemoration and education initiatives 
since the dismantling of Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
Building on the reasons for the founding of the ITF explained in chapter one and against 
the backdrop of events such as the Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets 
(1998) and NATO military intervention in Kosovo (1999), chapter two will delineate 
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Bauer’s notion of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ as well as the institutional policy 
discussions and decision-making within the ITF which directly influenced the 
convening of the SIF 2000 and the launch of the ITF’s ‘Liaison Projects’.  As this thesis 
is also concerned with the relationship between developments in the institutions of 
Holocaust memory work at the international level and their impact on the national and 
local levels, this chapter will also summarize how the SIF 2000 was perceived in the 
American, British and Israeli media; how the conference was used as a platform by 
some speakers to raise awareness of broader Nazi atrocities, other genocides and human 
rights abuses; as well as noting the event’s omissions.  Finally, in a further effort to 
provide a specific example of the relationship between the transnational, the national 
and the regional, this chapter will also look at how one particular element which 
corresponded with the Stockholm project, namely the launch of UK HMD was received 
in the British press and what questions and controversies it stimulated in the British 
public at large.   
 
Concerned with analyzing the legacies of the events described in chapter two, chapter 
three will focus on critically evaluating the direct consequences of the SIF 2000 and 
efforts by its organizers at implementing the objectives of the Stockholm Declaration in 
promoting Holocaust research, remembrance and education globally as well as 
acknowledging the broader victims of Nazi atrocity crimes and encouraging political 
efforts to prevent, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and 
xenophobia.”60  With these objectives in mind, this chapter is split into two main 
sections.  The first part concerns assessing the international impact of subsequent 
Stockholm International Forums on ‘Combating Intolerance’ (2001), ‘Truth, Justice and 
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Reconciliation’ (2002) and ‘Preventing Genocide’ (2004), whilst the second part is 
focused on providing an overview of the work of the ITF during the first decade of its 
existence as well as illustrating the practical implications of Bauer’s discourse of 
Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’.   This evaluation will demonstrate that whilst the 
subsequent SIFs and the ITF had their notable and important successes, in terms of the 
SIF 2000’s more ‘universalistic’ aspirations to promote the prevention of genocide, a 
number of limitations were apparent particularly in relation to Darfur and the Congo.   
 
Whilst chapter three is particularly keen to focus on these more ‘universalistic’ issues, 
chapter four is concerned with providing a specific intercultural case study of the ITF’s 
efforts to promote Holocaust research, remembrance and education through ITF 
‘Liaison Projects’, a type of policy that is introduced and discussed in detail in chapter 
two.  Whilst there have been many ITF ‘Liaison Projects’, each meriting scholarly 
attention and all with specific outcomes, this analysis of the causes and consequences of 
the British/Lithuanian ITF ‘Liaison Project’ (2000-2003) will analyze the political and 
cultural struggles facing Holocaust research, remembrance and education in Lithuania; 
the elements comprising the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’; the impact of this 
initiative as well as tentatively looking at the extent to which the adoption of the 
Stockholm Declaration in this context was perceived in Judt’s mode of thinking and 
Kroh’s words as an, “informal criterion for accession to the European Union.”61 
 
If chapter three focuses on the consequences of the SIF 2000 in terms of the work of the 
ITF and the subsequent Stockholm conferences and chapter four looks at the 
intercultural legacies of the conference in terms of the ITF’s British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison 
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Project’, then chapter five explores the key context of ‘cosmopolitanism’, or 
intellectuals and institutions which advocate human and minority rights, for 
understanding the broader historical and political significance of the SIF 2000 and the 
‘universalist’ rhetoric of the Stockholm Declaration on the Holocaust  to work towards 
the prevention of present day and future forms of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, 
anti-Semitism and xenophobia.”62   
 
In line with this, the first part of chapter five will look at the theoretical ideas and 
organizational developments  underlying ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual  and institutional 
responses to the legacies of Nazi atrocity crimes since 1945, and as part of this 
examination, will pose the challenging question as to whether Bauer’s concept of 
Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, which will have already been discussed in detail in 
chapters two and three, can also be comprehended within this framework of 
‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual traditions which are associated with thinkers such as Karl 
Jaspers, Raphael Lemkin, Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas.  Then the second part 
of this chapter will use the pre-existing primary and secondary literature on 
‘cosmopolitanism’ in order to analyze in detail one of the most prominent 
interpretations of the political and historical significance of the SIF 2000, namely,  the 
‘New Cosmopolitan’ reading of the events of 2000 offered by the social scientists Levy 
and Sznaider.   Lastly, and against the backdrop of HMM’s history of the causes and 
consequences of the SIF 2000, the third part of this chapter will take a critical look at 
the historical and political problems that are presented by Levy and Sznaider’s 
understanding of the symbolism of the Holocaust at the SIF 2000 in their ‘New 
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Cosmopolitan’ treatise, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age.63   
 
Sources and Methodology  
 
Aside from the pre-existing critical literature on ‘cosmopolitanism’ as well as the 
writings of ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers such as Jaspers, Lemkin, Arendt and Habermas as 
well as ‘New Cosmopolitans’ Beck, Levy and Sznaider, a number of published and un-
published, primary and secondary sources have been used in the research process for 
this history of the causes, consequences and intellectual and institutional context for 
understanding the SIF 2000.  The first key published primary source used throughout 
this thesis is the documentation of the speeches and presentations made at the four 
Stockholm conferences (2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004).  This documentation is available 
from an online archive administered by the Swedish government.64 However, it can also 
be accessed from a CD-Rom sourcebook of essays and interviews entitled, Beyond the 
Never Agains, which is edited by Eva Fried and published by the Swedish government.  
This book is available in some libraries internationally and can also be requested from 
Sweden’s Living History Forum.65   
 
In chapters one and two, other important published primary documents include the 
proceedings of the Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets (WCHA, 1998), a 
source which can be accessed online or purchased from the U.S State Department 
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archives,66 as well as a book containing the full documentation of the London 
Conference on Nazi Gold (LCNG, 1997).67  In relation to these events, Stuart E. 
Eizenstat’s memoir, Imperfect Justice is also used to provide a personal perspective on 
the restitution campaigns of the 1990s, although this is from the position of the interests 
of the Clinton administration.68 In order to counter-balance and contextualize this 
personal agenda, literature by restitution scholars such as Elazar Barkan, Michael 
Marrus and Michael Bazyler is also used as well as critical articles from journals, 
newspapers and magazines such as Commentary, The Forward and The Jerusalem 
Report. 69     
 
In terms of chapters two, three and four another key published source, particularly in 
terms of providing a reliable guide to the chronological development of the ITF and the 
organization’s major achievements in the first decade of its existence is Bitte Wallinn 
and Michael Newman’s edited history The Task Force for International Cooperation on 
Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book 
(2009).70  This source is also particularly useful in cross-referencing the veracity of 
basic information such as dates and major organizational events which are also 
chronicled in more detail complete with internal institutional debates in online ITF 
meeting minutes for the years, 1998-2007.  Alongside official speeches, education 
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reports and press releases, these unpublished meeting minutes were available for public 
viewing and download on the ITF’s official website in the summer of 2008.71  However, 
unlike the speeches, education reports and press releases, these minutes were removed 
whilst the ITF website was being updated in 2009 and are now no longer available to 
the public.  As a result, these minutes have been used cautiously to illustrate the internal 
organizational debates and diversity of opinions within the various national delegations 
which comprised the ITF during the first few years of its existence.  Furthermore, it 
should be noted that any critique offered in this thesis is done in the spirit of 
constructively contributing to the ongoing work of the ITF.    
 
Other key unpublished sources include a summary of the 7th May 1998 founding 
meeting of the ITF as well as a British report on an ITF advisory visit to Lithuania’a 
Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum in 2003.72 Furthermore, in terms of the 
British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, use has been made of a folder of letters, e-mails 
and reports archived at London’s IWM under the title Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office: International Task Force for Holocaust Commemoration, September 1998 – 
July 2002.73  However, whilst these primary unpublished sources are crucial in 
illuminating how institution’s attempt to construct the memory of the Holocaust, these 
sources also have their drawbacks.  For as Rodney Lowe has noted official government 
and institutional records such as public speeches, reports and organizational minutes 
cannot function as the last word on analyzing policy making because they sometimes 
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omit vital details, change form in relation to institutional developments and are written 
with a deliberate private or public agenda in mind.74   
 
It is to counter-balance these limitations that these sources will be contextualized, 
analyzed and cross-referenced in relation to the pre-existing critical literature on the 
social remembrance of the Holocaust in various national contexts.  Furthermore, 
although speeches, reports and meeting minutes tell the historian about institutional 
dynamics, agendas, and actions, they rarely illuminate the public reception of efforts to 
institutionally construct Holocaust memory nor do they excavate in any depth the 
thoughts and motivations of the makers of Holocaust memory at the institutional level.  
As a result, in an effort to gain insights into how events such as the SIF 2000 and the 
announcement of UK HMD were received by the media and the public in different 
nations, use has been made of a sample of Anglophone newspaper columns and ‘letters’ 
pages, online press reports, magazine articles and television transcripts from America 
(CNN, Commentary, The Forward, The New York Times and The Washington Post), 
Israel (Haaretz, The Jerusalem Post and The Jerusalem Report) and the United 
Kingdom (The BBC, The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Jewish 
Chronicle, New Statesman, The Sun and The Times).   
 
Some of these news providers such as The BBC, The New York Times, The Washington 
Post, The Jerusalem Report and CNN have been selected because they are 
representatives of high profile sources of world reportage for both a national and 
international audience; others such as America’s The Forward and Britain’s The Jewish 
Chronicle cater for more specifically Jewish audiences.  Finally, the publications and 
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articles selected also represent a diverse political spectrum of views and opinions.  For 
example, in relation to the announcement of UK HMD, British newspaper responses 
will be shown to vary from the centre-left (The Daily Mirror, The Guardian, The Sun) 
to the centre-right (The Daily Mail, The Times, The Daily Telegraph) and the space in-
between (The Independent),75 as well as traversing the divide between more serious 
broadsheets (The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Times) to more 
populist tabloids (The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, The Sun).  Admittedly, whilst this 
sample of publications only encompasses responses to the conference available in 
English and covers only a limited number of countries affected by the SIF 2000, as well 
as ultimately reflecting the attitudes of the most prominent opinion-makers and self-
selecting members of the public; they nonetheless remain a useful starting point in 
providing an awareness of how developments in Holocaust memory work at the 
international level are mediated to and received by various national societies.  For as 
historian John Tosh has noted, albeit in terms which too easily suggest a unified 
Zeitgeist as opposed to the divisions, contradictions and pluralities that animate public 
debates in contemporary democracies; whilst tabloids and newspapers might ultimately 
reproduce, “…what was considered to be fit for public consumption”,76 they are also 
useful for historians in that they provide, “…valuable insights into the mentality of the 
age.”77  
 
Furthermore, it is to provide a more detailed and personal insight into the responses of 
those present at the SIF 2000 that oral history interviews have been conducted with a 
cross-section of primarily British delegates to the conference, each selected as a 
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representative of a particular sector of Holocaust research, remembrance or education.78  
For example, Suzanne Bardgett is the curator of the Holocaust and ‘Crimes against 
Humanity’ exhibits at the IWM, London.  Professor David Cesarani is a leading 
Holocaust Studies academic in the United Kingdom and the United States.  Dr. Ben 
Helfgott is a spokesman for the British Jewish community as well as a survivor of the 
Nazi concentration camps at Buchenwald, Schlieben and Theresienstadt.  Professor Paul 
Levine is the co-author of Tell Ye Your Children,79 and an expert in Swedish responses 
to the Holocaust at Uppsala University, Sweden. Finally, Dr. Stephen Smith is a leading 
Holocaust educationalist and co-founder of the Holocaust Centre, Beth Shalom and the 
Aegis Trust for Genocide Prevention.  All of these interviewees have also been involved 
in the ITF’s project at some stage of its development, and when interviewed in 2009, 
Smith and Helfgott continued to be regular attendees at ITF meetings.  
 
Each of these interviews was subject to the planning, recording, transcribing and 
informed consent model of interviewing discussed at the course ‘Interviewing for 
Researchers’ (Senate House, London, 5th June 2008) and led  by Michael Kandiah, 
Director of the Oral History Program at the University of London’s Institute of 
Historical Research.80  Many of these interviewing techniques are also outlined in an 
alternative format in Valerie Raleigh Yow’s, Recording Oral History: A Practical 
Guide for Social Scientists.81  One of the techniques learnt on this course included the 
importance of preparing pre-interview questions, which were then tailored to the 
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interviewee in question as well as to the spontaneous demands of the interviewing 
moment.  Moreover, in order to ensure ethical practice, interviewees were presented 
with an informed consent form and could stipulate their conditions of participating in 
the project.  For example, Bardgett requests that she see how her oral history material is 
used prior to its official publication in academic journal articles and commercial books. 
 
Clearly, the strength of oral history interviews in giving a personal account of historical 
events which can now only be reconstructed in documents is also a source of their 
weakness in that they also articulate the fluctuations in memory and specific agenda and 
self-justification of each interviewee.  In this respect the sample of interviewees in this 
study is biased towards the British perspective on the events of 2000, although given 
more research time there are still other British representatives who could be interviewed 
such as former Education Director at the Spiro Institute, Trudy Gold and survivor of 
Auschwitz, Kitty Hart Moxon.  For these reasons this thesis does not claim to be the 
final word on the causes, consequences and intellectual and institutional context for 
understanding the SIF 2000.   Rather it is a British intervention in an international 
dialogue in which there are still plural histories to be written and a diversity of voices to 






“Money ought not to be the last memory of the 
Holocaust” 
 The Historical Context for the SIF 2000 
 
Whilst bearing in mind the importance of the reaction against Maastricht and the return 
of genocide to the European continent as important circumstances shaping the 
institutional convening of the SIF 2000, this chapter will delineate three factors which 
help to historically explain why the subject of Holocaust Education, Remembrance and 
Research was the central focus of the SIF 2000. The first factor relates to the cumulative 
impact of the Holocaust and Nazi era restitution campaigns of the 1990s and the belief 
articulated by Eizenstat, “that money ought not to be the last memory of the Holocaust, 
or of the slave and forced labor issues, but a sense of coming to terms with 
responsibility.”1  The second examines fears raised among liberal and social democratic 
politicians, such as the Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Persson at the extent of popular 
ignorance about the Holocaust as well as the rise of the far right and Holocaust denial in 
the 1990s and the relationship of these developments to the founding of the Living 
History campaign in 1997, the Swedish precursor to the ITF.  Finally, the third section 
tentatively proposes that whilst forms of international co-operation in Holocaust 
memory work forwarded by the ITF at the SIF 2000 may have been radically new in 
terms of the sheer scale of government involvement, in other respects these 
developments were vitally facilitated by intercultural patterns in Holocaust education 
and memorialization in the decades directly preceding the SIF 2000. 
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Restitution in the 1990s  
 
This section will outline the key developments and debates surrounding Holocaust 
restitution in the 1990s and the way in which these contributed to the political 
environment that facilitated the convening of the SIF 2000.  The restitution campaigns 
of the 1990s, which also included negotiations for the compensation of foreign workers 
who were pressed into service as forced and slave labor in Germany and the Nazi 
occupied territories,2 made nations aware that they had an obligation to take 
responsibility for historical injustices committed during the Second World War as well 
as a duty to mitigate the effects of national backlash against restitution campaigns by 
educating their respective publics about the Third Reich and its collaborators atrocity 
crimes.  Within this context, some of those involved in the restitution process such as 
Eizenstat and commentators such as Yisrael Gutman increasingly began to feel that the 
last word about the Holocaust and Nazi atrocities should not be about money but rather 
the respectful and appropriate memorialization of the victims of the Third Reich and its 
collaborators.  This awareness facilitated international political support for Persson’s 
launch of the ITF in 1998 and the subsequent convening of the SIF 2000.   
 
The movement for Holocaust restitution in the 1990s did not occur in a political and 
economic vacuum, but rather at a time when as cultural studies scholar, Barkan has 
noted, “beginning at the end of World War II, and quickening since the end of the Cold 
War, questions of morality and justice are receiving growing attention as political 
questions.  As such, the need for restitution to past victims has become a major part of 
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national politics and international diplomacy.”3   Post-Second World War political 
dynamics such as the growth of civil rights movements and decolonization meant that 
far from being an isolated instance of reparative justice, the political and grass-roots 
pressure for Holocaust restitution in the 1990s needs to be perceived within a broader 
global context of social movements for post-facto justice for victims of state sanctioned 
atrocity including war crimes, genocide and colonialism. For example, in relation to the 
Second World War, these developments have included the U.S congress’s passing of 
the Civil Liberties Act (1988) which facilitated the compensation of Japanese 
Americans that had been interned by the U.S government in the wake of Pearl Harbor,4 
as well as renewed pressure on Japan to make amends for its war-time atrocities, 
including the treatment of ‘Comfort Women’, or those East Asian (primarily Korean) 
and sometimes European women who were coerced into organized brothels for the 
Japanese military between 1931 and 1945.5   
 
Equally, scholars such as Marrus and Barkan have also noted the importance as a 
historical precedent for restitution in the 1990s that as part of West Germany’s 
reintegration into NATO under the chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer, the country 
ratified a reparations deal with Israel via the Jewish umbrella organization, the 
Conference of Jewish Material Claims against Germany (Claims Conference) in 1953.6  
Demonstrating the legal, diplomatic and ‘top-down’ nature of reparations negotiations 
in the 1950s,7 reaching this agreement was nonetheless, not without its public 
controversies, least of all in Israel.  The right-wing led by Menachem Begin accused the 
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Mapai government headed by David Ben Gurion of dealing in German ‘blood money’, 
whilst opponents of Begin described his mass street demonstrations as ‘fascist’.8  This 
dispute reached a crescendo during an Israeli Knesset session in January 1952, when 
street protests became so violent that the safety of Knesset representatives was 
jeopardized.9    
 
However, the result of the eventual settlement in 1953 was that over a period of 
approximately fifty years the German government paid over 100 billion Deutschmarks 
to Jewish and some non-Jewish victims of the Third Reich.10  Equally, owing to 
pressure emanating from the U.S government and American Jewish groups, Austria 
issued seven restitution laws to deal with property seized from Jews between 1946 and 
1949,11 whilst a Swiss law of 1962 ordered that the country’s banks audit their dormant 
accounts and restitute assets to owners and heirs within the next decade.  Indeed, 
Marrus has observed that the historical significance of these Cold War settlements, 
particularly the 1953 German case, should not be underestimated: 
…whatever the shortcomings of these agreements, and there were plenty, these were hardly seen 
at the time, and nor should they be seen now, as involving mere token payments, based on an 
evasion of responsibility.  Rather, the sums involved were huge, unprecedented, based on 
innovative legal principles, and often considered by the Americans who viewed the West 
Germans as their Cold War protégés, as pressing against the limits of what their new ally would 
be able to pay.12     
 
However, as Marrus notes despite these important achievements, this reparative justice 
and restitution for victims of Nazism in Western Europe during the Cold War was also 
largely inadequate.  This was because these settlements often did not cover payments 
for many other victims of Nazi atrocities including forced and slave laborers, Roma and 
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Sinti, homosexuals, the disabled and Jehovah’s Witnesses,13 whilst Austrian legislation 
was characterized by loopholes, unsympathetic administrators and short time frames for 
the processing of claims.14  Finally, although Swiss banks had found 10 million Swiss 
Francs in approximately 1000 inactive Jewish bank accounts in the decade between 
1964 and 1973, approximately 7000 claims had been processed and rejected.15  This 
was partly because Swiss banking rules were often saturated with bureaucratic 
intransigence.  As a consequence, relatives of Holocaust victims were often required to 
fulfill emotionally wrenching and impossible criteria such as producing documentation 
like death certificates if they wanted to access the accounts of their relatives.16  For 
example, when Romanian survivor and post-war U.S. citizen, Greta Beer was searching 
for the Swiss bank account of her father, Siegfried Deligdisch, one Swiss bank 
requested precise, “details of her father’s death, whether by violence or natural causes, 
even asking if he died with a gun to his head.”17  As a result, in America, Western 
Europe and Israel, it would only be with the increasing presence of the American class 
action legal process; the accelerated globalization of mergers and acquisitions within the 
banking economy; as well as post-Cold War political shifts which encouraged 
revitalized confrontations with the Nazi past, that these issues would once again be 
addressed in the decade directly preceding the SIF 2000.  
 
Furthermore, if there were serious issues surrounding the effectiveness of reparation and 
restitution in the West following the settlements of the 1950s and 1960s, compensation 
and restitution for Jewish victims of Nazi crimes in the Soviet bloc was even more 
acutely hampered by the Cold War political and institutional context.  By the late 1940s, 
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leaders in the Soviet Union had decided that social cohesion in the U.S.S.R and its 
empire would be better aided by an inclusive narrative of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ as 
opposed to the specific suffering of Jews under Nazism, a tragedy which raised the 
contentious issue of local collaboration with the Third Reich in states such as Latvia, 
Lithuania, Ukraine and Belorussia.18  The result of this Communist ideological 
landscape in the Eastern bloc was that Soviet Jews rarely received public recognition or 
compensation for their losses engendered during the Second World War.   
 
For example, in East Germany, scholars such as Thomas C. Fox, Jeffrey Herf and Bill 
Niven have shown that Communists initially refused the necessity of Jewish 
compensation altogether, whilst a dual set of categories was established which 
discriminated against Jewish material claims.19  Communists were ‘Fighters Against 
Fascism’ whereas Jews were classified as ‘Victims of Fascism’.  Even Jewish members 
of the resistance were not always given the status of ‘Fighter’.20  Furthermore, an East 
German scholar, Helmut Eschwege has uncovered evidence of East German Jews in the 
1950s who attempted to recover property that had been seized by the Nazis.  They were 
informed that because they were categorized as ‘passive’ and non-political as opposed 
to ‘antifascists’, they were disqualified from individual reimbursement.  In these 
instances, property stolen by the Nazis was either taken over by the East German Soviet 
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state or distributed to non-Jewish residents.  The result of this was that many East 
German Jews attempted to escape to West Germany which held the possibility of 
material payments for losses suffered.21 Although East German Jews as ‘Victims of 
Fascism’ were entitled to higher pensions, early retirement, housing and educational 
benefits, and by the 1980s, East Germany supported the renovation of synagogues and 
the upkeep of Jewish cemeteries, these minuscule gains were considered insufficient for 
the assets that Jewish communities had forcibly relinquished to the Nazi and 
Communist regimes.22 
 
Despite complaints from some American Jewish individuals and organizations about 
Soviet policies towards its Jewish populations during the Cold War,23 it was not until 
the 1990s and whilst working as a member of the United States Mission to the European 
Union under the auspices of the Clinton administration (1993-2001), that Eizenstat was 
given the mandate, “…to encourage the return of property confiscated from religious 
communities by the Nazis and then nationalized by Eastern European Communist 
governments.”24  Eizenstat’s remit coincided with the broader restitution battles being 
played out as post-Soviet states attempted to deal with the immediate legacies of 
Communism which included the distribution of property that had been nationalized 
under the Soviet system.25  Most radically, this took the form of a voucher system in 
Czechoslovakia whereby citizens could utilize coupons to bid for the tenure of certain 
government companies.  Other countries such as Poland used a lottery method to 
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distribute government businesses,26 whilst “Hungary offered victims vouchers pegged 
to the old value of the properties, which could then be used to buy any state property 
that was put up for auction.”27  Mixing restitution with privatization these policies often 
strengthened the middle-classes and sought to facilitate the move towards Western 
capitalist social and economic systems.  Furthermore, the Roman Catholic Church 
received compensation, particularly extensive property restitution in Poland where the 
church had become synonymous with Solidarity, anti-Communist resistance and Polish 
national identity in the immediate post-Cold War period.28        
 
As evidenced by these examples, post-Communist governments initially focused their 
attention on restitution that strengthened both national cohesion and the transition to 
capitalism.29  However, in these states there was also the question of restitution to 
minority groups who had suffered serious human rights violations and forcibly lost 
communal and individual property during the carnage of the Second World War and the 
ensuing nationalization of property by Communist regimes.  These groups included 
Jews, Roma, minority Hungarian populations in Slovakia and Romania as well as most 
contentiously the losses of the Sudeten Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia and 
Poland at the end of World War II.30  To address the specific question of Jewish losses 
in Central and Eastern Europe, Jewish organizations built on the precedent established 
with West Germany in the 1950s.  Desiring state and public recognition of Jewish 
                                                           
26
 Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, pp. 127-128; William R. Youngblood, ‘Poland’s Struggle for a 
Restitution Policy in the 1990s’, Emory International Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 645-647.   
Beata Pasek, ‘Returning Seized Property Proving Difficult in Post-Communist Poland’, Associated Press, 
16 March 1999. 
27
 Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, p. 128. 
28
 Ibid., p. 123. 
29
 Beata Pasek, ‘Polish Citizenship the Main Criterion for Property Restitution’, Associated Press, 23 
March 1999. 
30
 Mark Cornwall, ‘National Reparation? The Czech Land Reform and the Sudetan Germans, 1918-1938’, 
Slavonic and East European Review, No. 75 (1997), pp. 259-280; Timothy W. Ryback, ‘Sudetenland: 
Hostages to History’, Foreign Policy, No. 105 (December 1996), pp. 162-178. 
52 
 
suffering, the primary aims of Jewish reparation and restitution in the post-Soviet states 
became firstly, material assistance for Holocaust survivors, secondly, to revive 
decimated Jewish neighborhoods through the return of communal assets and finally, to 
provide assistance for individuals who were trying to reclaim personal properties that 
had been forcibly requisitioned under Nazi and/or Soviet domination.31    
 
These restitution negotiations in Central and Eastern Europe involved President of the 
World Jewish Congress (WJC) and Canadian billionaire, Edgar Bronfman, who became 
a pivotal player in a series of diplomatic negotiations which claimed to represent both 
the Israeli government and Eastern European Jews living in America.  Within this 
context, the non-governmental World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJRO) was set-
up in 1992 to investigate national laws, restitution cases and co-ordinate arbitration on 
the behalf of governments and the relevant members of the Jewish communities 
involved.32  Bronfman was assisted in his negotiations by WJRO co-chairman and 
Jewish Agency leader, Avraham Burg, WJRO Deputy Chairman, Holocaust survivor 
and former Israeli Consul General of New York, Naphtali Lavie as well as Bronfman’s 
top aide, the Orthodox rabbi and political science university lecturer, Israel Singer.33    
 
By 1997, the WJRO was conducting restitution meetings with nineteen European 
nations.34  Eizenstat was also involved in mediating many of the deals that were 
eventually reached with Central and Eastern European countries such as Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic.  One of the first reparation and restitution agreements 
was reached with Hungary in the summer of 1996, a country whose ex-Communist 
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government had renounced anti-Semitism in 1994, and which housed the most Jews 
between France and the Ukraine (80,000 – 100,000 Jewish citizens).35  The hub of this 
restitution plan comprised support for survivors and welfare for the Hungarian Jewish 
community as well as a government pledge to set up a foundation that would distribute 
compensation vouchers, artworks and real estate.36  Moreover, by 1997, Hungary had 
also founded a $21 million pension endowment for the country’s 30,000 survivors.37 
Further settlements were also negotiated in Poland and the Czech Republic.  For 
example, restitution of communal Jewish property in the Czech Republic began in 1990 
whilst legislation facilitating the restitution of Jewish religious property in Poland was 
ratified in 1997, although the restitution of Jewish and non-Jewish private property in 
Poland remains a contested issue.38   
 
Like Germany in the 1950s, efforts at Jewish compensation were widely perceived by 
the international community as part of the post-Soviet states push for NATO and EU 
membership.39  However, these restitution agreements in post-Soviet Europe have 
neither been unproblematic nor without accompanying controversies.  Divisions 
between the interests of the WJRO and local Jewish communities dogged negotiations 
in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland.  For example, in 1997 the WJRO protested 
against, “…a proposed Polish law that would return communal property confiscated by 
the Nazis and then the Communists to Poland’s tiny remnant Jewish community.”40  
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The WJRO perceived the proposed bill as an attempt by the Polish government to 
pacify its small national Jewish community with minimum restitution.  Claiming to 
represent the international interests of Diaspora Polish Jewry, the WJRO instead stated 
that almost 7000 expropriated communal buildings should be returned.  Epitomizing 
these conflicted relations between Polish Jewry and the WJRO, Stanislaw Krajewski,41 
a Polish Jewish intellectual and leader of Warsaw’s Jewish Forum at the time of the 
restitution controversies objected:  
 
It’s convenient to say that there’s no Jewish community here.  The more true that is, the easier it 
is for the WJRO to represent us.  But there is a community and it gets stronger every year.42     
 
 
The heated debates between the WJRO and the local Jewish community in Poland were 
repeated with national variations in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
These disagreements often hinged on the fact that the WJRO claimed to speak in the 
name of Diaspora survivors and perceived its’ role as the legitimate heir in distributing 
restitution settlements, whilst some members of indigenous Jewish communities in 
Central and Eastern Europe protested that they would rather negotiate directly with their 
national governments.  Many also feared that the enormous restitution demands of the 
WJRO risked provoking right-wing ethno-nationalist backlash and popular resentment 
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in the post-Soviet states.43  An example of the materialization of these fears would be 
the fact that in the run-up to the 1997 restitution legislation, Polish state apologies for 
anti-Semitic pogroms in the wake of the Second World War met with ethno-nationalist 
backlash from the President of the American Polish Congress, Edward Moskal, who 
criticized the Polish government of, “excessive submissiveness to Jewish demands.”44  
The result of this tense situation was that although the WJRO had been contractually 
empowered to negotiate on the behalf of Central and Eastern European Jewry in various 
nations, this representation was far from uncontested.  Lavie accused Polish Jews of 
twice trying to withdraw from their agreement with the WJRO whilst the Hungarian 
Jewish community consented to co-operate with the WJRO but forbade the body from 
speaking on its behalf.  Peter Feldmayer, President of the Hungarian Jewish Community 
even went as far as saying that, “Each country is different, but the WJRO looks at all 
countries as being one problem.  Naphtali Lavie treats us like a dictator.”45   
 
However, perhaps the deepest divisions were evident in the Czech Republic where 
Jewish community leaders refused to sign an agreement with the WJRO.  Czech 
community leaders and the WJRO fundamentally disagreed over the amount of 
confiscated Jewish property to seek restitution for.  Czech Jews sought 202 buildings 
whilst the WJRO put the figure at a bare minimum of 1000.  Tomas Kraus, director of 
the Czech Jewish Community argued that the WJRO estimate was inaccurate because it 
included properties that had been sold prior to World War II, whilst Lavie argued that 
the Czech number was too low because it did not figure into the calculation the real 
estate on which razed Jewish properties had once been present.46  These tensions over 
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the restitution of communal property reached boiling point when Lavie started 
negotiations with the Czech government without liaising with local Jewish leaders first.       
 
Compounding these divisions between the WJRO and Czech Jewry,47 restitution of 
Jewish property in the Czech Republic has also suffered from both the indifference of 
Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus (1992-1997) as well as political fears within the nation 
that successful Jewish restitution might inadvertently encourage the territorial claims of 
the Sudeten Germans, even though Jewish advocates have emphasized the 
distinctiveness as opposed to the comparability of post-Holocaust issues and the 
Sudeten case.  For these reasons a more comprehensive government bill outlining the 
restitution of Jewish property was defeated in 1994.48   As a result, although the Czech 
Jewish community was supported in its claims by Czech Republic President Václav 
Havel (1993-2003),49 and although it benefitted from two restituted synagogues and a 
cemetery at the heart of Prague’s frequently visited Jewish Quarter, the vast majority of 
Czech restituted Jewish properties have little commercial worth whilst funding for the 
small Jewish community of 4000 is largely sustained by one cash rich property in 
Prague.50  
 
However, despite or perhaps because of the shortcomings and controversies of many of 
these settlements, it can be tentatively proposed that the renewed emphasis on 
restitution issues and Jewish cultural heritage in the former Soviet bloc, was an 
important factor in making the SIF 2000 and the ITF’s focus on Holocaust research, 
remembrance and education relevant to Western, Central and Eastern European states at 
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the turn of the millennium.  This is because the high profile of the restitution campaigns 
helped to renew public interest in Jewish Civilization and the Holocaust in the post-
Communist bloc; whilst backlash against Jewish restitution among some groups in 
former Soviet countries could be interpreted as implying the necessity of Holocaust 
education, remembrance and research programmes in the region. Finally, against the 
backdrop of concerns expressed at how post-Soviet democracies would cope with the 
economic burdens of restitution,51 there was perhaps also the sense that Western nations 
should not just make demands but also contribute to the process of dealing with the 
post-Communist legacies of the Nazi past, a notion that was perhaps most fully realized 
in the idea of ITF ‘Liaison Projects.’   
 
Furthermore, Eizenstat’s efforts to promote Western norms of property law and 
democracy in the former Soviet bloc also coincided with a series of extremely 
controversial American class action law suits and attendant compensation deals in 
Western Europe which he also helped to arbitrate in the mid-late 1990s.  Marrus has 
perceived these deals as being significant for the central role played by individuals, 
claimant groups and class action lawyers in registering dissatisfaction with Western 
government led processes of reparation and restitution which had emerged during the 
Cold War era.52  However, although a significant innovation, the role of these class 
action lawyers also proved incredibly contentious with public outrage being expressed 
at exploitative behavior, high legal fees, publicity stunts as well as the vexed questions 
posed by the role of Jewish lawyers who defended banks and corporations during the 
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Holocaust law suits.53   Despite these controversies, important final settlements included 
the Swiss banks agreement to pay $1.25 billion to Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roma 
and Sinti, Homosexuals and the disabled after a class action lawsuit was resolved at the 
Brooklyn Courthouse, New York on August 12th 1998.54  
 
Other issues dealt with included German industry’s use of forced and slave labor during 
the war; Austria’s failure to restitute Jewish looted property and pay for its use of forced 
and slave labour and finally issues concerning the French spoliation of Jews under the 
Vichy regime.55  Emerging from the dynamics of these settlements was also the 
establishment in 1998 of the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance 
Claims (ICHEIC).  Founded by state insurance commissioners, survivor organizations, 
Jewish groups, the Israeli government and funded by various European insurance 
companies (Switzerland’s Zurich and Winterhur; Italy’s Generali, Germany’s Allianz 
and France’s Axa), ICHEIC was commissioned, “…to resolve and pay claims by 
survivors and heirs of Nazi victims who contend companies refused to pay their 
families’ life insurance policies.”56     
 
Indeed, during the SIF 2000 itself, news about the reparation campaigns in Western 
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Europe were evident in the British press. For example, on 26th January 2000 it was 
publically announced that the German cabinet had accepted a draft bill which laid the 
groundwork for a $5 billion compensation fund for victims of slave labor policies 
during World War II.57  Just over half of the former victims to be covered by the bill 
were Jewish whilst the rest of potential claimants tended to be Polish or Russian non-
Jews.58  However, the campaigns and class action law suits of the 1990s were more than 
just a contextual factor for the convening of the SIF 2000 on Holocaust education, 
remembrance and research.  This was for three main reasons.  Firstly, as part of the 
process of reaching settlements, national historical commissions were established which 
preceded the SIF 2000’s invocation that nation’s should research their Holocaust era 
pasts.  For example, almost two dozen historical commissions were established by 
different national governments in response to campaigns for compensation, including 
the Bergier Committee (1997) which was commissioned for five years to examine 
Swiss history during the Second World War.59  Furthermore, American legal historian 
and expert on Holocaust reparation and restitution in the 1990s, Michael Bazyler has 
noted that the positive step taken by countries and corporations to establish historical 
commissions and, “finally ‘come clean’ would not be occurring without the spotlight 
being shined on their activities through the lawsuits in the United States.”60     
 
Secondly, as part of the controversies that reparation and restitution campaigns 
generated in both Western and Eastern Europe, critical questions were raised as to the 
appropriate legacy of the Holocaust and Nazi era crimes.  For example, an article by 
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Yossi Klein Halevi in The Jerusalem Report of March 1997 documented some of the 
most polarized opinions.61 Holocaust survivor and editor of Macmillan’s The 
Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, Gutman expressed concerns that: 
 
In principle restitution is just.  But I’m very worried that this demand will create the impression 
that our historical account with Europe is associated with one issue.  We’re talking about the 
destruction of a civilization.62  
 
Equally, French Jewish leader, Theo Klein focused on one national perspective and 
articulated his anxiety that restitution campaigns might result in anti-Semitic backlash: 
 
For 2000 years, the Jews were identified with money in the popular imagination.  If we turn the 
memory of the Holocaust into a demand for reparations with interest that could haunt not only 
the (French) community but the whole Jewish people.63  
 
Finally, Efraim Zuroff of the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Israel Office objected that: 
 
No people can present the world with an unlimited number of moral demands.  Our efforts 
would be far better invested in issues related to bringing war criminals to justice.  Putting our 
efforts into reclaiming material assets will only reinforce anti-Semitic stereotypes.64       
 
These concerns raised by the reparation and restitution campaigns particularly in 
relation to anti-Semitism and promoting knowledge and awareness about the destruction 
of Jewish civilization during the Second World War, undoubtedly infused Eizenstat’s 
conviction which was articulated at the SIF 2000 that, “Financial restitution, while 
critical, cannot be the last word on the Holocaust…[this]… conference assures 
education, remembrance and research will be.”65   
 
Finally, issues of reparation and restitution directly influenced the policies of the ITF 
                                                           
61
 Halevi, ‘Reducing the Holocaust to a Search for Assets’. 
62
 Yisrael Gutman in Halevi, ‘Reducing the Holocaust to a Search for Assets’. 
63
 Theo Klein in Halevi, ‘Reducing the Holocaust to a Search for Assets’. 
64
 Efraim Zuroff in Halevi, ‘Reducing the Holocaust to a Search for Assets’. 
65
 Eizenstat, ‘Stockholm International Forum 2000: Task Force Briefing’, Stockholm International Forum 
Conference Series CD-Rom in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried.  
61 
 
and the subsequent convening of the SIF 2000 because of the precedents in promoting 
archival research and education about the Holocaust set in motion by two international 
conferences, organized to deal with issues of gold, art and property in the late 1990s.  
These international conferences were the London Conference on Nazi Gold (LCNG, 2nd 
- 4th December 1997) and the Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets 
(WCHA, 30th November – 3rd December 1998).  Supported by the representative of 
Britain’s New Labour government, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and at the initiative 
of Lord Greville Janner, the LCNG was convened at Lancaster House with forty 
governments in attendance.  The purpose of the conference was to decide what would 
happen to the remaining five and a half metric tonnes of looted Nazi gold which had 
been requisitioned by the allies from the Germans at the end of the Second World 
War.66  In the post-war period, countries from whom the gold was stolen managed to 
recover approximately 65% of their looted gold through a process which was 
administered by the Tripartite Gold Commission (TGC) under the trusteeship of the 
British, French and American governments.67  As individual claimants had received 
nothing from the account, it was the agenda of the British and Americans at the 
conference to convince countries eligible to donate their share to a victim’s fund.68  
Furthermore, and significant in relation to the future themes of the SIF 2000, it was also 
the goal of the LCNG to encourage all countries and institutions including the Russian 
Federation, the Vatican and the Reichsbank to allow unfettered access to their wartime 
archives.69  The result of the LCNG was the formulation of the International Persecutee 
Relief Fund for Survivors as well as the encouragement of nations to open their archives 
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to researchers and establish historical commissions.70  
 
Building on the process initiated at the LCNG and organized by the U.S Department of 
State and the USHMM, the WCHA was attended by the representatives of forty-four 
governments and thirteen NGOs including: the American Gathering of Jewish 
Holocaust Survivors; the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee; the Anti-Defamation League; B’nai B’rith International; the 
Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany; the European Council of 
Jewish Communities and the European Jewish Congress; the WJRO and Yad Vashem.71 
Representatives from the Holy See and the International Romani Union were also 
involved as were observers from Sotheby’s, Christie’s and the Pink Triangle 
Coalition.72     
 
The principle focus of the WCHA was the continuing problems surrounding cultural 
property, in particular the ownership, sale and display in museums of art looted by the 
Nazis during the Second World War.  It has been estimated that up to 600,000 paintings 
were stolen by the Third Reich and up to 100,000 still remain missing.73  This situation 
was further complicated by the fact that in response to the Nazis mass plunder and 
destruction of Russian cultural artifacts during Operation Barbarossa, the Soviets looted 
and hoarded vast quantities of German art as the war turned in the allies favor and the 
Soviets advanced westwards.  Most of these artifacts remained in Soviet hands 
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throughout the Cold War.74  As a result, it was imperative at the WCHA that Russia be 
at least willing to discuss divesting itself of this ‘trophy art’.75  However, although some 
liberal reformist Russians such as authors of Beautiful Loot (1995), Konstantin Akinsha 
and Grigonii Kozlov have advocated the public display and restitution to Germany of 
some of these expropriated cultural artifacts,76 for the vast majority of Russians these 
objects remain potent symbols of both national heroism and due recompense for Soviet 
suffering at the hands of the Nazis during the Second World War.  As a result, the 
dispute over the restitution of Soviet looted art to Germany is particularly intense and 
emotional.77 
 
However, although these issues were the central focus of the WCHA, the conference 
also arguably influenced the SIF 2000 in two key ways.  Firstly, a primary outcome of 
the WCHA was the Washington Principles, a non-binding document that was 
nevertheless adopted by a consensus among delegates present, including Russia.  
Encouraging “…countries to act within the context of their own laws”,78 the Principles 
implied that governments, museums, auction houses and galleries should attempt to 
trace looted art by researching the provenance of the items in their holdings; encourage 
nations to develop set procedures to resolve competing art claims as well as deal with 
heirless works of Nazi looted art.79  Although addressing different issues, the non-
binding format of the Washington Principles can be perceived as being mirrored in the 
subsequent construction of the Stockholm Declaration.  Secondly, the WCHA can be 
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perceived as marking a significant moment in the history of the ITF through the 
elucidation at the conference of a number of concrete short and long term projects in 
Holocaust education, remembrance and research.  These projects will be described and 
explored in more detail in chapter two, which analyzes the early years of the ITF and 
the subsequent organization of the SIF 2000. 
 
However, it should also be noted that the allocation of funds to support programmes of 
Holocaust education, remembrance and research which was advocated by some 
speakers at events such as the WCHA was not without its critics.  For example, the 
French Matteoli Report on Jewish confiscated assets (2000) proposed that unclaimed 
Jewish restitution funds should contribute to the maintenance of a National Memory 
Foundation.  This provoked outrage from Jean-Jacques Franckel, whose parents had 
been deported to Auschwitz.  For Franckel, who sued the French state, “The money 
should go to survivors, not for monuments or to cover the deficits of Jewish community 
organizations.  We are the victims of a second looting.”80   
 
Despite the strong opinions of survivors like Franckel, the presence of the ITF and 
questions regarding Holocaust pedagogy and memorialization at the WCHA in 
December 1998 suggests that Eizenstat’s and Gutman’s concerns that the last word 
about the Holocaust at the beginning of the new millennium should not be about money 
had been taken on board.  The next section will deal with a second set of important 
circumstances for the establishment of the ITF in May 1998 and the successful 
convening of the SIF 2000.   These factors concern the relationship of the founding of 
the ITF to the launch of Sweden’s Living History campaign in 1997; the Western and 
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Eastern European experience of anti-Semitic backlash against the Holocaust restitution 
movements of the 1990s as well as the troubling rise of the far right and Holocaust 
denial in the post-Cold War context of a reunified continent.   
 
The Establishment of Sweden’s Living History campaign (1997) and Liberal 
Fears Concerning the Growth of the Popular and Far Right in the 1990s 
 
The idea for the ITF and the SIF 2000 on Holocaust research, remembrance and 
education grew out of Sweden’s Living History campaign which was instigated by 
Social Democratic Prime Minister, Göran Persson in 1997.  Sweden had been a neutral 
country during the Second World War.   However, the Swiss bank scandals and a report 
by the American government entitled, U.S and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore 
Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II (1997) had 
demonstrated that even neutral nations were expected to confront their Nazi past.  In 
this report Sweden had been criticized for protecting German shipping, allowing the 
Wehrmacht to cross its borders, and selling iron ore and ball bearings to the Third 
Reich.81  Against this backdrop of pressure to confront the Nazi past, Persson was also 
perturbed by a survey by the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic 
Relations in co-operation with the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention 
which suggested that many Swedish schoolchildren were not even sure that the 
Holocaust had occurred.82    It was also felt that this lack of knowledge made young 
people more vulnerable to the propaganda of far right-wing extremists like David 
Janzon, groups such as the Swedish National Alliance (Sveriges Nationella Förbund) as 
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well as Holocaust deniers such as the Swedish based Muslim anti-Zionist and founder 
of Radio Islam, Ahmed Rami.83   These fears over the erasure of Holocaust memory 
were further compounded by the proliferation of Holocaust denial and what Roger 
Griffin calls ‘cyber-fascism’ on the Internet as well as by the gradual passing away of 
an aging population of Holocaust survivors.84    
 
Attempting to rectify this situation and following a parliamentary debate in June 1997 in 
which Persson personally pledged to take action on these issues,85 the Swedish 
government launched an information campaign about the Holocaust entitled Living 
History. This campaign was directed by the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office and was 
conducted at both the national and local levels. Living History sought to initiate a social 
discussion about the Holocaust within the context of issues such as democracy, 
tolerance and equality and the campaign became in Persson’s words, “…a broad 
popular movement in the classic Swedish mould.”86  Swedish schools were offered 
training programmes and educational materials, whilst a research centre for the 
Holocaust and genocide was established at Uppsala University.87 Furthermore, as part 
of the Living History project the Swedish government commissioned Stéphan Bruchfeld 
and American scholar living in Sweden, Paul A. Levine to write a short history of the 
Holocaust as an “academic anchor” for the Living History campaign.88 Levine 
commented of his experience writing Tell Ye Your Children: A Book about the 
Holocaust in Europe, 1933-1945: 
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Stéphan and I worked like complete idiots.  And literally did this book from scratch to finish in 
seven working weeks…We had help of course, but the last three weeks we were working about 
twenty hours because it had to be ready for the ceremony at Berwaldhallen, a concert hall in 
Stockholm because the King and Queen were booked.  And we got it ready.  And I think they 
printed off, 500 copies for 27th January [1998].89 
 
Comprising eighty-five pages and approximately fifty photographs, the intention of the 
Swedish government was that adults would read what became known as ‘the book’ with 
their children and educate them about the Holocaust. Initially, former German State 
Minister for Culture and Media at the time of the SIF 2000 and current publisher of Die 
Zeit, Michael Naumann criticized ‘the book’ for not mentioning, “…Kiruna, a city in 
northern Sweden” that had played an “…important role in maintaining the war industry 
and Nazi Germany’s ability to wage war.”90 However, in general, the publication of 
Tell Ye Your Children met with widespread critical acclaim.  Yehuda Bauer is reported 
by Levine to have described it as ‘the best history of the Holocaust available under one 
hundred pages’, whilst on its launch in January 1998, a survivor of the Lodz ghetto was 
overwhelmed by ‘the book’.91 Against this backdrop of recommendation, by May 1998, 
approximately 400,000 parents had filled in a form to request a free copy of Tell Ye 
Your Children from the Swedish government,92 whilst a further 200,000 copies had 
been requested by private individuals and made available to libraries, schools and 
pensioners organizations. Provision was also made to translate Tell Ye Your Children 
into the seven major immigrant languages in Sweden (English, Spanish, Finnish, 
Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Serbo-Croatian) as well as producing accompanying 
versions for the disabled.93  The success of the Living History campaign and Tell Ye 
Your Children became a critical factor in motivating Persson to pursue the idea of an 
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International Task Force on Holocaust Research, Remembrance and Education (ITF) in 
early 1998.    
 
Against the backdrop of the success of Tell Ye Your Children, the subsequent 
establishment of the ITF with the Americans and British in May 1998 as well as the 
elucidation of goals for the ITF at the WCHA,  fears over the role of the political 
extreme right in Swedish public life were further compounded by the Swedish police’s 
allegations that far right-wing groups were responsible for the death of a labour union 
leader and two police officers in 1999;94 whilst the SIF 2000 itself unfolded at the same 
time as the prosecution of three Swedish Neo-Nazis for distributing and selling far 
right-wing propaganda.95  That said the resurgence of extreme right-wing groups as well 
as softer right-wing populist parties marked by euro-skepticism and anti-immigration 
policies was not just a Swedish concern.  This feeling of pan-European liberal anxiety 
over the increasing presence of populist right-wing political parties and far right-wing 
political organizations in the 1990s was perhaps a further factor in why the founding of 
the ITF and the organization of the SIF 2000 garnered such widespread European 
support in January 2000.   
 
This resurgence in right-wing activity included the fact that Silvio Berlusconi’s 
‘Freedom Alliance’ won the Italian elections in March 1994,96 the French Front 
National made major gains in the elections of June 1995,97  whilst far from consensual 
contrition for the violations of Swiss neutrality in relation to the Third Reich during the 
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Second World War, the Swiss ‘public sphere’ during the 1990s was deeply divided over 
the questions of reparations and restitution and there was even a resurgence of anti-
Semitism in Switzerland. Regula Ludi has chronicled how Swiss Cold War ‘special 
case’ rhetoric of militarized ‘neutrality’, national independence and heroism had elided 
from public view the nation’s economic collaboration with Nazism, its political 
concessions to the Third Reich as well as its humanitarian failures in regards to Jewish 
refugees.98  Some members of the Swiss polis resented the breaking of this Cold War 
consensus and right-wing politicians such as Christoph Blocher exploited this potent 
resentment over reparations and restitution in order to make his People’s Party the 
second most powerful political collective in the Swiss parliament.  Reinforcing his 
position in 1997, he commented, “Switzerland had no reason to apologize for doing 
business with Nazi Germany in order to survive as a neutral country.”99  Whilst the 
presence of Blocher in Swiss politics was undoubtedly a concern, 1995 Swiss ‘anti-
racism’ legislation had facilitated the conviction of Holocaust deniers Jürgen Graf 
(1998) and Gaston-Armand Amaudruz (2000 and 2003).100  
  
Furthermore, against the backdrop of negotiations to deal with Austria’s failure to 
restitute Jewish looted property and pay for its use of forced and slave labor, Jorg 
Haider’s populist right-wing Freedom Party was elected the second strongest party in 
the Austrian parliament of October 1999.101  This was a particularly disturbing electoral 
development in Western Europe given Haider’s personal and political background.  
Haider was born in 1950 and his parents had been active National Socialists, whilst the 
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family’s 38,000 acre estate in Carinthia, ‘the Valley of the Bears’ had been appropriated 
by one of Haider’s relatives, a local Nazi official from the widow of an Italian Jewish 
timber businessman for a fraction of the property’s worth in 1940.102  Politically Haider 
was notorious for his anti-Semitic statements and attendance at a meeting of former SS 
officers at Ulrichsberg in Carinthia in 1995 where he commented, “The Waffen SS was 
a part of the Wehrmacht and hence it deserves all the honor and respect of the army in 
public life”.103  Given the importance of the Haider controversy in the media reception 
of the SIF 2000, which will be explored in chapter two, this section will briefly 
delineate Haider’s position within the politics of Austrian collective memory of the 
Nazi past.  
 
Haider’s right-wing attitudes towards the Nazi past were clearly a product of his family 
background.  However it is also arguable that they had been reinforced by the Cold War 
mythologization of the memory of the Holocaust in Austria.   Aided by growing 
American indifference to DeNazification as the Cold War intensified, Austrian 
governments had often used the rhetoric of the Moscow Declaration of 30th October 
1943 which stated that Austria was the “first free country to fall to Hitler’s aggression” 
in order to over-exaggerate the role of Austrian resistance to the Nazi regime and de-
emphasize the extent of Austrian collaboration with the Nazis. This collaboration had 
included the fact that an estimated 7000 Austrian-Jewish businesses were ‘Aryanized’ 
between March and June 1938, approximately 60,000 Austrian Jews were murdered in 
Nazi extermination and concentration camps, whilst, Austrians had comprised up to 
14% of the SS and as many as 40% of the perpetrators in Auschwitz.104  Founded in 
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1956, the Freedom Party which succeeded the League of Independents became a 
rallying ground for the articulation of the agenda of these ex-Nazis.  The Freedom Party 
was politically positioned between the socialist left and the clerical conservatives and its 
supporters had the potential to swing the results of national elections. As a result of this, 
both socialist and conservative camps attempted to appease Freedom Party interests, 
culminating in socialist chancellor Bruno Kreisky’s appointment of four ex-Nazis to his 
cabinet in 1970.105    
 
However, scandals that had erupted in the 1960s surrounding the anti-Semitic and pan-
Germanic statements of Vienna University of World Trade Professor, Tara 
Borodajkewycz and the controversy surrounding Helmut Qualtinger’s television play, 
Der Herr Karl (1961) had begun the process of challenging this post-war Austrian 
national mythology.  That said it was not until the Kurt Waldheim affair in 1986, when 
the former general secretary of the UN and OVP Federal presidency candidate was 
publically confronted with his own service record in the German Wehrmacht that liberal 
Austrians began to accept a ‘co-responsibility’ thesis for the nation’s complicity in Nazi 
crimes.106  Within this context, Haider’s right-wing attitudes towards the Nazi past 
represented a deeply perturbing desire to disavow the horrors and responsibilities of 
history in order to preserve the dignity of Austrian nationhood.  In his bid for political 
influence Haider also systematically exploited the political capital arising from social 
anxieties concerning the breakdown of the Cold War state-orientated Austrian economic 
system in the 1980s in favor of a more competitive neo-liberal model of global 
commerce.  He also utilized concerns raised about national sovereignty issuing from 
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Austria’s late entry into the EU in 1996 and, like other members of the West European 
populist right, played on social anxieties about domestic employment levels in terms of 
the eastwards expansion of the EU and accompanying levels of immigration.107  
 
That said, illustrating the even broader relevance of Persson’s project, the rise of the 
populist and far right in the 1990s was not an issue confined to Western Europe but was 
also a problem in Eastern Europe,108 where Tismaneanu has described a condition of 
‘cultural despair’ since 1989. ‘Cultural Despair’ refers to the political and economic 
dislocations arising from the fall of Communism which resulted in resurgent ethno-
nationalism and accompanying skepticism towards the EU, liberal democracy and the 
memory of the Holocaust among far right groups in countries such as Romania, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and the Baltic States.109  For example, ultranationalists in 
Romania in the 1990s such as Iosif Constantin Dragan, owner of the right-wing weekly 
newspaper, Europa as well as the writer Cornelieu Vadim Tudor, who established the 
far right political party and weekly publication, Greater Romania were responsible for 
denying the Holocaust in order to rehabilitate the reputation of Second World War 
Romanian dictator and collaborator in the Nazi perpetration of the Holocaust, General 
Ion Antonescu.110  This situation was mirrored in Slovakia where leader of the Slovak 
National Unity Party and economist, Stanislav Pánis denied the Holocaust in order to 
restore the reputation of Nazi collaborator and Slovakian leader, Josef Tiso.111  
 
Furthermore, antipathy towards remembrance of the Holocaust in the post-Soviet states 
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has often been exacerbated by the politics of competitive victimhood between members 
of ethno-nationalist groupings who feel that their suffering equaled, if not surpassed that 
of the Jews under both Nazism and Communism.112  For example, in the Polish national 
context, these issues over competing Polish and Jewish victimhood were crystallised in 
the debate over the presence of the Catholic Carmelite convent at Auschwitz.113 This 
conflict had been most heated during the 1970s and 1980s but re-surfaced forcefully in 
the year preceding the SIF 2000 over the ‘War of the Crosses’ that played itself out in 
the gravel pit of the same Convent (March 1998 - May 1999).114  Responding to 
rumours that the eight metre high ‘papal cross’ would be removed from the grounds of 
Auschwitz, former deputy of the Confederation of Independent Poland and ex-
Solidarity activist, Kazimierz Switon agitated Poles to plant 152 crosses in the gravel pit 
in order to memorialise the Nazi perpetrated execution of 152 Poles in 1941 and to 
‘protect and defend the papal cross’ as a national symbol.115 Many of the leading figures 
in the Polish ‘War of the Crosses’ (1998-1999), including leader Switon, reflected 
extreme and marginal viewpoints that were expressed in Far Right weekly, Nazsa 
Polska or in the national Catholic daily, Nasz Dziennik, a publication associated with 
Radio Maryja, a right-wing Catholic media organization preaching anti-liberalism, anti-
Semitism and anti-Communism.116   
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Provoking schism within the Polish Catholic church and consternation from both the 
Israeli government and a group of U.S. congressional representatives, the Polish army 
did not remove all the crosses until May 1999, by which time there were 322 crosses 
planted in the gravel pit.  Within the controversial context of Polish Catholicism and the 
history of Polish anti-Semitism what the ‘War of the Crosses’ demonstrates is the 
ongoing and, “...contested meaning of Auschwitz and the problematic presence of a 
Christian symbol at that site...”117  Furthermore, Geneviéve Zubrzycki has also 
suggested  that the ‘War of the Crosses’ can be perceived as demonstrating the fact that 
in relation to the memorialization of the Holocaust, “…more nationalistic Poles 
specifically resent dictates from the West as to the proper focus of work on postwar 
memory and identity.”118  It is within this context of ethno-nationalist reaction and in 
opposition to the representation of liberal consensus implicit in documents such as the 
Stockholm Declaration (2000) that more skeptical commentators such as Konstanty 
Gebert,119 the infamous Polish-Jewish underground journalist Dawid Warszawski 
during Communism and current contributor to the Gazeta Wyborcza, have predicted 
that Polish and Jewish memory of the Second World War will never be reconciled, but 
will instead always be subject to ongoing contestation and debate.120   
 
Analyzing the rise of the radical right in Western and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, 
Diethelm Prowe noted, “The social antagonism which fuels the hateful language and 
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violence of the present radical right is that of an emerging European multicultural 
society”, whilst the Holocaust has, “…become the central object of hateful rejection 
and denial for the right today.” 121  In many respects, it was this situation that Persson’s 
Living History campaign sought to address, whilst combating Holocaust denial was also 
an important factor motivating the founding of the ITF and the convening of the SIF 
2000.  Indeed, the shadow of high profile Holocaust denial was even present in the run-
up to the conference.  This was a result of the libel trial that British right-wing historian 
David Irving was bringing against American historian Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin 
Books over his representation in her 1995 book, Denying the Holocaust.122  However, 
despite the undisputable merits of Persson’s project, as Gebert and Zubrzycki have 
suggested and as will be explored in chapters three and four, battling Holocaust denial, 
ethno-nationalism and extreme right-wing backlash in various nation-states would 
remain one of toughest challenges posed to the ITF in the first decade of its’ existence. 
  
Precedents in Inter-Cultural Collaboration in Holocaust Memory Work 
 
Inter-cultural co-operation in the construction of the memory of the Holocaust 
stimulated by the SIF 2000 and the establishment of the ITF also needs to be perceived 
within a much longer historical trajectory of international developments in Holocaust 
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remembrance that if not always initiated, were intensified as a result of the fall of 
Communism between 1989 and 1991.  This short case study of global Holocaust NGOs 
and institutional relations between the USHMM, the State Museum Auschwitz-
Birkenau and the IWM, London will demonstrate the increasing importance of inter-
cultural collaboration in the production of institutional Holocaust representations in the 
period directly preceding the convening of the SIF 2000 and the theorization of the 
ITF’s notion of ‘Liaison Projects’ in the late 1990s.  This is not to say that these inter-
cultural collaborations directly caused the SIF 2000. Rather these examples of inter-
cultural teamwork demonstrate that there were several paradigms of international co-
operation in Holocaust memory work already in place that the WCHA and the SIF 2000 
utilized as examples in their own specialist led panels.  Furthermore, the ITF would 
draw on the expert personnel in these museums and NGOs for support in its own cross 
cultural collaborations enacted in national arenas after 2000.     
 
Some of the groundwork for the global ethos evident in the SIF 2000 and the ITF’s 
inter-cultural collaborations had been laid by specific institutions such as the USHMM 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  The USHMM was commissioned by the Carter 
administration in 1978 as a result of fears raised by a Neo-Nazi march in Skokie, 
Illinois; as a pacifier to an American Jewish public who were enraged by the 
government’s sale of military planes to Saudi Arabia and as an emblem of the Carter 
administration’s attempt to make human rights integral to American foreign policy.123  
The importance of Eastern Europe as both an imaginative space in the museum 
planner’s horizon and as a somewhat grotesque cabinet of curiosities for artifact 
collection is illustrated by two examples.  Firstly, in the summer of 1979, USHMM 
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commission members embarked on a research trip to Eastern Europe and Israel on 
which many participants were appalled by Soviet distortions of the memory of the 
Holocaust.124  For example, Elie Wiesel, survivor of Auschwitz and Chairman of the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Council until his resignation in 1986, was furious 
that the commemorative monument at Babi Yar in Ukraine did not mention the word 
‘Jew’.125  Subsequently, this tour became almost paradigmatic for any high level official 
recruited to join the effort to construct the USHMM in the 1980s and early 1990s.  This 
was because the visit to sites such as the Warsaw Ghetto, Treblinka and Auschwitz-
Birkenau was perceived to underscore the enormous tragedy of the Holocaust as well as 
demonstrating the Soviet ideological distortions that the USHMM sought to correct.126  
Secondly, the USHMM recognized opportunities for ‘artifact collection’ presented by 
the post-1989 dismantling of Communism.  As a result, by 1992 and the opening of the 
USHMM in 1993, Chairman of the International Relations Committee Miles Lerman, 
“…had signed official agreements with every Eastern European country except 
Albania, not only paving the way for artifact collection, but allowing the museum to 
copy massive amounts of archival material heretofore inaccessible to scholars.”127   
 
Against the backdrop of these changes wrought by the end of the Cold War, in the 
autumn of 1989, Polish Prime Minister, representative of Solidarity’s left-wing and 
member of the Catholic intelligentsia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki recognized that given the 
Soviet distortions of the representation of history at Auschwitz-Birkenau the public 
memory of that site needed to be reformed at the camp grounds and museum.128  These 
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distortions included the relegation of Jewish suffering to its primary exposition in the 
Jewish Pavilion, despite the fact that the majority of people murdered at Auschwitz-
Birkenau had been Jews.129 This was illustrated during the 1990s, when analyst of the 
number of victims at Auschwitz-Birkenau, Francisek Piper revised the Communist 
estimate of victims at the camp from four million to considerably less than two million 
and more likely in the region of 1.3-1.5 million.130  Alongside these calculations, Piper 
also proposed that there were two key phases at the camp complex, the first period, 
1940-1942, where most of the prisoners killed, primarily at Auschwitz 1 were Polish, 
and the second stage from the middle of 1942 onwards, when the majority of those 
murdered were Jews at Birkenau.131   
 
As a result, one of the problems with the Auschwitz-Birkenau memorial and museum at 
the end of the Cold War, was that rather than recognizing these distinct historical phases 
and victim numbers, the Sovietization of Poland after 1945 had led to the subordination 
of the narrative of systematic anti-Semitic racial extermination at Birkenau to a Polish 
Communist ideologically driven interpretation which stressed the suffering and killing 
of national and left-wing political prisoners such as Poles, Communist resisters and 
socialists at the Auschwitz complex.132  Indeed, Jonathan Huener, a scholar of the 
history of the camp during the Communist period has noted how this form of 
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remembrance was inaugurated at the camp’s first museum, opened in June 1947. For 
Huener, the historical narrative presented at this museum fundamentally drew on the 
legacy of ‘Poland’s martyrological culture’,133 whilst simultaneously incorporating 
Polish Communist doctrine as well as marginalizing, although not denying, the history 
of the persecution and extermination of the Jews at Auschwitz-Birkenau.134    
 
Furthermore, the need to reform the representation of the history of Auschwitz-Birkenau 
at the camp grounds and museum was also partly stimulated by increasing international 
pressure in the post-Cold War era.  Before the demise of Communism, just 5 million of 
the 22 million visitors to Auschwitz-Birkenau, which had been granted the status of an 
UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1979,135 came from outside Poland. However, as 
Michael Steinlauf observed (1997), after the fall of the Berlin Wall, over half the people 
coming to the site have been from beyond Poland’s borders including Germans, Israelis 
and Jews from all over the world.136 One of the key consequences stimulated by these 
issues over the representation of history at Auschwitz-Birkenau for inter-cultural 
dynamics in Holocaust memory work was the convening of an important international 
conference entitled ‘The Future of Auschwitz’ in May 1990 at the Oxford Centre for 
Hebrew and Jewish Studies at Yarnton Manor.  Organized in collaboration with the 
Polish Ministry of Culture, the result of these discussions between twenty-seven 
concentration camp survivors, academics, religious leaders and editors from nine 
countries across the globe was ‘The Yarnton Declaration of Jewish Intellectuals on the 
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Future of Auschwitz’.137  This document recommended that the Polish government 
should consult with Holocaust research centres and survivor’s groups, whilst the 
museum at Auschwitz-Birkenau should be reformed to clearly demonstrate the most 
recent estimates of the numbers of prisoners murdered there; the specific victim status 
of the Jews who, “...aside, from the tribes of Sinti and Rom... were the only people 
condemned to death for the “crime” of having been born”,138 as well as the fact: 
 3. that huge numbers of non-Jews, especially Poles, died at Auschwitz, and that the camp played 
a key role in the Nazi campaign to destroy Polish nationhood; 
4. that both Jews and non-Jews murdered there were drawn from all walks of life and all political 
persuasions, from dozens of cultural, religious and national traditions; 
5.  that the atrocities committed were perpetrated by the German National Socialist regime and 
its collaborators.139 
 
In response to these recommendations the Polish government removed the inscription 
citing 4 million victims from the International Memorial at Auschwitz-Birkenau.  
However, owing to constant postponements it was not until 1992 that a new 
commemoration message was inscribed in nineteen languages at the International 
Memorial.  Such is the public weight of this new message, that Professor Jonathan 
Webber, a British based Jewish Studies specialist, co-author of the new inscription and 
one of the founding members of the International Auschwitz Council, described it as a 
present day, “vernacular sacred text”,140  which reads as follows: 
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Let this place remain for eternity as a cry of despair and a warning to humanity.  About one and 
a half million men, women, children, and infants, mainly Jews from different countries of 
Europe were murdered here.  The World was silent.  Auschwitz-Birkenau, 1940-1945.141  
  
The international debate over the future of the Auschwitz State Museum was given 
further impetus in 1993 by Webber and was sustained with funding from TEMPUS, the 
European Union’s higher education modernization programme which primarily 
supports university co-operation projects with the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, 
Mediterranean states and countries in Central Asia.  The results of these numerous 
national and international discussions over Auschwitz were a number of efforts at 
reforming the layout of the museum which included, “the recaptioning of photographic 
displays with information about Jewish victims, the translation of captions into Hebrew 
alongside European languages, and the retraining of some of the guides.”142  
 
The role of the growing importance of inter-cultural co-operation in Holocaust 
memorialization prior to the SIF 2000 is also apparent in the planning of the UK’s 
permanent Holocaust exhibition at London’s IWM, an institution which is funded by the 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport and which also functions as the country’s 
national museum of twentieth century conflict. The Holocaust Exhibition was 
commissioned in 1995 and opened in June 2000, following important domestic 
developments such as the addition of the Holocaust to the British National Curriculum 
(1991) and two temporary exhibitions at the IWM on the Holocaust, ‘Belsen, 1945’ 
(1991) and a photographic exegesis on the Warsaw Ghetto (1993).143  The construction 
of the exhibition was also given a major boost by private funding and a £12.6 million 
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Heritage Lottery Fund grant which was given in December 1996 on the grounds that the 
exhibition would be the IWM’s contribution to millennium year.144  According to 
British Holocaust memory studies scholar Steven Cooke as well as Curator of the 
Holocaust Exhibition, Bardgett, the decision to commission the IWM’s Holocaust 
Exhibition was also partly and not un-controversially influenced by developments in the 
USA, 145  although the construction of the display remained primarily an IWM and UK 
based process: 
 
The  USHMM’s example was a really important factor in the decision to set up the Holocaust 
exhibition here because our Chairman and our then Director, Alan Borg went to see it, in I think 
about 1994, and were very impressed by it.  And I think could see how something like that could 
work in the UK.146 
 
Equally, although the content of the permanent exhibition was principally guided by a 
British advisory board of experts, USHMM staff also played a key role in influencing 
what Bardgett has described as the Holocaust exhibition’s “purist approach” – 
historically analytical in content with heavy reliance on artifacts and audio-visual 
components but eschewing theatrical reconstructions.147 In line with this Annie Dodds 
and her October Films co-producer/director James Barker were enlisted to produce 
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films and edit existing footage to operate within the narrative of the exhibition.148  
These moving images included allied newsreels from the 1940s, Nazi propaganda films, 
amateur home movies as well as a series of specially recorded interviews with 
survivors.149 USHMM Permanent Exhibition developer, documentary producer and 
member of the IWM Exhibition Advisory Group, Martin Smith as well as Raye Farr, 
Director of Film and Video at the U.S Holocaust Research Institute were also crucial in 
giving Dodds and Barker feedback about their work.150   Furthermore, in May 2009, 
Bardgett recalled:  
 
I remember the Head of the Acquisitions section of the USHMM just gave me all his contacts in 
Europe, sort of printed out, which saved me a huge amount of time because we’re talking pre-
Internet age when we embarked on this programme.151  
 
Whilst recognizing the fact that any comment on this matter can only be purely 
speculative and that after 2000 the majority of the ITF’s funding would be concentrated 
in archival and educational as opposed to museum based projects, it is still worth posing 
the question as to whether the USHMM’s involvement during the construction of the 
IWM Holocaust exhibition could be perceived as a prototypical ‘Liaison Project’ 
experienced in a Western European as opposed to Eastern European region.  To state 
this is not to detract from the fact that the production of the Holocaust exhibition was 
financed by the lottery and private donors as well as fundamentally based in an IWM 
curatorial team, with a primarily British based advisory group and also with 
consultation from other UK organizations such as Beth Shalom.  Rather it is simply to 
highlight the role of the USHMM as a much appreciated advisory voice, and that this 
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type of international co-operation in Holocaust memory work was perceived as 
beneficial within the context of two states who were key founders and promoters of the 
ITF and its subsequent ‘Liaison Projects’ after 2000. 
 
However, it was not just the USHMM who aided with the design of the IWM 
exhibition, the curatorial team spoke to Yad Vashem about their plans,152 whilst Teresa 
Swiebocka of the Auschwitz State Museum, “came over to look at the Auschwitz model 
and to make comments on where the particular trees would have been, the watchtowers, 
on what had been reconstructed.”153  Although the Auschwitz model at the IWM was 
produced specifically for the London based Holocaust exhibition, the idea of using a 
model of the camp as a display strategy had a number of historical precedents.  For 
example, a white plaster representation of the slaughter of Jews in a gas chamber and 
crematoria at Auschwitz Birkenau was originally completed in 1948 by an ex-Polish 
underground fighter Mieczyslaw Stobierski who had based his design on the testimony 
of an SS guard who had administered the crematorium.  This model was placed for 
public display in the Auschwitz barracks.  Stobierski’s model was later reproduced for 
Yad Vashem, whilst the USHMM also asked Stobierski to make another copy for the 
American museum which was completed in December 1992.154  Stobierski’s model 
illustrates an important Polish iconographical contribution to international Holocaust 
memory work, whilst the IWM’s admittedly unique and bespoke Auschwitz model is 
also a further example of this institution initiating dialogues with types of display 
strategies already effectively utilized by institutions such as the Auschwitz State 
Museum, Yad Vashem and the USHMM.   
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Moreover, the position of the Polish Ministry in organizing ‘the Future of Auschwitz’ 
conference, the role of Stobierski at Yad Vashem and the USHMM as well as the task 
of Swiebocka at the IWM also highlights the fact that whilst developments such as the 
SIF 2000 and the ITF would be initially spearheaded by Sweden, America and Britain, 
Eastern European Holocaust organizations were not simply a passive arena for either 
what has been deemed the power play of the  ‘Americanization’ of the Holocaust or the 
institutional lending, copying or purchasing of archival materials by Western Holocaust 
organizations after Communism.  Rather Eastern European organizations participated as 
active agents whose grassroots support and memorialization initiatives were and are 
essential to the success of ongoing Holocaust memory work in the Western World and 
Eastern Europe after Communism.  As a result, the conclusion of the USHMM’s 
permanent exhibition, which emphasizes the post-war emigration of survivors to Israel 
and America and uses a casting of Cracow’s Remu synagogue’s memorial wall to stress 
the post-war status of Europe as, “A Jewish Graveyard”, needs to be re-nuanced in light 
of developments since the fall of Communism.  For whilst chapter four will demonstrate 
that serious challenges are still posed to Holocaust memorialization in some post-Soviet 
states, ongoing efforts to commemorate the memory of the six million also need to be 
perceived within the context of ‘Hidden Jews’ ‘coming out’ of the Communist closet in 
Poland, the thriving Jewish Quarter in Prague and recent restorations of Jewish cultural 
life such as the Dohány Street Synagogue in Budapest.155 
 
From this perspective, it is also important to note that whilst the ITF was unique in 
terms of the sheer extent of government involvement in memorialization initiatives, in 
other ways it utilized and built upon the precedent of global NGOs which were already 
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promoting the study of the Holocaust in America, Europe and Israel.  For example, 
directly succeeding the establishment of the ITF in May 1998, two of these 
organizations were responsible for mounting presentations in a section addressing issues 
of Holocaust education, remembrance and research at the WCHA.  These organizations 
included the Anti-Defamation League’s Braun Historical Institute for combating anti-
Semitism and racial hatred, which carries out research, remembrance and education 
about the Holocaust within a schema that perceives, “…the history of anti-Semitism as 
culminating in the Shoah.”156  Founded in 1976, another international NGO is the 
United States based Facing History and Ourselves National Foundation which seeks, 
“to promote democratic citizenship through the curriculum.”157  Facing History 
operates with a full-time representative in Switzerland, which co-ordinates educational 
materials and teacher training in Western, Central and Eastern Europe.  At the WCHA, 
a representative of the organization, Margot Stern Strom, stated that translations of the 
Facing History resource book had been made into Hungarian, whilst the Slovak 
Republic had contacted the organization about developing school textbooks and the 
Romanian Ministry of Education had proposed the integration of Facing History into 
the education system.158   
 
Within this context of European politics and the issue of the eastern expansion of the 
EU, it is also important to observe the founding of the European Council for Cultural 
Co-Operation in the mid-1990s which looked at issues of historical education within the 
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EU and mooted the idea as to the extent to which the Holocaust could be pedagogically 
interpreted within the framework of contemporary ethics.159  As a result, the founding of 
the ITF and the convening of the SIF 2000 can be perceived as utilizing and expanding 
upon foundations of inter-cultural collaborations in Holocaust memory work that had 
been established by various public and private sector organizations in the period both 




This chapter has outlined the historical context for the founding of the ITF in May 1998 
and the convening of the SIF 2000 on Holocaust research, remembrance and education 
in January 2000.  It has argued that a chief impetus for the founding of the ITF and the 
organization of the SIF 2000 came out of the historical process stimulated by the 
restitution campaigns of the 1990s, and the desire by key figures in that struggle, such 
as Eizenstat, to ensure that the last word on the Holocaust and the Third Reich at the 
beginning of the new millennium should not be about money but rather nations taking 
moral responsibility for their complicity in the Nazi past through acts of public research, 
education and memorialization.  It also suggests that national developments in Sweden 
such as the founding of the Living History campaign (1997) were indispensable in 
leading to the conceptualization of the ITF and the SIF 2000, whilst pan-European 
concerns at the rise of the popular and far right-wing in the 1990s as well as various 
forms of Holocaust denial made the mission of the ITF and the SIF 2000 feel relevant to 
a newly reunified continent at the turn of the century.   
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However, this chapter has also proposed that far from being entirely new, developments 
such as the ITF and the SIF 2000 utilized the expertise and institutional foundations of 
inter-cultural co-operation in Holocaust memory work which had been cultivated by 
various private and state sector organizations in the decades preceding 2000.  Taking 
forward the history of the institutions introduced in this section, chapter two will focus 
on the decision-making at the WCHA and within the ITF which led to the formulation 
of the idea of  ITF ‘Liaison Projects’ as well as directly resulting in the organization and 




The ITF and the Organization and Media Reception of 
the SIF 2000 
 
Sandwiched between the London and Washington conferences, the Task Force for 
International Co-Operation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (ITF) was 
established on 7th May 1998 at the suggestion of the Swedish government and in co-
operation with the British and Americans.1  Consisting of the representatives of 
governments, the ITF was to be academically advised by Yad Vashem historian Yehuda 
Bauer whilst the organization’s remit was to promote international archival openness, 
education and memorialization of the Holocaust through co-operation with relevant 
NGOs.  The summary of the inaugural meeting of the ITF held in the Swedish Prime 
Minister’s Office on 7th May 1998 states that the organization was founded because 
remaining indifferent to Holocaust memory, “could threaten our common future” and 
that in order to implement contemporary institutional memory of the Holocaust “… in a 
complex world, people and countries need to share experiences.”2  At this meeting it 
was proposed that international co-operation should focus on those aspects of the 
Holocaust that have, “been touched upon” or “neglected”.  It also stated that 
collaborationist projects should specifically target parents and young people and should 
be orientated towards, “long-term changes and effects of attitudes.”3   
 
It was also mooted that the ITF should support efforts to record the histories of 
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Holocaust survivors and look into ways of using the Internet for education whilst 
finding ways to battle international electronic networks of Holocaust denial.  It was also 
stressed that, “Knowledge about the Holocaust should be woven into existing structures, 
for example, the educational system, research, and training of teachers and 
journalists”4  This chapter will use documents from the WCHA, interviews with British 
delegates to the SIF 2000, ITF minutes, press reports and scholarly articles, in order to 
interrogate institutional developments within the ITF which shaped the objectives and 
organization of the SIF 2000 as well as the launch of the ITF’s first ‘Liaison Project’ 
with the Czech Republic.  It will then document the subsequent press reporting of the 
SIF 2000 in the British and American media before turning to an analysis of the 
analogous reception of the announcement of UK HMD, in order to gain an awareness of 
how developments in the remembrance of the Holocaust at the international and 
national political levels are communicated to and received by national societies. 
 
It is difficult to establish why the Swedish government contacted the British and 
Americans as the first ITF partners.  It is perhaps because as British participant in the 
ITF, Stephen Smith observed, Persson was most probably, “…approaching Clinton and 
Blair who I think he saw as his natural political allies....”5 For example, although 
Sweden continued to refuse full NATO membership and the country retained its status 
of military non-alignment, it had also become a NATO Partner for Peace in 1994, which 
had resulted in Swedish participation in NATO peace-keeping forces in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (1996).  Beyond these foreign policy alliances, the American Democratic 
Clinton government had also been committed to Holocaust restitution initiatives 
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throughout the 1990s in order to support survivors as well as promote convivial German 
and East European relations; civil society and the rule of law in the post-Soviet states as 
well as broader human rights issues.6  Finally, Tony Blair’s speech welcoming Bill 
Clinton to address the British Cabinet on 29th May 1997 after his landslide New Labour 
election victory demonstrated the strength of the centre-left Atlantic alliance, his 
commitment to European issues as well as his conviction that Britain could act as a 
diplomatic ‘bridge’ between Europe and America.  Addressing Clinton, Blair stated, “I 
think you, like me, have always believed that Britain does not have to choose between 
its strong relationship in Europe and its strong relationship with the United States of 
America.”7  Moreover, in relation to Persson’s project specifically, not only had New 
Labour convened the LCNG, but the adoption of the European Convention on Human 
Rights into national law as well as Blair’s ‘Third Way’ multicultural domestic and 
foreign policy rhetoric chimed with Persson’s historically specific and yet ethically 
‘universalistic’ vision of Holocaust remembrance which encompassed the aims of 
placing, “recognition of the urgent necessity of combating racism, anti-Semitism, ethnic 
hatred and ignorance of the past on the daily agenda of the international community.”8   
 
A further instance of the proximity of New Labour policies to Swedish multicultural 
rhetoric was Robin Cook’s ethical Foreign Policy announced in his Foreign Office 
Mission Statement of 1997.  Admittedly, by 2000 Cook faced criticism that his Mission 
Statement had been both diluted by pragmatism and subject to scathing assessment by 
John Maples, the Shadow Home Secretary who had alleged Cook’s hypocrisy in failing 
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to critique the human rights record of China, speak out on Chechnya or halt the sale of 
Hawk jet spares to Zimbabwe.  However, Cook stood firm in January 2000, stating that 
British foreign policy would be underlined by four key ‘ethical’ or arguably 
‘cosmopolitan’ aims, “more bridges and fewer barriers; the global interest becoming 
the national interest: universal values: and the greater Britain’s standing in Europe, the 
greater in the world.”9  Thus, from the outset the so called ‘universal’ values that the 
political founders of the ITF and instigators of the SIF 2000 wanted to promote were 
very much based on a synergy or coalition of European and American liberal 
multicultural ideals that were prevalent among the British, Swedish and American 
political leadership in the years directly preceding the millennium. 
 
However, the role of Sweden in approaching Clinton and Blair and establishing the ITF 
in May 1998 was not without its critics. Persson observed that, “Many of the major 
Swedish newspapers thought it was presumptuous of me to have ideas about what world 
leaders like Blair and Clinton might think”,10 whilst Efraim Zuroff of the Simon 
Wiesenthal Centre’s Jerusalem Office complained at the ITF inaugural meeting (7th 
May 1998) that Swedish educational efforts were undercut by judicial failures in regards 
to the post-war entry of Nazi war criminals into Sweden.  As a result, Zuroff called, 
“for the investigation and establishment of a legal mechanism to deal with Nazi war 
criminals living in this country.”11        
 
Furthermore, it was not insignificant that the historian Yehuda Bauer had been 
nominated to be Academic Advisor of the ITF in May 1998, after he had been involved 
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in advising the Swedish government on the Living History campaign.12  Given the 
importance of Bauer to the future development of the ITF as well as his role in co-
authoring the Stockholm Declaration, this section will now unpack the history of his 
writings in more depth.  Bauer left Europe owing to the rise of Nazism. Born in 1926 in 
Prague, Bauer’s Zionist father tried to raise money to move his family to Palestine and 
finally succeeded on March 15th 1939, the same day as the German occupation of 
Bohemia and Moravia.  Bauer finished high school in Haifa and signed up for the 
Palmach or the Jewish underground which later became the basis of the Israeli army, 
before embarking on a career in academia in which he has held pre-eminent positions at 
Hebrew University and Yad Vashem.  Between the 1960s and 1970s, Bauer’s research 
centered on survivor testimonies as well as on historical analyses of the role played by 
key American Jewish associations during the Holocaust.  By contrast, since the 1980s, 
Bauer’s research has increasingly focused on the issue of the rescue of Jews as well as 
on the relationships formed between Jews and Nazis during the Second World War.13   
 
However, Bauer’s historical work has also been significant in the controversies it has 
generated.  Contrasting with the Stockholm Declaration (2000), in The Holocaust in 
Historical Perspective (1978), Bauer rejected descriptions of the Holocaust which 
placed the event within narrative tropes of ‘universalism’.  This is because Bauer 
claimed that viewing the Holocaust within the wide horizon of human responsibility too 
often produces, “vague, universalistic generalizations like “the results of prejudice”, 
“man’s inhumanity to man”, and similar meaningless drivel.”14  Arguing that the 
Holocaust needs to be explained historically, Bauer also proposed that the Holocaust is 
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both ‘unique’ and “…a central experience of our civilization.” 15 It is also worth 
quoting the following paragraph from Bauer at length because it simultaneously reflects 
Bauer’s scorn of  ‘universalistic’ rhetoric at the end of the 1970s as well as delineating 
what would become his controversial and contradictory notion of Holocaust 
‘uniqueness’: 
 
To view the Holocaust as just another case of man’s inhumanity to man, to equate it with every 
and any injustice committed on this earth – and God knows, the number is endless – to say that 
the Holocaust is the total of all crimes committed by Nazism in Europe, to do any or all of this is 
an inexcusable abomination based on a mystification of the event.  On the other hand, to view it 
as totally unique is to take it out of history and out of the context of our everyday lives, and that 
means opening up the gates for a possible repetition. 
 
We should properly use the term ‘Holocaust’ to describe the policy of total physical annihilation 
of a nation or a people.  To date, this has only happened once, to the Jews under Nazism.16  
 
This last sentence resonated with Bauer’s further categorization of the ‘uniqueness’ of 
the Holocaust that, “…the Nazi policy towards the Jews was motivated by a 
pseudoreligious and anti-Christian ideology that was based on a very deep anti-Semitic 
European tradition, and it was total and logical.”17 Furthermore, part of Bauer’s stance 
in The Holocaust in Historical Perspective also included two beliefs, echoed in the later 
rhetoric of the ITF, that, firstly, contemporary Holocaust denial and political right-wing 
extremism must be battled and secondly, that it was important to find an effective way 
to teach the factual history of the Holocaust to future generations.18  However, Bauer’s 
very specific conceptualization of the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust became subject to 
increasing criticism by the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
Bauer’s framing of the history of the Holocaust within the schema of ‘uniqueness’ 
clashed with the research of scholars such as Sybil Milton and Henry Friedlander who 
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argued that Bauer’s definition of the term ‘Holocaust’ should be altered to 
accommodate the fact that, “The Nazi regime applied a consistent and inclusive policy 
of extermination - based on heredity - only against three groups of human beings: the 
handicapped, Jews and Gypsies.”19  The virulence of the ‘uniqueness’ debate was 
intensified by the fact that post-war failures of justice and compensation abounded not 
only in relation to Jewish victims of Nazism, but also in regards to these  two other 
groups who Milton and Friedlander have defined as being subject to the Nazis, 
“consistent and inclusive policy of extermination.”20  
 
These conflicts over what Bauer called the ‘uniqueness’ of the Jewish Catastrophe and 
the meaning of the word ‘Holocaust’ were also reflected in heated debates during the 
planning and construction of the USHMM in the 1980s and 1990s.  For example, in the 
early 1980s, Bauer alongside survivors such as Elie Wiesel and Henryk Grynberg saw 
efforts particularly by some Eastern European members of the museum’s council to 
expand the number of victim groups included under the term ‘Holocaust’ as an 
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unacceptable effort to ‘de-Judaize’ the term and in so doing, abnegate the recognition of 
the specific experiences of Jews as victims of the Third Reich.21 Furthermore, for Bauer 
and Monroe Freedman these efforts also smacked of latent anti-Semitism, with 
Freedman going as far to say that some Eastern European representatives, “… insistence 
on referring to six million Jews as an indistinguishable part of eleven million 
civilians…”, was if not a form of Christian conversion, then certainly a “posthumous 
assimilation.”22   
 
For different reasons, a multitude of voices argued against Bauer and other ‘uniqueness’ 
advocates in desiring a more inclusive understanding of the term ‘Holocaust’ at the 
USHMM.  For example, during the museum’s planning in the mid- late 1980s, Roma 
representatives like Ian Hancock and William Duna complained that they felt ignored 
and marginalized by the process, whilst USHMM Council historian, Milton argued that 
the Roma and disabled experience should be integrated much more fully and forcefully 
into the museum’s narrative.23  Although these debates remained live both until and 
after the opening of the USHMM in 1993, in the wake of Wiesel’s resignation from the 
Chairmanship of the Holocaust Council on 4th December 1986, the dominant notion of 
the ‘Holocaust’ that held sway during the planning of the exhibition was advanced by 
Project Director Michael Berenbaum.  This sought to provide a careful balance between 
understanding the fundamental American context framing the construction of the 
exhibition as well as emphasizing that the Nazi mass murder of European Jewry resides 
at the core of the ‘Holocaust’ whilst also recognizing the broader victims of the Third 
Reich’s atrocity crimes within the exhibition’s narrative.  Linenthal has summarized this 
approach as follows, “…a careful inclusion of non-Jewish victims, a balance between 
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Jewish life before the Holocaust, the extermination, and the return to life after; and 
emphasis on Americans, characterized as bystanders and liberators.”24     
 
Despite this attempt at balancing several interest groups at the USHMM, the public 
debates about what Bauer called the ‘uniqueness’ of the Jewish Catastrophe and the 
meaning and use of the word ‘Holocaust’ continued following the opening of the 
museum in 1993.  For example, some members of the American Jewish community 
expressed concerns over the alleged ‘Americanization’ of the Holocaust at the 
USHMM.25  These complaints responded to what Berenbaum had referred to as the 
museum’s framing of the history of the Holocaust within a schema promoting American 
liberal democratic values (a type of liberal framing of the Holocaust which was 
arguably, just one precursor for the so called ‘universal’ values that would be fused with 
European influences and Bauer’s ‘unprecedentedness’ rhetoric in the Stockholm 
Declaration 2000).  Moreover, for Anson Rabinbach these objections, which were 
articulated by U.S Jewish conservatives such as Edward Norden expressed American 
Jewish political fears that the USHMM’s willingness to promote liberal ‘universalist’ 
values over the pure focus on the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust might contribute to, 
“…the further erosion not of Holocaust memory, but of Jewish identity.”26   
 
By contrast, American Jewish scholar Peter Novick expressed a different set of 
concerns when he argued that the exceptional or ‘unique’ status accorded to the 
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USHMM on the Washington Mall risked ‘screening out’ American accountability for 
the suffering endured by African Americans under the system of slavery.27 Furthermore, 
the controversy over Jewish ‘uniqueness’ claims was also further intensified when 
scholar David E. Stannard attacked Bauer, Steven T. Katz and Deborah Lipstadt on the 
grounds that ‘uniqueness’ rhetoric is complicit in ‘denying’ the severity and status of 
the genocide of the Native Americans, a group who finally had their own museum 
opened on the Washington Mall in 2004.28  Lastly, and even more controversially 
American-Jewish left-wing critic Norman Finkelstein argued in his highly problematic 
conspiratorial narrative ‘The Holocaust Industry’ that the use of the discourse of 
‘uniqueness’ is synonymous with the political and economic interests of American 
Jewish organizations and right-wing pro-Israeli lobby groups.29  
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Against the backdrop of these controversies, by the time of the establishment of the ITF 
in 1998, Bauer had shifted his terminology from the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust to 
the ‘unprecedentedness’ of the Holocaust. Bauer now defines the Holocaust or the Nazi 
perpetrated mass murder of European Jewry as ‘unprecedented’ because the Nazi 
regime and its collaborators radical anti-Semitic and non-pragmatic ideology sought to 
murder all Jews across the Nazi occupation zone during the Second World War.  For 
Bauer, the ‘unprecedentedness’ of the Holocaust resides in, “...the ideological, global, 
and total character of the genocide of the Jews.”30  This also means that for Bauer the 
Holocaust is simultaneously the paradigmatic and exceptional instance of genocide 
against which all other instances of group killing and persecution can be compared to 
see if they conform to Bauer’s categories of the ‘partial’ destruction of racial, national 
and ethnic groups (‘genocide’) or ‘total’ destruction (‘Holocaust’).31  In contrast to his 
earlier complete disregard for ‘universalist’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ rhetoric in The Holocaust 
in Historical Perspective, the ‘unprecedentedness’ thesis also embraced the 
‘universalistic’ concept that: 
 
Because it seems to me, the realization is sinking in that the Holocaust says something terribly 
important about humanity.  It is on the one hand, a genocide that must be compared to other 
genocides; that universal dimension of comparability should concern everyone from Kamchatka 
to Tasmania and from Patagonia to the Hudson Bay.32 
 
 As will be explored in more detail in chapter five, Bauer’s shift towards 
‘unprecedentedness’ was evident in the ‘universalistic’ rhetoric of the Stockholm 
Declaration and was later most forcefully articulated in his 2001 book, Re-thinking the 
Holocaust (RH).  Despite Bauer’s statement in RH that, “...one should never say that 
one form of mass murder is ‘less terrible’, or even ‘better’, than another”,33 the 
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invocation of the ‘unprecedentedness’ of the Holocaust still divides opinion.  Whilst 
some scholars essentially take forward the type of critique of Bauer advocated by 
Milton and Friedlander; others have perceived Bauer as advancing an overly-
exclusionary definition of ‘genocide’,34 whereas Stuart D. Stein has interpreted Bauer 
as, “differentiating between the Holocaust and other genocides” in order to imply “...a 
superior genocide, and genocides.”35  Putting forward an alternative perspective, 
Stephen Smith, British ITF representative, co-founder of the Nottingham based 
Holocaust memorial centre, Beth Shalom as well as co-initiator of Rwanda’s Kigali 
Memorial Centre, has noted the more positive potentials in Bauer’s thought:  
 
What Bauer is able to do which many historians find difficult is to change his position and say, 
“I’ve changed my position”.  Now I’ve watched Yehuda’s development in his thinking over the 
last fifteen years and I’ve had the opportunity to do that personally through his writing and his 
thinking because I’m quite close to him personally, and I think what I’ve seen is a really honest 
historian there.  Because what he says is, “I’m prepared to re-assess the facts as I find them”.  So 
there isn’t a single thesis, there, actually.  There is a dynamic process which as an individual and 
as a professional he is dealing with.  And I think that if you try to deal with his writing in any 
other way and say, “Yehuda Bauer as an individual has developed his thinking”, you’ll mis-read 
it.  I don’t think he’s contentious at all.  Not really.  Another thing about him is, which I think is 
quite different to a lot of historians...he is very politically tuned in.  He understands the 
difference between documenting the past and addressing that within a current, contemporary 
context and making it relevant.  And...therefore, actually, while he is quite clear about the as you 
described it, the ‘unprecedented’ nature of the Holocaust he does not see and I don’t see this as 
being at variance with looking at genocide as a universal phenomenon, and a comparable 
phenomenon including comparison with the Holocaust.36 
 
If Bauer is interpreted in a way which rejects the potential for the hierarchization of 
victimhood that is one possibility within his definitions of Holocaust (‘total 
destruction’) and genocide (‘partial destruction’), and instead encourages respectful 
remembrance of what has conventionally become the specificity of the name, 
‘Holocaust’ to commemorate the Jewish tragedy of the six million; Justice and 
commemoration for all racial, social, sexual, national, political and religious victims of 
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Nazi atrocities;37 a self-critical Israeli national consciousness as well as the ongoing 
legal recognition and memorialization of past genocides and the prevention of future 
genocides,38  then RH  begins to live up to its claim that it marks a self-reflexive attempt 
by an Israeli citizen to encourage Jewish people to psychoanalytically, “...work through 
the mourning, the loss” and encourage “Jewish society to open up to the world.”39     
 
The ITF, the WCHA and the subsequent organization of the SIF 2000  
 
Having been established in May 1998 and having gained an Academic Advisor in the 
figure of Bauer, according to the archival documents of the WCHA, the ITF’s second 
meeting of 25th September 1998 marked the moment when the rotating chairmanship of 
the Task Force was passed from Sweden to the United States.40  This meeting held at 
the USHMM also saw the acceptance of Israel and Germany as ITF members and 
resulted in the elucidation of a number of concrete short and long term projects for the 
organization which coalesced with the ITF’s broad goals of Holocaust remembrance 
and, “fighting intolerance, racism, and other challenges to basic human values.”41  
These prospective projects included: suggestions for how international and national 
versions of the Swedish book, Tell Ye Your Children could be created; a Task Force 
declaration on Holocaust education to be compiled by the U.S;  the compilation of a 
directory of Holocaust education organizations to be worked on by Sweden and the 
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United States; a Task Force mandate on access to archives and a guide to archival 
material to be proposed by the U.S and the UK; as well as a set of guidelines on 
Holocaust education and a proposal for an International Day of Holocaust 
Remembrance to be drafted by the UK.42  Progress on these projects was to be made by 
the WCHA, so that an ITF working report could be presented to delegates and future 
inter-cultural collaboration in Holocaust education encouraged.43 
 
In line with decisions made in September 1998, a number of ITF Declarations and 
policy documents were showcased to those present at the WCHA.  These Declarations 
and documents set the precedent for what would be the chief themes at the SIF 2000 as 
well as highlighting the primary objectives of the ITF in its formative years.  These 
primary objectives of the ITF were developed in relationship to the inadequacies of the 
restitution conferences of the 1990s, which as has been demonstrated in chapter one, 
found their expression in complaints articulated in different ways by representatives 
such as Eizenstat, Gutman and Auschwitz survivor, Wiesel that the tragedy of the 
Holocaust cannot simply be financially recompensed but must also be recalled as a sign 
of, “conscience, morality, and memory.”44  Mirroring this concern, the first Task Force 
Declaration at Washington focused on ‘Promoting Holocaust Education, Remembrance 
and Research’.  The wording of this Declaration is additionally significant in that it also 
alludes to the importance of radical right-wing reaction and Holocaust denial in the 
1990s as factors motivating the founding of the ITF and the subsequent convening of 
the SIF 2000: 
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As the international community continues to focus on the Holocaust era assets at the 1998 
Washington Conference and beyond, the priority and urgency for international attention must 
also encompass Holocaust education, remembrance and research.  Efforts and resources in this 
direction should be expanded to reinforce the historic meaning and enduring lessons of the 
Holocaust (‘Shoah’) and to combat its denial.45 
 
 
The second declaration emphasized the importance of archival openness and made the 
ambitious claim that all Nazi era documents should be accessible by 31st December 
1999 because: 
 
The governments comprising the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, 
Remembrance and Research agree on the importance of encouraging all archives, both public 
and private, to make their holdings more widely accessible.  This will facilitate further research 
and encourage greater understanding of the Holocaust and its historical context.46 
 
Other ITF policy documents forwarded at Washington included a presentation by 
Stéphane Bruchfeld (Prime Minister’s Office, Sweden); Wesley A. Fisher (USHMM) 
and Nicolas Gauvin (USHMM) on the recently established and ongoing compilation of 
an ‘International Directory of Organizations in Holocaust, Education, Remembrance 
and Research’. This directory listed basic information on an estimated 900 Holocaust 
organizations across the world.  Bruchfeld also collaborated with Levine in order to 
propose that Tell Ye Your Children could be internationalized through national 
adaptations each of which would add, “…several pages treating their own specific 
histories.”47   
 
Anthony Layden, Head of the Western European Department, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office of the UK outlined preliminary guidelines for Holocaust 
Education as well as the role of governments and NGOs within that nexus.  He stated 
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that Holocaust education is important in order to ensure that young people have a well 
rounded knowledge of twentieth century history as well as a respectful relationship with 
Holocaust survivors.  He also thought that Holocaust education possessed the capability 
to be socially enlightening in encouraging genocide prevention and racial tolerance 
within societies.48  Layden highlighted that whilst all governments should promote 
memorialization initiatives such as museums, the exact role played by national 
governments in Holocaust education would be dependent on whether a country’s 
education system was centralized or localized; subject to a national curriculum or more 
flexible in orientation.49   
 
Finally, Smith presented a ‘Proposal for International Commemoration of the 
Holocaust’ which evaluated the concept of Holocaust Memorial Days (HMDs) and 
stated that they were an appropriate form of commemoration because they possessed the 
capacity to promote remembrance of the victims of the Holocaust; ‘awareness’ for the 
potential for future genocides in the world; a symbol of ‘solidarity’ against anti-
Semitism and racism as well as an opportunity for ‘education’ about the Holocaust.  
However, citing the diversity of HMDs already in place, such as the liberation of 
Auschwitz (27th January in Germany and Sweden); Anne Frank’s birthday (12th June in 
the Netherlands) or Yom HaSho’ah in Jewish communities in America and around the 
globe, Smith noted that: 
 
Task force participants do not consider it necessary or desirable that all countries that decide to 
institute a Holocaust Remembrance Day should hold it on the same date.  A number of different 
dates are already regarded as significant in different countries…Countries may wish to consider 
them, or other dates with more significance for them, should they decide to adopt a 
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Remembrance Day.50       
 
 
These Declarations and policy proposals at the WCHA illustrate the fact that far from 
promoting uniformity in Holocaust remembrance, the mission of the ITF was about 
setting down certain normative baselines for research, remembrance and education, 
which were designed to either support regional initiatives already in place, or 
alternatively encourage the innovation of new programs that would be national 
variations of the kind of international norms outlined in Washington.  These policy 
proposals or normative baselines would be more systematically laid down at the SIF 
2000 in the guise of the Stockholm Declaration, a document which also utilized Bauer’s 
rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ as well as advocating key American and 
European politicians shared liberal ‘universalist’ values at the end of the 1990s.  
 
At a further ITF meeting during the WCHA it was decided that France, Poland and the 
Netherlands would also be invited to become members of the ITF.  This meeting also 
contained embryonic discussions of the concept of ‘Liaison Projects’ or ‘Field 
Missions’.  However, within the context of this analysis of the SIF 2000, it was perhaps 
most pertinent for the announcement by Sweden of plans for a Stockholm Conference 
on Holocaust Education, to run in 1999 or 2000.  It was also decided that an ITF 
Endowment fund administered by Sweden would be instigated at the Stockholm 
Conference.  This would give the ITF, the ability to fund projects on research, 
remembrance and teaching that it deemed worthy of support.  
 
These initial meetings of the ITF in late 1998 and early 1999 took place against public 
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debates about NATO intervention in the escalating crisis of Serbian perpetrated mass 
murder of Muslim Albanians in Kosovo.  Having sanctioned NATO air strikes against 
Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities in Iraq (1998), in the summer of the same 
year, Blair was one of the first Western leaders to advocate military action against 
Milosevic’s armies who were fighting against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and 
perpetrating a vicious campaign of ethnic cleansing against the province’s Muslim 
Albanian civilians.51 Blair justified the case for NATO humanitarian military 
intervention in his Chicago speech (April 1999), arguing that Western nations should 
militarily intervene in the affairs of states who were perpetrating repression, ethnic 
cleansing and genocide, as long as the case for intervention met the criteria of ‘Five 
tests’: “a strong case, exhausted diplomacy, realistic military options, a readiness to 
accept long-term commitment and a link to national interests.”52    
 
NATO’s air campaign began on 26th March 1999 and lasted seventy-eight days. 
Initially, NATO’s military strategy was dogged by disagreements between the British 
and Americans over issues such as the deployment of ground troops,53 whilst the air 
campaign itself had a number of unforeseen consequences and presented severe moral 
and ethical dilemmas for NATO’s leadership.  For example, at first air strikes did little 
to disrupt Serbia’s genocidal military campaign and huge numbers of Kosovar refugees 
fled to Albania and Macedonia.  Equally, NATO’s air campaign was most effective at 
eroding Serb power when elements of the political and economic system were targeted 
such as power supplies, bridges, railway tracks and factories.  However, these strategic 
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gains came mainly at the cost of Serbian civilians.54  That said, in spite of the tough 
ethical dilemmas raised, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo is widely perceived as one of 
the success stories of the first Blair administration, whilst the Swedish government also 
contributed peace-keeping forces to the campaign.55  This is because as adviser to the 
House of Commons Defence Committee, Michael Clarke observed, NATO intervention 
in Kosovo set in motion, “…a dynamic that saw the fall of Milosevic in Serbia, his 
delivery to the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague, and [brought] Kosovo to 
the brink of independence.”56 
 
Despite the perceived success of the campaign, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 
provoked controversy with critics like Daniele Archibugi expressing anxiety at the 
precedent set by state alliances acting unilaterally outside the purview of international 
law, for whilst the campaign had been supported by the EU, it had lacked UN 
prerogative.57  In response to these concerns, ‘cosmopolitan’ German intellectual Jürgen 
Habermas expressed the view that the Kosovo conflict must be perceived as an 
‘emergency situation’ rather than a precedent where, “the dilemma of having to act as 
though there were already a fully institutionalized global civil society…does not force 
us to accept the maxim that victims are to be left at the mercy of thugs.”58  Given the 
controversies provoked by NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo, it is significant 
that in the British and American press, literary and visual metaphors arising out of the 
public memory of the Holocaust played a crucial role in how NATO’s air campaign was 
mediated and justified to the British and American public in the absence of UN sanction 
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for military intervention.59    
 
For example, Tony Kushner has demonstrated that metaphors relating to the memory of 
the Holocaust were used by the Clinton and Blair administrations to justify and rally 
popular support for NATO military intervention in Kosovo.  The fact that the 
grandparents of American Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright had perished during 
the Holocaust meant that the Kosovo war was sometimes referred to as ‘Madeleine’s 
War’. Continuing these Second World War and Holocaust metaphors, UK Minister for 
International Development, Clare Short, agreed with Clinton that Albright’s support for 
the war demonstrated that we have ‘learned the lessons of Munich.’  Equally, language 
and rhetoric associated with the Nazi persecution of European Jewry was used to frame 
reports and images of Muslim Kosovar Albanians in British newspapers such as The 
Daily Mirror, The Guardian and The Daily Mail.60     
 
However, this use of Holocaust metaphors to publicize news about contemporary 
genocides has not proved un-controversial.  For example, prior to the Kosovo crisis, U.S 
Communications scholar, Barbie Zelizer suggested that the Western media’s tendency 
to use literary metaphors and photographic imagery of the Holocaust as a reservoir of 
archetypical visual and verbal tropes in order to convey news about post-1945 
genocides in places such as Cambodia and Bosnia risks creating a pernicious, “atrocity 
aesthetic”.61  For Zelizer, this “atrocity aesthetic” is problematic because far from 
sensitizing the public to violence and the importance of dealing with those responsible 
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for the perpetration of mass atrocities, it is more likely to provide reductive frameworks 
of comprehension which simply allow viewers to, “…position new horrors rather than 
understand them…”,62 and in so doing, “… classify, categorize, and in many cases 
forget what we are seeing.”63  Beyond Zelizer’s critique of the problem of, 
“Remembering to forget”,64 the significance of this phenomenon of journalistically 
framing Kosovo via the use of literary and visual tropes associated with the Holocaust 
will be explored in more detail and in a different context in chapter five’s section on the 
‘New Cosmopolitanism’. 
 
Thus, as NATO commemorated the 50th anniversary of its establishment (April 1999) 
against the backdrop of the anxieties provoked by Kosovo, three ITF meetings were 
held in 1999, two in London under the British chairmanship (8 - 9th March 1999 and 
25th June 1999) and a third in Jerusalem under the Israeli chair (13 - 14th October 1999).  
According to ITF minutes,65 the first meeting in London primarily focused on the 
continuation and completion of projects from previous meetings.  Within this context, 
the USHMM took up the German delegations suggestion at a meeting in 1998 that an 
ongoing calendar of Holocaust events be compiled and constantly updated.  The best 
ways to disseminate Holocaust education guidelines was discussed, whilst Smith 
continued to argue that owing to the diversity of national historical particularities across 
Europe, “…it was difficult to find a single date equally meaningful and appropriate to 
all.”,66 although the European Parliament and the Council of Europe could be 
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approached to see if they would be willing to promote such a Holocaust 
commemoration day.   
 
Other issues addressed were the Yad Vashem Holocaust Educator’s conference, the 
prospective administration of the Task Force fund and the necessity that it not, 
“…compete for sources of finance with other Holocaust related institutions,”67 as well 
as the organization of the impending Stockholm conference.  From a retrospective 
knowledge of the institutional development of the ITF, it is also notable that by the 
March 1999 meeting, member states were beginning to assume functions that would 
remain their primary area of competence throughout the next few years.  For example, 
the USHMM would often be responsible for technological issues involved with the 
development of databases or the ITF website; Yad Vashem, alongside the USHMM 
would be vital in providing teacher training sessions for ‘Liaison Projects’; the British 
delegation would be at the forefront of HMD discussions; whilst Sweden would 
organize a series of Stockholm conferences and end up administering the ITF fund. 
 
 
According to ITF minutes accessed online in 2008, a key discussion at the first London 
meeting was the prospective role that ‘Field Missions’ or what would later become 
known as ‘Liaison Projects’ would play in both the SIF 2000 and the future role of the 
ITF.  Although this information about the theorization of ‘Liaison Projects’ is difficult 
to corroborate with other documentary sources at present, it is worth reviewing this 
information, however tentatively because the idea of the ‘Liaison Project’ would 
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become so central to new member states gaining membership to the ITF after the SIF 
2000.  Also, the discussions about ‘Liaison Projects’ demonstrate how sensitive the ITF 
was to potential criticism about being branded as an organization that simply imposed 
western norms and values without any sensitivity to the specificities of national and 
regional context in the post-Soviet states.  Building on a ‘Field Missions’ paper written 
by Yad Vashem, but arguing that bilateral and multilateral projects should go beyond 
the process of teacher training, a Senior Advisor to the U.S Under-Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs proposed that, “Field Missions should be a primary vehicle for Task 
Force outreach to other countries.”68  He further added that there “was a need to slow 
down and work towards the Stockholm Conference as a showcase for the pilot project.  
What’s done in 1999 can be viewed as an experiment.”69  
 
The Senior Advisor also argued that under good conditions, missions should comprise 
three member countries working in partnership with a liaison state.  The formation of 
ITF diplomatic liaison partners should reflect pre-existing political and cultural links 
with the country of co-operation.  He also emphasized that an essential prerequisite to a 
successful international collaboration was a prior awareness of the conditions of 
Holocaust education in the liaison state and stressed that these missions should be long 
term projects.  In this way, missions would be specifically tailored to the country in 
question yet implemented in a flexible way in order to ensure their sustainability.  
Finally, the Senior Advisor underlined the fact that, “Missions should only visit 
countries that have invited them to do so.  To date the Czech Republic has expressed an 
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interest as have (informally) the Argentines.” 70   He was concerned that short-term 
projects might backfire because they could be perceived as western impositions, an 
opinion encapsulated in his comment that, “Teachers can be resentful of westerners 
parachuting in, conducting one workshop and then leaving.”71 
 
These issues were further discussed at the June 1999 meeting in London where a 
‘Liaison Projects’ concept paper proposed by the delegation from the Netherlands met 
with consensus and prospective ‘Liaison Projects’ with the Baltic States, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovakia, Russia and Argentina were mooted.72  The presence of the South 
American option is significant as it suggests that even at this early stage, the ITF’s 
objectives were far wider than the recovery of the European memory of the Holocaust.   
It was also highlighted at this meeting that the criteria for potential ‘Liaison Projects’ 
could include: 
…comprehensive national education programs (like Sweden’s Living History Project), teacher 
training  curriculum development, establishment of national remembrance days and related 
activities, establishing museum/remembrance institutions, hosting conferences, developing 
educational guidelines, using survivor lectures, recording survivor histories, concentration camp 
visits, developing or accessing educational material. Liaison with expert institutions, educator 
exchanges, and using travelling exhibitions.73 
 
After discussions, it was decided that on condition of mutual agreement with the host 
nation, the Czech Republic would become the first site of a ‘Liaison Project’,74 and as 
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part of this initiative, “…experts from the Task Force country institutions would 
conduct intensive training in the Czech Republic for teachers who could then train other 
Czech teachers in the Czech language, for a multiplier effect.”75  A country that joined 
NATO in 1999 and aspired to EU membership, it is arguable, that the willingness of the 
Czech government to co-operate with the ITF was further reaffirmed by Deputy Prime 
Minister, Pavel Rychetsky’s announcement in January 2000 that the Czech government 
would return property seized from the Jews during the Nazi era.76    
 
In line with these plans, specific details of the Czech ‘Liaison Project’ were confirmed 
at an ITF meeting during the SIF on 27th January 2000.  It was decided that the 
Netherlands, America and Israel would be the Czech Republic’s ‘Liaison Partners’ and 
a number of initiatives became immediate targets for implementation.  Organized by the 
Czech Ministry of Education, the Jewish museum in Prague, the Romani Museum in 
Brno and the Terezín memorial, experts from the Task Force would assist in a series of 
four training seminars between March and May 2000 for four hundred Czech educators 
in Terezín and Prague.  A limited selection of these Czech educators would then be 
involved in training schemes in the USA, Israel or the Netherlands or alternatively, 
could be called on to participate in a specialized week long seminar on the Holocaust, 
run with ITF support in the Czech Republic in 2001.  Other strands of the proposed 
‘Liaison Project’ included training programmes for civic educators, the reform of 
history textbooks as well as the establishment of Internet links between Czech teachers 
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and ITF experts.77 
 
This ‘Liaison Project’ built on the fact that as scholar Michal Frankl has observed the 
memory of the Holocaust in the Czech Republic had been distorted by the experience of 
Nazi and Soviet occupation. The construction of the ‘Protectorate of Bohemia and 
Moravia’ by the Nazis and the Third Reich’s suppression of the Czech population was 
succeeded by the idolization of the Communist elements of the Czech resistance by the 
post-war Soviet regime.  These Soviet governments also included anti-Zionist elements 
which were intensified by the Kremlin’s decision to cease diplomatic contacts with 
Israel in the wake of the state’s success in the ‘Six Day War’ (1967).  Within this 
political context, the extent of Jewish suffering, the role of Nazi-Czech collaboration as 
well as the issue of domestic anti-Semitism during the Second World War was largely 
suppressed.  For example, in May 1947 the Czechoslovakian government resolved to 
maintain Terezín as a memorial primarily to the suffering of political prisoners detained 
in the Small Fortress during the Second World War, whilst sidelining the hardships 
endured by the Jewish inhabitants of the ghetto.78   
 
Furthermore, the crackdown on reformers, intellectuals and dissenters in the wake of the 
Prague Spring (1968) by Czech communist leader Gustav Husak included the closing 
down and effacement of the walls of the Prague Pinkas synagogue where the names of 
78,000 Jewish victims of the Nazi occupation had been individually hand printed on the 
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walls by the local Jewish community between 1954 and 1959.79  Husak sanctioned this 
desecration on the grounds that the Pinkas Synagogue was perceived by the 
Communists as an emblem of ‘Zionist propaganda’.   Furthermore, investigation of the 
Nazi era ‘autonomous’ government and Czech Police units role in constructing 
internment camps for Roma and Sinti at Lety u Pisku and Hodonin u Kunstátu was also 
stymied during the Soviet period.80  This situation in relation to Jewish and Roma 
victims only really began to change in the twilight years of Communism and after 1989 
when an Education Department (1993) and international meeting centre (1997) were 
established at Terezín, and successful efforts were made by the Czech Jewish 
community to restore the Pinkas Synagogue (1992-1995).81  
 
Supporting statements made in ITF minutes, Frankl’s research also notes that, “The 
Czech Republic was first a liaison partner and later became a full member of the Task 
Force” and cites the Fenomén Holocaust Project (The Holocaust Phenomenon Project) 
as a particularly important Czech initiative in this regard.82  Founded by the Office of 
the President of the Czech Republic backed by Václav Havel, the Fenomén Holocaust 
Project originally focused its attention on the genocide of the Roma and Sinti but later 
expanded its remit to include all victims of Nazi crimes.  The project ran an 
international conference called Fenomén Holocaust between 6th and 8th October 1999, 
which included a speech by Havel and attendance by Bauer as well as other ITF 
delegates.83  The Fenomén Holocaust Project was quickly integrated as a further 
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component of the ITF ‘Liaison Project’ with the Czech Republic.84  The adoption of this 
project by the ITF demonstrates the way in which the organization sought to build on 
indigenous Holocaust remembrance initiatives that were already operational in national 
public arenas. 
 
The June 1999 meeting was also significant for Poland’s report on its Holocaust 
commemoration activities, and the USHMM’s offer to design a Task Force logo.  The 
idea of, “…the possible complementary nature of Task Force efforts with other 
international organizations (Council of Europe, OSCE, UN Human Rights 
Commission)” was observed.85  Within this context, the ITF considered approaching 
international bodies such as the European Parliament and the Council of Europe as 
potential collaboration partners, although it is significant that these organizations were 
not fundamental to the ITF’s establishment. Members of the UK delegation as 
represented by Smith and David Cesarani continued their work on HMDs, whilst a 
decision was made that despite approving Italy’s application to join the Task Force, 
there should be a halt on further expansion until after the Stockholm Conference.86  As 
British historian Andy Pearce has documented, the month of June was also especially 
significant for Smith and Cesarani because after a number of Task Force discussions, 
the idea for a British HMD received national media exposure in June 1999 after it was 
discussed in the context of Prime Minister’s Question’s and packaged as a 
Parliamentary Bill.  Following on from this discussion, the plan and objectives for a 
British day of Holocaust memory assumed a unified outline in a Consultation Paper of 
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October 1999.87  However, it should be stressed that although HMD in the UK was 
implemented through British governmental channels and whilst the campaigning of the 
Holocaust Educational Trust (HET) played a central role in getting the legislation 
adopted, as Smith noted in an interview in 2009, British HMD was also “… a 
recommendation of the Task Force.”88   
 
Whilst these meetings unfolded and HMD was being formalized in Britain, the Swedish 
government was busy organizing the SIF 2000 after the first invitation to the conference 
was presented to participants at the June 1999 ITF meeting.89  Despite the high profile 
of Holocaust issues in the global media in the late 1990s, organizers maintain that they 
were astonished at the amount of political interest that the event inspired in those 
invited to attend.  Persson has commented that, “…the response surprised us when the 
acceptances and confirmations began to arrive”,90 whilst Smith, a British participant in 
the preparations has observed: 
 
The invitations were sent out and there was certainly no anticipation that twenty-two heads of 
state would come.  We thought two, three...We thought one or two minor countries might send 
senior representatives but the letters were sent to Heads of State and on the main part, Heads of 
State attended, which was totally, absolutely, unexpected.  And the scale of it was totally 
unexpected.  We genuinely thought that there would not be that much interest.  We certainly 
thought that there would not be that much interest from Central and East European countries and 
we didn’t even expect them to come.  And I know that for a fact.  So it caught the organizing 
committee by surprise.  There was certainly no...I mean the team was only three people; there 
was no sense from the Swedish Prime Minister’s Office’s side that they would actually have to 
put any resources into it.  It was expected to be a small affair.91 
 
Mirroring the fact that it was agreed on 1st July 1999, that Israel would succeed the UK 
as Task Force chair, followed by Sweden at the end of 1999 and Germany and the 
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Netherlands in 2000, the next meeting of the ITF occurred just three months before the 
SIF 2000 in Jerusalem in October 1999.  Minutes from this meeting suggest that it was 
convened against the backdrop of a two-day Yad Vashem International Conference on 
Holocaust Education which the ITF had affiliated itself with as a ‘moral supporter’.92  
This important precursor to the SIF 2000 was considered different from the impending 
Swedish event because as two Israeli delegates pointed out, the Yad Vashem conference 
had been, “…designed for educators and the Stockholm meeting for political, religious 
and civic leaders.”93 Against this backdrop, it was announced that the early stages of 
implementing the Czech ‘Liaison Project’ had been successful and that the declaration 
of an annual UK HMD would be announced at the same time as the convening of the 
SIF 2000.  The next section will delineate the media reception of the SIF 2000 in the 
British and American contexts although reference will also be made to Swedish and 
Israeli commentaries.  Finally, this chapter will conclude with a description of the press 
responses to the announcement of UK HMD, an initiative shaped by British 
campaigners and  members of the ITF and communicated to British society through the 
media discourses of one particular national ‘public sphere’.  
 
The Media Reception of the SIF 2000   
 
The sheer spectacle of the SIF 2000 dazzled many of the delegates present at the event.  
For example, Eizenstat commented of the impact of the SIF 2000 that:  
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After more than half a century, it was extraordinary to convene so many political leaders to 
commit their countries to promote Holocaust education, remembrance – like national days of 
commemoration – and research.94   
 
Equally, Levine recalled in an interview in November 2009 that: 
 
I’ll never forget standing on the stairs and putting my arm around Lars-Erik [Wingren] and 
saying, “Can you believe this?” as the hundreds of delegates streamed in…  But we were 
overwhelmed and I was personally overwhelmed.95  
 
 
Finally, for psychologist and survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau and Bergen-Belsen, Hédi 
Fried: 
As a survivor, I was personally very happy to see my adoptive country, Sweden, hosting that 




Positive responses to the SIF 2000 were also evident in a number of recollections about 
the conference by British eyewitnesses to the event which were recorded in 2009.  The 
British delegation was organized through the auspices of the office on post-Holocaust 
issues in the European Union Department (Bilateral) of the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.97  The British delegation included both Cesarani and Smith as 
well as figures such as Jeremy Cresswell (Head of the European Union Department – 
Bilateral), Ben Helfgott (1945 Aid Society and Board of Deputies of British Jews), 
Trudy Gold (Spiro Institute), Suzanne Bardgett (IWM), Janice Lopatkin (HET) and 
Gillian Walnes (Anne Frank Educational Trust).  Leading figure within the British 
Jewish community, Ben Helfgott, who personally experienced the wartime horrors of 
Buchenwald, Schlieben and Theresienstadt felt that the Forum was, “…very 
uplifting…at an event like this you always come out more Enlightened and enthusiastic.  
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I mean this was something very special.”98   
 
Equally, predating the opening of the IWM’s Holocaust exhibition in June 2000, 
Bardgett, the then Project Director of the aforementioned exhibit at the London 
establishment commented of her experience at Stockholm that: 
 
It had a very major impact on me.  I had never been at an event where there were so many 
statements, pledges, to remember the Holocaust from so many senior people.  It had a very 
profound effect on me.  I remember actually being quite overcome by...I couldn’t sleep actually, 
the night after the main events because it was sort of, so extraordinary.99        
 
Bardgett was so struck by the conference that on the 1st February 2000 she wrote to the 
British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook thanking him for his speech and his mention of 
the IWM Holocaust exhibition.  She stated to Cook that, “The Forum seemed a real 
watershed in history of understanding this subject, and it was very encouraging to hear 
such firm commitment from each country both to education and to the remembrance of 
this terrible event.”100  Wanting the IWM’s patrons to know about discussions at the 
SIF 2000, Bardgett also sent a note about the conference with Cook’s speech attached to 
the IWM’s Founding Patrons and Advisory Group in the weeks following the Forum.101  
The IWM curator was not alone in her positive sentiments about the conference.  
Despite prior inter-cultural developments in Holocaust education and memorialization 
over the previous decades, Smith recalled commenting to his colleagues at the end of 
the first day that the SIF 2000 still marked a significant watershed in terms of the global 
density of the institutions of Holocaust history and remembrance: 
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We can’t say anymore that the Holocaust has been forgotten, the question is what kind of 
memory have we got?”  I think that then began a new process in terms of internationalising 
memory and it happened in that hall, that day, there’s no doubt about that.102   
 
 
Even a somewhat more circumspect Cesarani recalled that despite the freezing cold 
climate and prolonged periods of diplomatic tedium, it was nevertheless an 
‘extraordinary’ event in more ways than one: 
I remember it being extremely cold.  And everywhere I stood to give interviews with radio or 
television involved me standing in a very cold puddle of water.  It was also very boring for long 
stretches.  All of these conferences involved plenary sessions in which politicians and diplomats 
would make very long and very inconsequential speeches and you would have to sit through 
them and pretend to be awake.  The Stockholm Conference was of a different order to the one in 
London and Washington because there were far more countries represented at a senior level.  So 
the plenary sessions were extraordinary because you had one Prime Minister, one President after 
another getting up and making speeches.  It was also extraordinary because Prime Minister 
Persson, who was then Prime Minister of Sweden, was clearly dedicated to making people aware 
of the persecution and mass murder of the Jews.103  
  
Press reportage of the SIF 2000 in British and American newspapers was primarily 
placed within the context of the coincidental news of the Haider controversy in 
Austria.104  Owing to the strength of the Freedom Party, Chancellor Wolfgang 
Schuessel of the Austrian People’s Party decided to propose a governing coalition with 
Haider on 25th January 2000. Accidently overlapping with the eve of the SIF 2000, the 
presence of Haider within the upper strata of European power politics became a 
controversial issue which made the SIF 2000 seem relevant to journalists.  On the 27th 
January 2000, The New York Times proclaimed news of the Stockholm conference in a 
report headlined, ‘Rightists Gain in Austria Strikes Some of its Neighbours as a Loss’ 
whilst on the same day The Washington Post reported on the Forum within the context 
of, ‘Austria Alliance Alarms Europe: Far Right Party likely to be Partner in Governing 
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Coalition.’105  In a similar vein, in Britain on the 27th January 2000, the left-wing The 
Guardian headed an article which included quotes from politicians present at 
Stockholm, ‘Austria gets Pariah Warning Over Haider’,106 whilst the more 
conservative broadsheet, The Times reported that, ‘Leaders gather at Holocaust 
Forum’, an initiative which, “…comes at a time when the far Right is enjoying a 
renaissance in Europe and amid shock in Sweden at the growth of neo-Nazism.”107   
 
The main news in these press reports was the U.S and Europe-wide condemnation of 
Haider by a number of politicians who were present at the SIF 2000. Despite acting 
chancellor of Austria and leader of the Social Democrats Viktor Klima’s efforts at a 
Reception at Stockholm City Hall to reassure assembled delegates as to the intentions of 
his country by stating that, “...there must be no doubt about the continuation of the 
critical confrontation with the Nazi past.”,108 the censure of the Austrian government 
coming from assembled politicians was unambiguous.  Persson was quoted in The 
Washington Post as stating, “The European Union is also a union consisting of values 
that respect tolerance.  The program that is developing in Austria is not in line with 
those values.”109  Germany, France and Italy also expressed concern about Haider’s rise 
to pre-eminence, however, it was the Israeli government who was most enraged and 
threatened to cease diplomatic relations with Vienna.  The Guardian quoted Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak as commenting from the SIF 2000 that, “For every Jew in the 
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world it is a highly disturbing signal...It touches every one of us”,110 whilst Michael 
Melchior, the Israeli minister responsible for battling anti-Semitism was reported in The 
Times as stating that, “This man and his teachings are insults to decency and 
democracy.  They are an insult to the essence of the message of what we are gathered 
here to talk about.”111  Although not presenting a speech at Stockholm, First Lady 
Hilary Clinton and candidate for the American Senate also joined in the condemnation 
of Haider, arguably in order to support the foreign policies of her husband as well as to 
show her liberal credentials and undercut her political opponent Rudolph Giuliani, 
Mayor of New York, who had allegedly shared the stage with Haider at a Martin Luther 
King commemoration in January 2000.  Writing to Edgar Bronfman, President of the 
WJC, Mrs Clinton stated, “Haider’s record of intolerance, extremism and anti-Semitism 
should be a concern to all of us.”112 
 
In terms of the political dynamics of institutional Holocaust memory and reparative 
justice, one of the key results of the Freedom Party controversy was that the United 
States government operated a ‘restricted contacts’ policy in which no contact was 
allowed with Haider or any Freedom Party members of the Austrian government whilst 
the class-action law suits relating to slave and forced labour were being resolved.113  
The affair was also significant because as spearheaded by the socialist government of 
Lionel Jospin in France, the EU placed sanctions on Austria.  This meant that whilst 
Austria continued to partake in EU meetings, Schuessel became isolated among EU 
leaders and bilateral relations with Austria were limited among the other EU heads of 
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state.114  The results of this international condemnation were that by February 2000, 
Haider had resigned as leader of the Freedom Party and refused to participate in the new 
government.  However, victory against the Austrian populist radical right was far from 
total.  Half of the Austrian governing cabinet comprised members of the Freedom Party 
whilst Haider retained his position as Governor of Carinthia.115  Furthermore, 
commentators such as Robert S. Wistrich, Neuberger Chair in Modern Jewish History at 
the Hebrew University, Jerusalem warned of the potential consequences of the Haider 
affair: 
If he presents a threat, and he does, it is one that should be met not by rejecting the choice of the 
Austrian people but by giving them ample opportunity to reconsider.  By contrast, the EU’s 
diplomatic embargo seems calculated to turn Austria into pariah state, a policy that may give 
some temporary satisfaction to the cosmopolitan defenders of a united Europe but it is likely to 
backfire in the end.116  
 
The fact that the convening of the SIF 2000 was often journalistically framed in terms 
of this battle against a resurgent European far right is further compounded by two press 
reports issued in February 2000.  The headline of a BBC report of 18th February 2000 
describes the SIF 2000 as a ‘World Alert for the Rise of the Far Right’117 whilst in a 
report for CNN, Stieg Larsson, left-wing journalist, writer of the Millenium crime 
trilogy, and founder of the Swedish anti-racist and youth orientated Expo Foundation, 
expressed the opinion that:  
 
I think the Stockholm conference is the most important event in the matter of anti-fascism in 
many, many years simply because anti-Semitism is once again the absolute cornerstone of all 
neo-Nazi and racist activities in Europe.118 
 
With the exception of the context of the Haider controversy, press reportage of the SIF 
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2000 in British and American newspapers generally gained only a brief mention as in 
The Daily Telegraph’s description of the conference in the ‘World Bulletin’ under the 
heading ‘Jews honour Wallenberg.’119 However, it should also be noted that on 27th 
January 2000 news of the SIF 2000 made the front page of The Times and the inside 
pages of The Daily Telegraph for domestic political reasons in Britain.120  Relating to 
the controversy over New Labour’s proposal to repeal Section 28, or the law which 
prohibited the promotion of homosexuality by UK local authorities and was seen by 
abolitionists as inhibiting teachers from supporting gay teenagers and tackling sex 
education effectively in schools, SIF 2000 attendee and leader of British Orthodox 
Jews, Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, in a classic moment of faith inspired ‘liberal 
ambivalence’ towards homosexual difference opposed the repeal of Section 28 on the 
grounds that:  
 
I can never forget as a Jew that homosexuals were sent to Auschwitz just as Jews were.  If our 
society has become more tolerant then that is a good thing.  However, the current proposal is 
based on a fundamental confusion between tolerance and moral judgement.  There is a real 
danger that the abolition of Section 28 will lead to the promotion of a homosexual lifestyle as 
morally equivalent to marriage.121   
 
Sacks comments incited a reader, Jonathan Fraser to write a letter to The Jewish 
Chronicle: 
 
I remember being bullied at school for being Jewish (and therefore being different) at the time of 
the Yom Kippur War.  Treating gays and lesbians as ‘different’ is the surest way of encouraging 
hatred.  And Section 28 encourages this.  When, next January, we reaffirm that the Holocaust 
should never happen again, we would do well to remember the other victims as well as those 
from our own families and friends.122 
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In addition to this commentary, The Jewish Chronicle’s coverage of the SIF 2000 was 
to be primarily found in an article under the headline, ‘Britain to attend Latvia talks on 
suspected war criminal’ by Ronald Loefler, Hal Weitzman and Bernard Josephs.  This 
article reported that:  
 
Latvia won praise at an International Forum on the Holocaust…by inviting representatives of six 
nations to Riga to discuss the case of Konrad Kalejs, the alleged Nazi war criminal who left 
Britain for America earlier this month.123  
 
Loefler, Weitzmann and Josephs also commented on Foreign Secretary Cook’s presence 
at the SIF 2000, the conference’s coincidence with the announcement of UK HMD as 
well as Persson’s pledges to set up a Holocaust museum in Sweden and donate $5 
million to the Swedish Association of Jewish Communities.  They also noted that the 
WJC’s Bronfman, “…was holding a parallel conference at the Stockholm Great 
Synagogue” which Persson attended in order to present, “Nina Lagergren, Raoul 
Wallenberg’s sister, with the WJC human rights award.”124 
 
However, the achievements of the SIF 2000 did not win universal praise.   Absent from 
attending the Forum itself, for Zuroff writing in The Jerusalem Report (28th February 
2000), the conference was a catalogue of ‘Missed Opportunities in Stockholm’.  Zuroff 
reiterated his critique of the Swedish government for failing to deal with war crimes 
issues, especially in the wake of the January 2000 release of Bosse Schoen’s 
documentary which alleged that a minimum of 260 Swedes had been Waffen-SS 
members during the Second World War.125 Within this context, Zuroff criticized the 
organizers of the SIF 2000 for not inviting Simon Wiesenthal and disapprovingly 
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observed of the treatment of the Swedish war crimes issue that: 
 
Prime Minister Persson called for an investigation, but no operative decision on this has been 
made and the subject was studiously avoided by the visiting dignitaries who preferred to praise 
their host.  Nor was it discussed in any of the numerous panels and lectures.126  
 
However, in spite of this, Zuroff stated that the most important of the SIF 2000’s 
shortcomings was: 
 
…the cynical manner in which it was exploited by some Eastern European leaders to deliver 
sanitized presentations of their history and the role played by their countrymen in the 
implementation of the Final Solution.127  
 
In regards to this criticism and in contrast to the reported praise heaped on Latvia in The 
Jewish Chronicle’s report, Zuroff criticized the speech of Latvian President, Vaira 
Vike-Freiberga for minimizing the extent of local collaboration in the Holocaust and for 
blaming “…Nazi racist propaganda exclusively for the participation of Latvians in the 
murder of the Jews, which is grossly inaccurate.”128  Equally, given the extent of local 
Lithuanian collaboration in the Nazi mass murder of 212,000 of Lithuania’s 220,000 
Jews during the Second World War, 129 Zuroff also found fault with Prime Minister 
Andrius Kubilius’s claims that the Lithuanian Jewish collective had been one of the 
‘happiest’ in Europe because Lithuania was “…a country with no anti-Semitism in its 
recorded history.”130  Zuroff’s observations were supported by scholar Göran Adamson 
who also censured the Bulgarian government’s speech for over- stating the lack of anti-
Semitism in the Bulgarian parliament during the Second World War as well as over-
exaggerating the overall “… benevolent character of the Bulgarian people.”131 
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Adamson also observed the ‘vagueness’ of the commitments to human rights in 
presentations by Persson, Italian Prime Minister D’Alema as well as the brevity of 
Havel’s speech, which nonetheless condemned racism and anti-Semitism, pledged his 
country to the needs of Holocaust survivors and supported the memorialization of the 
Jews and Roma through the ‘Holocaust Phenomenon’ project.132     Within this context, 
Adamson felt that it was ironic that: 
 
The only states who avoided this ever threatening vagueness were actually those who, in various 
degrees made nationalistic speeches, that is those who used the SIFH as a platform for ideas, in a 
manner contrary to the stated purpose of the conference.133 
 
Although the SIF 2000 did not gain extensive coverage in the UK print media or in 
American newspapers such as The New York Times and the Washington Post, it did 
receive substantial exposure through television, radio and the Internet.  For example, a 
report on CNN’s website (27th January 2000) proclaimed that there would be a live 
webcast of the opening ceremony,134 whilst in February, a CNN World Report was aired 
entitled ‘Stockholm International Forum Remembers Crimes of Nazism’.135 Equally, 
BBC reports on the SIF 2000 were written against the backdrop of other Holocaust era 
headlines such as ‘Latvia killers rehabilitated’ (26th January 2000); ‘Blair unveils 
Holocaust Memorial Plan’ (26th January 2000); ‘Nazi slave cash bill adopted’ (26th  
January 2000); ‘The Long Fight for Holocaust Compensation’ (26th January 2000) and 
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‘Berlin’s Battle to build memorial’ (27th January 2000).136   
 
However, perhaps two BBC reports on the conference are most significant both in terms 
of the high profile of the actors involved as well as in the way that they intimate future 
challenges for the Stockholm Project and the ITF in terms of the public perception of 
global dynamics in Holocaust memory work.  For example, the first report situates the 
convening of the SIF 2000 within the question, ‘Is there a Holocaust Industry’;137 whilst 
the second is by diplomatic correspondent Barnaby Mason and fronted a headline which 
proclaimed ‘Uncomfortable Questions in Stockholm’ and which observed, “Walking 
around the conference centre, you feel a curious disconnection between the comfortable 
people sipping coffee and the horrors whose memory they are here to perpetuate.”138    
 
Mason’s article then focuses on the Opening Speech of Auschwitz survivor, Nobel Prize 
Winner and Honorary Chairman of the Conference, Elie Wiesel.  In his speech Wiesel 
had called on Persson to make the conference an annual event on “conscience and 
humanity” and had posed a number of difficult questions to the delegates gathered 
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culminating in his statement that if the allies had not followed the policy of 
appeasement, the Holocaust, “…could have been avoided.”139  In many respects, it is 
unsurprising that the BBC picked up on Wiesel’s high profile speech because at least 
one delegate believed that Wiesel had potentially, “insulted the international 
community,” and in general had formulated an address that was off tone within the 
context of the Forum’s political objectives.140  Wiesel was also in the world press later 
in the week when he made an official address to the German Reichstag on 27th January 
or HMD in Germany.  Wiesel’s speech was part of a ceremony announcing the building 
of a ‘Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe’ in Berlin.  In his address, Wiesel 
reinforced the idea of the Holocaust as what Dirk Moses might call an enduring stigma 
on German national history and identity,141 stating to the politicians gathered that, “No 
people ever inflicted such suffering as your people on mine in such a short period.  
Until the end of time, Auschwitz is part of your history and mine.”142  
 
However, other issues were raised at the SIF 2000 which received little or no coverage 
in the press.  In this regard, much like debates surrounding the creation of the USHMM, 
except played out against the more ‘universalistic’ rhetoric of Holocaust 
‘unprecedentedness’ rather than ‘uniqueness’, the SIF 2000 was also used as a platform 
by some speakers in order to raise awareness of not just issues arising from the Nazi 
mass murder of European Jewry but also other Nazi atrocities and instances of genocide 
and/or human rights abuses since 1945.  For whilst Turkey continued to maintain its 
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silence on the Armenian genocide during World War One;143 and there was no 
representative of a disability NGO, in spite of the need to memorialize the Nazi T4 mass 
murder programme as well as to highlight the ongoing human rights abuses of disabled 
children in some Romanian orphanages,144 Texas University Professor Ian Hancock 
spoke on the behalf of Europe’s Roma and Sinti during the second plenary session and 
criticized the delegates to the SIF 2000 on the grounds that: 
 
…the primary target today in Europe of right-wing aggression and racist attacks are the Roma, 
my people, the Romani people, the so-called ‘Gypsies’.  We were also second only to the Jews 
in the Holocaust, in terms of being victimized, singled out, the targets of attempted 
extermination.  And yet that connection has not been made.  It seems to me puzzling, given the 
reason for this conference, which is to remember what happened then, and to take it as a lesson 
and apply it to what is happening now.  Nobody on the first day talked about what happened to - 
what is  happening to - Roma today in Europe.  It has come up in one or two of the sessions 
when we have raised the issue ourselves, but it has not been a spontaneous issue at all.145       
 
Furthermore, in his address, Hancock was particularly critical of the claims made in the 
Czech delegation’s speech on the grounds that, “… in the past year those very same 
governments have refused entry to Roma, particularly from the Czech Republic, seeking 
asylum on grounds of human rights violations.”146  Equally, whilst Prime Minister of 
the Bosnian republican government since 1993 and Co-Chairman of the Council of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haris Siladzic acknowledged the importance of remembering 
the Holocaust he also drew particular attention to the Serbian genocide of Bosnian 
Muslims (1992-1995), as well as the plight of innocent, non-terrorist Muslim civilians 
and refugees caught up in the conflict in Chechnya:  
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The Allies did not bomb the railway tracks leading to Auschwitz, because they feared that it 
would arouse the wrath of the Nazis; six million people died.  In our case, an arms embargo led 
to ‘only’ a quarter of a million deaths - an embargo that penalized only the victims for the 
aggressors already had more arms than they could handle.  How many will die in Chechnya 
remains to be seen; it will depend on who counts the dead.  The majority of our quarter of a 
million victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina were Bosniaks, Bosnian Muslims.147           
 
Despite Russia’s presence at the SIF 2000, and although the Danish Prime Minister, 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen called for a peaceful resolution to the Chechen conflict and, 
“…access for humanitarian aid”,148 few politicians at the SIF 2000 commented on 
Russia’s brutal autumn 1999 attempt to militarily reclaim its former province against 
the backdrop of the violent terrorist provocations of Chechen separatist war-lords and 
fighters, many of whom were Islamic extremists.149  This was in spite of the fact that 
soon after the crisis flared, international human rights organizations began to raise 
concerns about the conduct of ‘cleansing’ operations by Russian federal forces;150 
whilst an article on the plight of non-militant and non-Islamic extremist Chechen 
refugees by Vanora Bennett in The Times (27th January 2000) cited the concerns of 
Muscovite human rights worker Svetlana Gannush that, “There is a strange revanchist 
attitude fuelling this war, a distorted Russian nationalism…A huge number of people 
believe Russia is fighting not Chechnya but Chechens.”151   
 
The Media Reception of the Announcement of British HMD 
 
On 26th January at the SIF 2000, British Foreign Secretary Cook told international 
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delegates present that, “…today Tony Blair has announced that the 27th January will 
every year be commemorated in Britain as Holocaust Memorial Day not just in memory 
of the victims of the Holocaust alone but also in memory of all victims of genocide.”152 
Preceding Cook’s speech by a few hours, Blair had announced an annual UK HMD 
amidst the media fanfare of an official trip to the Anne Frank Trust exhibition in 
London.  Blair stated that, “The Holocaust and the lessons it teaches us for our own 
time, must never be forgotten.”153, as well as emphasizing that, “As the Holocaust 
survivors age and become fewer in number, it becomes more and more our duty to take 
up the mantle and tell each generation what happened and what could happen 
again.”154  Blair placed the decision for a HMD within the context of New Labour’s 
objectives to encourage, “a just, tolerant and multi-racial Britain” as well as the 
government’s desire to, “build a new patriotism that is open to all.”155  Echoing the 
policy line of the Prime Minister, whilst stressing the more ‘universalistic’ aims of 
British HMD, Home Secretary, Jack Straw added:  
 
Appalling and inhuman acts of genocide changed the course of history in the twentieth 
century.  Millions of people perished or had their lives hideously damaged.  This is an 
opportunity for us to recognize and act upon the lessons from the past. 
 
Our aim, in the 21st Century, must be to work towards a tolerant and diverse society 
which is based upon notions of universal dignity and equal rights and responsibilities 
for all citizens.  The Holocaust Memorial Day is a symbol of this.156 
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General press reports on Blair’s announcement in The Guardian and The Times noted 
that the first UK HMD would be held on the 27th January 2001 and that a working group 
on HMD was considering the various ways in which the Holocaust could be 
commemorated.  These suggestions included a secular ceremony attended by senior 
figures from the Royal Family and British politics.  Other events mooted included 
Holocaust survivors giving speeches in schools as well as the charitable selling of 
commemorative stamps, badges and memorial candles.  BBC news reported that the 
Prime Minister’s sentiments were echoed publicly by a number of British delegates to 
the SIF 2000 including Chief Rabbi Sacks who reportedly said that, “I welcome this 
announcement and applaud the government on what is a brave and significant idea”;157 
Smith described the news as, “A remarkably bold initiative”;158 whilst Eldred 
Tabachnik QC and President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews mirrored the 
ITF’s liberal ‘universalistic’ rhetoric in stating that, “It is essential that we remember 
the genocides of the last century and learn their lessons for the future.”159   
 
However, not all commentators shared Sacks, Smith and Tabachnik’s enthusiasm for 
British HMD.  In The Guardian, Anne Karpf, daughter of Holocaust survivors and 
author of The War After (1996) bemoaned, “the Spielberg agenda of using the 
Holocaust to teach liberal values.”160  Karpf also expressed fears that a ritualized day of 
Holocaust Remembrance would be little more than a series of ‘empty tributes’ that 
would reinforce public forgetting in a society that in her childhood experience had 
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ignored the memory of the Holocaust.161  Political writer and Observer columnist Will 
Hutton worried that UK HMD might end up suggesting, “…that the crazed mix of 
eugenics, anti-semitism and barbarism were and are unique to Germans and Germany, 
rather than something common to all European culture and something which we all 
must face.”162  In a different vein, Simon Finch, producer of the Channel Four 
documentary Hitler and Stalin, critiqued UK HMD from the perspective of the 
continuing inadequacy of the public remembrance of Stalin’s crimes: 
 
Think of the absurdity of the phrase, “the gulag industry” and you see the problem.  No iconic 
images exist to symbolize the millions who died in Stalin’s camps.  There is no archive.  There 
has been no public process of reckoning, and precious little discussion of guilt.  There is no 
chance of a memorial day for victims of Stalinism.163  
 
 
However, perhaps the most acerbic criticism came from left-of-centre columnist, Nick 
Cohen in the New Statesmen.  Writing in November 2000, Cohen proposed that British 
HMD was inappropriate because the country had not been occupied by the Nazis during 
the Second World War as well as politically hypocritical.  Cohen argued that this 
hypocrisy arose from the government’s implementation of the Immigration and Asylum 
Act (1999),164 its arms deals with countries which continued to violate human rights, as 
well as the failure of the proposed HMD to deal with specific issues such as the 
Armenian genocide as well as the persecution of the Kurds by the Iraqi government.165        
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Discussions about HMD in the British ‘public sphere’ were also reflected in letters to 
the editor published in the broadsheets between 27th and 29th January 2000.  These 
letters tended to illustrate the lack of popular awareness about inter-state organizations 
such as the ITF in national public life as well as demonstrating how the announcement 
of HMD provoked mixed responses relating to the role of memorialization in 
constructing multicultural values within British society.  Supporting the announcement 
Professor Geraldine Van Bueren stated in The Times that, “Holocaust Day should be 
regarded as an opportunity for all of us to commemorate where daily acts of 
intolerance and their silent acquiescence may eventually lead”;166 whilst Mr John 
Wagner believed that HMD should be represented by a yellow star of David badge 
which would turn that symbol, “of repression into one of defiance against any country 
or power that commits the crime of genocide.”167   
 
By contrast, the more politically conservative Daily Telegraph bemoaned in an 
‘Opinion’s Column’, Blair’s “Playing with history.” Despite acknowledging the failures 
of British policy towards the Jews during the Second World War, including immigration 
policy to Palestine and whether the allies should have protested the case of the Jews 
louder or even attempted to bomb Auschwitz, the writer maintains that a HMD in the 
UK, “…is the wrong way for Britain to commemorate a uniquely German crime” and 
that, “Blurring the distinction between those who ran the death camps and those who 
liberated them may serve European unity, but not historical truth.”168  Agreeing with 
this article in a ‘Letter to the editor’ on 29th January 2000, Mr Philip Malins from 
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Solihull in the West Midlands stated that commemoration of Holocaust victims should 
be incorporated into Remembrance Sunday because, “This would be a much more 
positive, constructive national day, embracing people of all ages and races, a fitting 
memorial to those who fought and died in the greatest of all wars.”169  Displaying a 
degree of ambivalence towards the remembrance of the suffering of the Jews during the 
Second World War as well as that endured by other victims of genocide, these articles 
in The Daily Telegraph also suggest a desire by the centre-right to represent World War 
II in a triumphal national narrative which is at odds with what can be interpreted as the 
liberal ‘universalistic’ and nationally self-critical representation of the remembrance of 
the Nazi past that was reinforced by the rhetorical claims of the SIF 2000.   
 
In The Guardian, two letters from Gil Elliot and Jane Clements of the Council of 
Christians and Jews whole-heartedly supported UK HMD.  However, echoing the 
complaints of writers such as Karpf and Hutton, letters of left-wing dissent were also 
published concerning the danger that UK HMD might ignore the national memory of 
Britain’s own Imperial transgressions as well as justify contentious domestic and 
foreign policies in the present.  Given Britain’s colonial past, Professor Robin Wilson 
protested, “Would it not be more appropriate for the day to be called national 
Holocaust and slavery day?”170  Equally, Mr Paul Elsen from London interjected that, 
“No person would deny the Jews proper commemoration for the Holocaust.  What 
opponents object to is its use as a symbol of Jewish victimhood and thus as justification 
for Israeli aggression and oppression”;171 whilst Mr Noel Longhurst from Sheffield 
protested against perceived parliamentary and social hypocrisy, “Am I alone in thinking 
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that the announcement of Holocaust day sits somewhat uneasily next to the row about 
letting in ‘too many’ refugees many of whom have been persecuted in their 
homelands.”172    
 
The heated opinions expressed in The Guardian suggest that the idea of UK HMD did 
not just provoke disdain from the popular right but also ambivalence, and sometimes 
outright opposition for very different political and social reasons from commentators 
left of New Labour, who perceived the government as being hypocritical in both its 
domestic multiculturalism and ‘ethical’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ foreign policy rhetoric.  In 
this mode of left-wing ambivalence towards British HMD, the commemoration day was 
perceived as a liberal and ‘universalistic’ representation of specific Jewish victimhood 
that in centering the Jewish tragedy was neither self-critical nor diverse enough to 
encompass the numerous narratives of suffering contained within the multicultural 
British ‘public sphere’. This was a position shared by Britain’s Armenian community 
who were battling to get the Turkish government to acknowledge the massacre of 1.5 
million Armenians during the First World War.  As a result, they interpreted Straw’s 
references to the need to remember genocides as political hypocrisy and polemically 
proclaimed that UK HMD, “…was an insult to other victims of genocide.”173   
 
Mirroring the way in which news about UK HMD was mediated through a specifically 
British context, The Guardian, The Times and The Daily Telegraph made virtually no 
mention of the role of the ITF or the convening of the SIF 2000 in bringing about the 
conceptualization of UK HMD, although The Guardian did report that, “There are also 
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plans to offer every household in Britain a free book on the Holocaust, following a 
similar initiative in Sweden.”174  Equally, in the Jewish Chronicle’s report on the 
announcement of UK HMD, reference was made to the convening of the SIF 2000, the 
British financial contribution to the ITF as well as the fact that President Arpad Gonz of 
Hungary had, “…announced that his country would inaugurate an annual Holocaust 
remembrance day on April 16, the anniversary of the start of the deportation of 
Hungarian Jewry in 1944.”175  Very little mention of the announcement of UK HMD 
was made in the tabloid print media (The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, The Sun) with 





The political and intellectual personnel of the ITF including but not limited to Academic 
Advisor and Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ advocate, Yehuda Bauer played a key role 
in the organization of the SIF 2000 and the writing of the Stockholm Declaration.  For 
many attendees, such as Eizenstat, Levine, Bardgett and Smith, the event was 
‘extraordinary’ and marked a significant attempt to ensure that the remembrance of the 
Holocaust as well as the acknowledgement of, “The terrible suffering of the many 
millions of other victims of the Nazis”,177 would not just be about the necessary 
although ‘imperfect justice’ of reparations, but also in the words of Wiesel, “…the 
                                                           
174
 Alan Travis, ‘Blair sets date for Holocaust memorial’, The Guardian, 27 January 2000, p. 15. 
175
 Bernard Josephs, ‘Blair to announce Holocaust day for the UK’, The Jewish Chronicle, 21 January 
2000.  
176
 ‘Brits to mark Holocaust’, The Sun, 27 January 2000, p. 10. 
177
 ‘Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust’, in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, 
ed. Fried, pp. 136-137. 
140 
 
continuing ethical value and weight of memory.”178  However, speeches by some 
delegates to the SIF 2000, the media reception of the conference in the British, 
American and Israeli press as well as the public response to analogous announcements 
such as the launch of UK HMD, suggests that the project of remembrance outlined at 
the SIF 2000 also provoked criticism from various dissenting voices.   
 
Issues raised included the ongoing need to prosecute Nazi war criminals and Sweden’s 
failures in this regard;  the demand for greater justice and remembrance for Europe’s 
Roma and Sinti populations; debates in relation to national identity provoked by the 
announcement of UK HMD; ambivalence in Eastern European countries towards taking 
national responsibility for collaboration in the Holocaust and finally, pressure over the 
extent to which remembrance of the Nazi past should directly contribute to international 
action to  memorialize other historical atrocities as well as to  prevent future genocides 
and human rights abuses in line with the Stockholm Declaration’s commitment to 
condemn, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.”179  As 
will be seen in chapter 3, which looks at the consequences of the SIF 2000 in terms of 
the successive SIFs and the ITF, as well as chapter four, which delineates the impact of 
the ITF’s British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’; many of these issues would continue to 
shape, confront or be debated in subsequent SIFs as well as in the ITF during the first 
decade of its existence.     
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The Legacies of the SIF 2000:  
The Subsequent Stockholm Conferences and  
The First Decade of the ITF 
 
Once the politicians had exited the conference stage and the scholarly experts had 
discarded their prompt notes where could the impact of the SIF 2000 be traced beyond 
the newspaper articles, television reports and Internet bulletins?  Some of the immediate 
consequences of the SIF 2000 included increased pressure on Germany to resolve slave 
labor compensation issues as well as the arrival in Latvia of prosecutors from six 
nations, including the U.S and the UK, in order to mount criminal cases against alleged 
Second World War perpetrators in the Baltic States.1  Equally, Polish scholar Jolanta 
Ambrosewicz-Jacobs has noted the fact that Poland’s participation at the SIF 2000 also, 
“…helped the authors of the first curriculum pertaining to the Holocaust, Robert 
Szuchta and Piotr Trojanski, obtain financial support from the Ministry of Education in 
April 2000.”2  Moreover, in response to the heated public discussions that greeted the 
Polish publication of Neighbors in the spring of 2000,3 Polish President, Aleksander 
Kwasniewski made an important address on 10th July 2001 marking the sixtieth 
anniversary of the Jedwabne tragedy.  In response to Jan T. Gross’s analysis of the July 
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1941 Polish massacre of approximately 1,600 Jews in the small town of Jedwabne, 
Kwasniewski stated:  
 
I apologize in the name of those Poles whose conscience is moved by that crime.  In the name of 
those who believe that we cannot be proud of the magnificence of Polish history without at the 
same time feeling pain and shame for the wrongs that Poles have done to others.4   
 
Whilst Kwasniewski’s address cannot be viewed as a direct consequence of the SIF 
2000 but rather as a result of the Neighbors controversy, it is notable that his speech 
mirrored ideas about nations taking responsibility for their Nazi pasts which were 
enunciated at the SIF 2000.5 
 
Furthermore, in the months following the SIF 2000, the ITF also rolled out further 
stages of its ‘Liaison Project’ with the Czech Republic.  In 2000, the Terezín Memorial, 
the Jewish Museum in Prague and the Ministry of Education organized a number of 
training seminars for Czech teachers.  Between 2000 and 2002, several hundred 
instructors attended this three-day course at the Terezín Memorial Museum.  
Participants were given lectures on the genocides of the Jews and the Roma and Sinti 
during the Second World War as well as instruction on Jewish history, anti-Semitism, 
racism and pedagogical approaches to the teaching of the Holocaust and Nazi ‘Crimes 
against Humanity’.  Members of the ITF assessed these courses at Terezín and 
recommended that improvements needed to be made in terms of module content and 
methods used.  This advice was adopted and used to improve the syllabus for future 
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recipients of instruction.6  
 
It should also be noted that a few months after Stockholm, two other major international 
conferences on the Holocaust were organized and these included some of the same 
participants.  The first event was convened in London and Oxford in July 2000 and was 
a major week long academic conference entitled Remembering for the Future.7  This 
event was the latest in a series of academic conferences motivated by the leadership of 
Holocaust and Christian-Jewish relations scholar, Elisabeth Maxwell and convened 
under the same name in Oxford (1988) and at Berlin’s Humboldt University in 1994.8  
Although Remembering for the Future (2000),9 was  not directly linked to the SIF 2000, 
Bauer delivered a plenary address on ‘genocide’ which can be perceived as further 
reinforcing the themes of Stockholm in that he reminded his audience that, “…our very 
aim, as students of the Holocaust and Genocide, is eminently political, globally so.”10  
The second international conference continued the work of the LCNG (1997) and 
WCHA (1998) and was convened in Vilnius, Lithuania in October 2000.  The particular 
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focus of this meeting was issues of heirless art and cultural property.  At this conference 
Israel’s consul general in New York, Colette Avital put forward the highly controversial 
claim that Israel was the rightful heir to unclaimed Jewish art.  Understandably unable 
to reach a consensus, delegates decided that more study of the issue was required.11   
 
Finally, an unexpected corollary of the SIF 2000 was the 2007 release of mezzo-
soprano, Anne Sofie von Otter’s vocal interpretation of music by Jewish composers 
interned in Theresienstadt.12  She originally became involved in the project when she 
performed some of the songs at the SIF 2000.13   However, in the long term there were 
two key institutions through which efforts were made to enact the legacy of the SIF 
2000 and the sentiments of the Stockholm Declaration (2000).14  The first related to the 
subsequent convening by the Swedish government of SIFs on ‘Combating Intolerance’ 
(2001), ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ (2002) and ‘Preventing Genocide’ (2004); 
whilst the second corresponds to the ITF’s efforts to put the Stockholm Declaration 
(2000) into practice via the promotion of Holocaust remembrance, research and 
education throughout the world.  This chapter will give an historical overview of these 
two important institutional outcomes of the SIF 2000 as well as providing an assessment 
of the successes and challenges faced in implementing the Stockholm Declaration 
(2000), a document which in principle encouraged the international community to fight 
against, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia”;15 as well 
as demanding that nations confront their Nazi and Holocaust era pasts.   
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The Legacies of the SIF 2000 Part 1:  The SIFs 2001, 2002 and 2004 
 
One of the most significant consequences of the SIF 2000 on Holocaust Education, 
Remembrance and Research was that Swedish Prime Minister Persson took on Wiesel’s 
request to make the Forum an annual event, and fused this with the liberal 
‘universalistic’ aims of the SIF 2000 in order to promote democracy, tolerance and 
genocide prevention.  This work was continued in subsequent SIFs on ‘Combating 
Intolerance’ (2001), ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ (2002) and ‘Preventing 
Genocide’ (2004).  This section will briefly summarize the key discussions, 
achievements and challenges posed to each of these conferences, primarily using 
sources from Fried’s edited anthology of SIF speeches and interviews, Beyond the 
‘Never Agains’.  However, in order to provide a more balanced analysis, this 
commentary will also utilize oral history interviews carried out with SIF attendees, 
newspaper articles as well as critical reviews of Fried’s anthology.   It will be seen that 
whilst these conferences were significant in encouraging dialogues between politicians, 
academics, NGO representatives and genocide survivors on a range of important human 
rights issues, the SIF conferences were also challenged by ongoing political failures to 
adequately address the pressing issues posed for the international community by the 
perpetration of contemporary genocides in places such as Darfur and the Congo.  
  
The SIF 2001 (29th - 30th January 2001) was attended by delegates from fifty-one 
countries as well as representatives of NGOs, universities, and transnational institutions 
such as the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU.  This conference focused 
its discussions on issues related to modern forms of far right-wing fanaticism, racism, 
xenophobia, Islamophobia, homophobia and anti-Semitism such as ‘white power’ music 
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and online Holocaust denial.16  The chief outcome of the SIF 2001 was the Declaration 
of the Stockholm International Forum on Combating Intolerance.  This non-binding 
document sought to encourage national, local and transnational agencies, “… to combat 
all manifestations of intolerance in our societies” by improving, “… existing systems 
for collecting and analyzing information”; supporting “… the creation of a research 
process linking academics and policy-makers”; further developing “…and where 
absent consider establishing, legislative measures, including anti-discrimination 
legislation”; encouraging,“…media in our societies to develop training programmes for 
journalists, editors and producers”; and supporting, “international co-operation in the 
establishment of a voluntary Internet Code of Conduct Against Intolerance.”17   
 
Whilst Irwin Cotler, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada (2003-) 
perceived the SIF 2001 as, “…an important contribution to thinking about and acting 
upon the combating of racism, xenophobia and discrimination”,18 other attendees 
perceived the SIF 2001 as one of the weakest gatherings in terms of its subsequent 
impact on world affairs.  Psychologist and survivor of Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen, 
Hédi Fried was disappointed that no particular conference on combating Neo-Nazism 
was held after the SIF 2001 or the SIF 2002,19 whilst in relation to the SIF 2001, British 
Holocaust NGO representative, Stephen Smith felt that, “…the political follow-up after 
the second conference on racism and tolerance was nonsense, because it could really 
have been utilized to help deal with some of the Durban issues.”20  Here Smith was 
referring to the disastrous UN Durban World Conference Against Racism which was 
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held in South Africa in 2001 against the backdrop of the Second Palestinian Intifada and 
reignited anger against Israel in the Middle East.  Far from challenging anti-Semitism, 
the Durban Conference was widely reported as a “festival of anti-Jewish hate” which 
resulted in the walk-out of the American and Israeli governments after continued efforts 
by some delegates to brand Israel as ‘uniquely racist’.21 There were also reports that 
anti-Semitic literature and cartoons were circulated at Durban, whilst similar 
controversies at a parallel meeting of approximately 3000 NGOs led to condemnations 
and walk-outs of the NGO Forum by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International.22       
 
The third SIF was convened between 23rd and 24th April 2002 and it tackled the issues 
of ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’.  Representatives from forty countries, the UN, 
the EU as well as international experts were present at this conference which focused on 
how different post-conflict societies, “…move forward and live with painful memories 
of injustices… [and]…with the legacy of past atrocities and authoritarian rule.”23  
Although Esther Mujawayo-Keiner, survivor of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and 
founder of the Rwandan widows support group, Avega was initially concerned at the 
implications of the word ‘reconciliation’ in the conference title,24  many participants 
involved in the SIF 2002 found its seminars on ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ in 
relation to Rwanda, South Africa, Bosnia, Cambodia, and the German-Polish context 
particularly stimulating and useful.  For example, for Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, who 
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had just been elected the first President of Timor-Leste, the SIF 2002 was, “...an 
unforgettable occasion”,25 whilst for Cotler, the SIF 2002 was, “...very important for 
the people who were there, for example, from Rwanda, to have discussion of various 
justice models, like the Gacaca... as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda.”26  Equally, Youk Chhang, survivor of the Cambodian genocide (1975-1979) 
and Director of the Cambodian Documentation Centre was impressed at the dialogues 
that the SIF 2002 fostered: 
…I was surprised, especially when I saw the list of participants, including both Palestinians and 
Israelis.  I thought ‘Wow, how did they manage to get them to talk together like that?  So for me, 
it was an amazing conference.27   
 
Finally, Smith, who had been involved in creating memorial museums in post-apartheid 
communities such as the Cape Town Holocaust Centre and post-genocide societies such 
as the Kigali Memorial Centre, Rwanda, both praised and noted the inadequacies of the 
SIF 2002: 
The third conference on truth, justice and reconciliation, I thought was very useful because we 
had real practitioners in those rooms talking about the very real difficulties and challenges 
involved in forgiveness and reconciliation.  But I have to say that I don’t think the senior 
diplomats and attendees captured the significance of that conference, because I don’t think they 
understand enough the importance of reconciliation for stable communities and societies.  I think 
the organizers (including me) should have addressed this more clearly.28    
 
Although the SIF 2002 did not result in a conference declaration, it had other significant 
consequences.  One of these was the fact that Sweden provided some financial support 
to the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).  Equally, despite Sweden’s 
own checkered record on the prosecution of Nazi war criminals,29  its Foreign Affairs 
Ministry put pressure on states in the former Yugoslavia, such as Serbia, Montenegro 
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and Bosnia and Herzegovina to co-operate with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and “…conduct war crimes trials that meet international 
standards” as a prerequisite for accession to the EU.30  Another key consequence of the 
SIF 2002 was that in a similar way to the SIF 2000 on ‘Holocaust Education, 
Remembrance and Research’, the Stockholm conference on ‘Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation’ was particularly significant in encouraging new bonds or strengthening 
existing global networks of co-operation between governments and/or NGOs.   
 
For example, Youk Chhang, felt that the SIF 2002, “…made a lot of difference to my 
work.”31  He formed links with the government of Timor-Leste and modified the way 
he interviewed and documented the actions of former Khmer Rouge perpetrators.32 
Finally, in co-operation with the ICTJ, he established an international Affinity Group of 
documentation centers throughout the world, in countries such as the former 
Yugoslavia, South Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, Guatemala and Burma: 
From this affinity group with people from different parts of the world, I get many constructive 
ideas.  We come together and share issues about technology, ways of disseminating and 
documenting information.  Each of us can bring something different based on the differences of 
culture and politics in our own country.33      
 
Furthermore, highlighting the 2002 Stockholm conference’s links to the original 
objectives of the SIF 2000, in his presentation to the 2002 Forum, entitled, ‘From the 
Shoah to Rwanda’, Smith drew on the examples of the post-1945 development of the 
memory of the Holocaust in Europe and post-1994 efforts to commemorate the 
Rwandan genocide in order to suggest, “how the memorialization process facilitates or 
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otherwise reconciliation.”34  Smith chronicled how the survivors of the Holocaust and 
their representatives had to find ways, “to secure justice, care for survivors and assist 
the community in coming to terms with its loss”,35 and how this is still an ongoing 
process, two generations or more  since the Jewish catastrophe.36  He hoped that some 
of the lessons learned from this process might contribute to understanding and finding 
solutions to the difficulties and struggles facing the justice and commemoration process 
in Rwanda.  Smith observed that victims of the Rwandan genocide, including orphans, 
widows and HIV/AIDS rape victims need long term support from both their national 
government and the international community, particularly in an environment where 
genocide victims often live in close proximity to former perpetrators.  Smith believed 
that national and international support for education and commemoration strategies 
could contribute to the re-building of Rwandan society by combating denial and 
bringing “about public recognition of the victims’ lives.”37   
 
Smith’s paper at the SIF 2002 related to his Aegis Trust project to construct the Kigali 
Memorial Centre in Rwanda, which was opened in April 2004.  This centre includes 
three exhibits, one documenting the 1994 genocide; one dedicated to children’s 
experiences and one based on genocide as a world-wide issue.  250,000 victims of the 
Rwandan genocide are also buried in the environs of the Kigali Memorial Centre.  
According to the centre’s website, in the first week of its opening, 1500 survivors 
visited per day and 60,000 people came to the Kigali Memorial Centre in the first three 
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months of its existence, including 7000 from the international community.38  In an 
extract from an interview with Smith that was conducted at Beth Shalom in June 2009, 
he described the construction of the Kigali Memorial Centre in the following terms: 
So effectively... we were invited to try and create a Genocide Memorial Museum and to assist 
with the preservation issues and so on, which we did.  And spent, I guess a couple of years doing 
that, raised the money and built the museum, designed it, installed it and did everything from 
here.  So, using some of the skills and the knowledge that we’d got in creating memorial 
museums but doing so in a different context.  What we didn’t do was just take Holocaust 
education, remembrance and research and just download it into Rwanda.  It was very much again 
based on focus groups, stakeholder communications in the city and around the country in 
Rwanda, listening to what survivors had to say, listening to what civil society had say and 
developing a culture of remembrance there that was appropriate for the society.  Which included 
putting human remains on display, which was not my favoured method but it was one which the 
survivors were absolutely adamant was going to happen.39   
 
Following the SIF 2002, there was no SIF held in 2003, although the year was 
significant for another off-shoot of Sweden’s  Living History project, an initiative which 
had originally contributed to the founding of the ITF and the convening of the SIF 2000, 
as demonstrated in chapter one.  For although the work of the Living History project had 
been active since 1997, the result of a Swedish parliamentary decision in December 
2001 was that in June 2003 the Swedish government formerly established The Living 
History Forum.40  The objectives of this newly established institution were, “…to 
engage in issues relating to tolerance, democracy and human rights taking the 
Holocaust as a starting point.”41  As a result, the specific roles designated to The Living 
History Forum included promoting awareness, facilitating research and educating 
teachers and young people about the Holocaust, human rights, tolerance and democracy; 
promoting the observance of Sweden’s Holocaust Memorial Day on 27th January as 
well as acting as the organizational office behind the Swedish ITF delegation.42    
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However, The Living History Forum also had an impact on the memorialization of the 
Holocaust at both the national and the global levels.   This was not just via its 
involvement with the ITF, but rather through the legacies of The Living History 
Project’s commissioning of Levine and Bruchfeld’s short history of the Holocaust, Tell 
Ye Your Children (1997).   By 2005, 1,170,000 copies of Tell Ye Your Children had 
been requested and distributed in the Swedish language and ‘the Book’ was also 
available in languages read by sizeable immigrant groups in Sweden: English, Spanish, 
Finnish, Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Serbo-Croatian.43   With the exception of the 
Bible and one particular Swedish cook-book, Tell Ye Your Children has been printed in 
greater numbers than virtually any other text in Swedish publishing history.  According 
to Levine, versions of ‘The Book’ have also been published in, “Russia, Estonia, 
Finland, Norway, Denmark, Germany, France, Latvia, Japan, Portugal and in most of 
these instances they were done by the Ministries of Education, in these countries, doing 
translations.”44  Reflecting on the extraordinary national and global popularity of what 
became known as ‘The Book’ Levine believes that its accessibility lies in the fact that as 
writers, he and Bruchfeld were: 
 
…both pragmatic and sober.  We were not at all nationalistic…there was a police show that I 
grew up with in the 1960s called Dragnet, a detective show, a cop show, in which the main 
character called Detective Sergeant Joe Friday, what he would always do, what he would always 
say to those he was questioning was, “Just the facts man, just the facts”.  And this is what we did 
in Tell Ye Your Children.  Which I think explains a lot of its success.45  
 
The last SIF was convened between 26th and 28th January 2004 and it was called 
‘Preventing Genocide: Threats and Responsibilities’.  Although attended by controversy 
owing to Israeli ambassador Zvi Mazel’s outraged response to a controversial art exhibit 
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in Stockholm, Snow White and the Madness of Truth;46 as well as met with a small scale 
protest by the left-wing Anti-War coalition;47 the SIF 2004 was the first significant 
inter-governmental gathering on the issue of genocide since the adoption of the UN 
Genocide Convention in 1948.48  The SIF 2004 was attended by representatives of fifty-
five governments, fourteen transnational agencies as well as genocide survivors such as 
Mujawayo-Keiner and experts from the field of genocide studies such as Helen Fein, 
Frank Chalk, Barbara Harff, Ted Gurr, Samantha Power and Carol Rittner.49   
 
Following an opening speech by Persson which called on the international community 
to reject rhetorical clichés and, “…go beyond the ‘Never Agains’”,50 UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan delivered the keynote address of the conference.  Whilst Annan re-
affirmed the importance of international efforts to prevent genocide, he also admitted to 
gross UN failures in relation to Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, “In 
both cases the gravest mistakes were made by member states, particularly in the way 
that decisions were taken by the Security Council.  But all of us failed.”51 Annan made 
no direct mention of the recent American and European political schisms over the Iraq 
War (2003),52 although perhaps this was because of the fact that in January 2004 the 
UN itself was becoming embroiled in revelations over the ‘oil for food’ scandal in 
Iraq.53   
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Furthermore, addressing the concerns of SIF 2004 organizers and Anti-War protestors 
who wanted the minority rights of groups such as the Chechens, the Turkish Kurds, the 
Palestinians and the Colombian trade unionists to be discussed;54 Bauer also delivered a 
speech in which he outlined the specific objectives of the conference organizers as well 
as the idea that other diplomatic arenas would be necessary to address and work towards 
peaceable resolutions to certain present-day conflicts and minority rights issues: 
 
The next task is to make clear that the organizers of the Forum would plead with the participants 
not to discuss past and current violent conflicts. They are asking you to leave the discussion of 
Iraq, Kashmir, the Middle East, and other issues to the appropriate arenas, not here, where no 
resolutions can be passed´ and no agreements can be reached. Our Forum is directed to the 
future. We want to help in creating the tools and mechanisms that may prevent, or at least 
diminish, genocidal dangers in the future.55 
 
Despite the desire of SIF 2004 organizers to orientate discussions towards the future, 
the plenary session speeches by political leaders were often most significant in their 
reflections on the past.  For example, the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame was 
addressing the Forum a few months before the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan 
genocide;56 the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Andranik Margarian praised 
Sweden for recognizing the Armenian genocide and called on other members of the 
international community to follow suit;57 and in contrast to criticisms voiced by Efraim 
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Zuroff about the speeches of Latvian and Lithuanian delegates at the SIF 2000,58 on the 
eve of these nations’ accession to NATO and the EU in 2004, both the President of the 
Republic of Latvia, Vaira Vike-Freiberga and the Prime Minister of Lithuania, Algirdas 
Brazaukas tackled issues relating to the Nazi past more fully in their speeches.  For 
example, Vike-Freiberga drew attention to Latvian suffering under the Nazi and Soviet 
regimes but also specifically pointed out that, “The racial ideology and extreme 
xenophobia of the Nazi German Reich culminated in the mass murders of the 
Holocaust, leading to the near annihilation of the Jewish and Roma communities in 
many countries, including my own.”59  Admittedly, Vike-Freiberga’s speech remained 
problematic in that it did not address the issue of Latvian collaboration in the Holocaust, 
even though she also drew attention to the fact that, “Latvia supported the resolution on 
anti-Semitism proposed by Ireland at the UN General Assembly in 2003.”60  By 
contrast, Brazaukas directly tackled the issue of Lithuanian complicity in the Jewish 
catastrophe: 
 
We will always remember what happened in Lithuania back in 1941. It took only half a year of 
massacre to systematically destroy the six-centuries-old civilization of the Lithuanian Jewry. 
This was a catastrophe which rippled across an immense part of Europe and was almost 
indifferently witnessed by locals. In some cases they even collaborated with the Nazis.61       
 
Following the format of previous SIFs, a number of panels, seminars and workshops 
were held, this time on the themes of ‘Threats: Anticipating genocidal violence’; 
‘Responsibilities: Individual, National and Multilateral’; ‘Prevention: Policy 
Instruments and Responsibilities’; ‘Creating Awareness: Education, Media, Memory.’62  
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SIF 2004 attendees found these seminars notable for a number of reasons.  Gareth 
Evans, President of the International Crisis Group found David Scheffer’s definition of 
‘atrocity crimes’ potentially very useful in terms of encouraging international non-legal 
action and political debates about genocide, mass murder and human rights abuses.63 
From a different perspective, Human Rights lawyer, Payam Akhaven was particularly 
moved by Mujawayo-Keiner’s presentation on her experiences as a survivor of the 
Rwandan genocide.64  He also said that he found the Stockholm process particularly 
useful because: 
 
At the Stockholm Forum, I had the chance to interact with some government officials – some 
Foreign Ministry officials, parliamentarians or advisors which gave me a feel for how they think 
about the issues.  As a human rights advocate it is essential for me to know how to engage these 
people.  What sort of language do they understand?  How do they formulate self-interest?  How 
could one try to change their way of constructing foreign policy or security objectives?  These 
are all important issues and questions for me because in order to be effective, we have to move 
beyond mere condemnations and righteous indignation and infiltrate the centers of power with 
new ideas and perspectives.65   
 
The SIF 2004 had a number of outcomes.  The first was a ‘Declaration of the Stockholm 
International Forum: Preventing Genocide: Threats and Responsibilities’.  This 
document was supposed to encourage the international community to “identify as early 
as possible and to monitor and report genocidal threats”; shoulder our “responsibility 
to protect groups identified as potential victims of genocide, mass murder or ethnic 
cleansing”; bring perpetrators of genocide to justice; support research into genocide 
prevention; educate “the youth and the wider public against genocide dangers of all 
kinds” and encourage co-operation between transnational, national, regional and state 
institutions and NGOs in working to prevent genocide, mass murder, ethnic cleansing 
and the spread of ideologies which advocate group hatred and the destruction of human 
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life.66  This document has been viewed as important because it utilizes the notion of the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ which had first been delineated in a 2001 report by the 
Canadian sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
and which would become a commonplace of international legal parlance after the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ was adopted by the UN World Summit in September 2005.67  
 
Furthermore, conference delegates such as Smith, Bauer and Cotler also perceived the 
SIF 2004 as particularly significant because it contributed to the creation of the post of 
UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide,68 which was first filled by 
Argentinean human rights lawyer and President of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice, Juan Méndez in July 2004.69  The role of the UN Special Advisor 
on the Prevention of Genocide is to report to the UN Secretary-General and through him 
to the UN Security Council on recorded instances of national, racial, religious or ethnic 
human rights violations that have the potential to escalate into genocide.  It is also the 
role of the UN Special Advisor to suggest realistic measures for the prevention of 
genocide in different national contexts where the threat of violence has been detected.70 
 
However, despite being recognized as one of the most important conferences in the 
                                                           
66
 ‘Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum: Preventing Genocide: Threats and 
Responsibilities’, in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried, pp. 146-147. 
67
 The UN Outcome Document on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) stresses that “Each individual 
state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.”  However, when “...national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations”, then it is the responsibility of the international community through the United Nations to 
take diplomatic, humanitarian and/or collective action to “...protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” (UN Outcome Document on R2P quoted in 
Diana Amnéus, A Right to Humanitarian Intervention? (Stockholm: The Living History Forum, 2005), p. 
16.) 
68
 For example, see the following quote from Annan’s key-note speech at the SIF 2004: “We should also 
consider establishing a Special Rapporteur on the prevention of genocide, who would be supported by the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights but would report directly to the Security Council...” (Annan, 
‘Stockholm International Forum (2004): Key-note speech by the Secretary General of the UN’). 
69
 ‘Interview with Stephen Smith’; Bauer quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried, p. 96; Cotler 
quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried, p. 42. 
70
 Annan quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried, p. 113. 
158 
 
Stockholm series, the SIF 2004 was not only criticized by anti-war protestors but also 
by a number of intellectual commentators and conference attendees.  For example, 
Holocaust Studies Professor, G. Jan Colijn observed that it is unlikely that, “…the 
creation of a special adviser on genocide prevention at the UN can overcome the 
structural problem of power asymmetry in the international arena.”71 Furthermore, in a 
critical review of ‘Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, the main source of SIF documents and 
interviews, University of Maryland International and Security Studies scholar, Milton 
Leitenberg candidly noted that the organizers of the SIF 2004’s ambivalence towards 
addressing contemporary violent conflicts was deeply problematic because: 
 
…it is possible that not a single one of the speeches by national representatives pointed out that 
the next ‘Again’ had already taken place, in the Congo between 1998 and 2003, with a cost of 
perhaps 3.5 million lives. (This reviewer attended the entire conference)  In spite of this there 
was absolutely no international response during that period.  Furthermore, yet another Genocide 
had already begun and was well underway as the conference was taking place: in the Darfur 
province of Sudan, and perpetrated by the Government of the Sudan.  It is questionable whether 
any of the speeches by diplomatic figures pointed this out either.72   
 
Leitenberg’s analysis was further supported by a dialogue with Samantha Power in 
Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, in which both Power and her interviewer critiqued the 
international community and the SIF 2004 for failing to speak out about the perpetration 
of mass atrocities in countries such as Darfur, the Congo and Chechnya.73  Indeed, 
further criticisms of the SIF 2004 were evident in other conversations with conference 
participants in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’.  In a similar way to Colijn, Evans was 
concerned about the structural limitations placed on the role of UN Special Advisor on 
the Prevention of Genocide.  He noted that whilst Méndez had a very good reputation, 
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“…does he have sufficient staff?  Does he have any financial support?”74   Equally, 
Mujawayo-Keiner was disappointed that issues such as restitution, which directly relate 
to efforts by genocide survivors to re-build their lives after catastrophe were not 
addressed more fully in the seminars and workshops.75  Finally, Power, who has already 
been cited above and is author of the 2003 Pulitzer Prize winning book, A Problem from 
Hell, re-iterated her fears that ultimately, “…countries talk big and act small” on the 
issue of genocide.76  She also sent out a provocative message to Europeans, which 
shattered any illusions of grandeur that international events such as the SIF 2004 may 
have generated: 
 
The real question – on Darfur and on atrocity prevention in general – is: Where are the 
Europeans?  Where is the public pressure in various European countries?  Why don’t they 
mobilize? ...American students have helped to pressure the most ideological administration in 
American history to refer the case to the International Criminal Court.  Why is there no similar 
political pressure in Europe?77 
 
Indeed despite the promises made at the SIF 2004, the international community’s 
response to the genocide in Darfur continued to be inadequate to the scale of the crisis.  
For whilst, some action was taken, for example, the United States Congress classified 
the violence in Darfur as a genocide in June 2004; the UN World Summit adopted the 
notion of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in September 2005 and UN Resolution 1593 
referred Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir to the ICC; the fact remained that as in 
previous genocides numerous state interests combined with the power of veto held by 
the UN Security Council (America, France, Britain, Russia, China)  continued to block 
effective action being taken.78  In this instance, the Sudanese government’s hostility to 
UN intervention; the United States focus on the ‘War on Terror’, the fact that the 
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Sudanese government co-operates with the U.S to fight indigenous terrorism as well as 
skepticism cast on the humanitarian motives of Western military interventions as a 
result of the invasion of Iraq (2003).79  Other significant factors precluding an effective 
response included China’s concern to defend its economic interests in Sudan which are 
based on the oil and arms trade; the EU’s relative disengagement from the issue as a 
consequence of the policy of ‘African solutions to African problems’; as well as the 
international community’s primary focus on finding a resolution to the Sudan’s North-
South civil conflict.80  As a result, far from going Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, the 
limitations of the SIF 2004 were all to evident: By 2006, the genocide in Darfur had 
cost the lives of approximately 400,000 non-Arab Darfuris and the annihilation of an 
estimated 1000 villages.81 
 
The Legacies of the SIF 2000 Part 2: The First Decade of the ITF 
 
The second major institutionalization of the objectives of the SIF 2000 was evident in 
the continuing work of the ITF which employs the Stockholm Declaration (2000) as its 
guiding manifesto.82  This section will use the ITF’s official history edited by Wallin 
and Newman, alongside newspaper articles, academic papers, interviews’ with ITF 
members as well as the organization’s meeting minutes in order to provide an overview 
of the impact of the ITF in implementing the Stockholm Declaration in the first decade 
since the SIF 2000.83 During this time period, the ITF has quickly moved from being, 
“…a short-lived group of governments supporting educational and other efforts 
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relating to the Shoah of the Jewish people”,84 to a long-term, international outfit with a 
still highly specific and yet in other respects more ‘universal’ remit of research, 
remembrance and education.  However, as will be seen, the extent of the ITF’s 
‘universality’ in promoting the Stockholm Declaration’s commitment to fight, 
“genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia”;85  was hotly 
debated within the organization during the first decade of its existence.   
 
The ITF’s decision making plenary consists of government representatives, university 
academics as well as NGO members and it is chaired by a different member state each 
year.  Also integral to the ITF’s structure and institutional discourses is the fact that 
Bauer served as the ITF’s first Academic Advisor, and was given the status of Honorary 
Chairman of the organization in November 2005.86 Bauer was succeeded as Academic 
Advisor, by Professor Dina Porat, the Head of Tel Aviv University’s Stephen Roth 
Institute for the Study of Contemporary Anti-Semitism and Racism in January 2007.87  
In the ITF’s recent, ‘Ten Year Anniversary Book’, Bauer and Porat described the 
primary objectives of the Task Force in the following terms: 
…the Stockholm Declaration, is the foundation of the ITF.  It explains the Holocaust and by 
adding the Hebrew term ‘Shoah’ in brackets after the word ‘Holocaust’, makes clear that the 
main concern of the ITF is to teach about, remember and research the genocide of the Jewish 
people in World War Two.  It then goes on to say that Nazi Germany also perpetrated a number 
of other major crimes, thus contextualizing the Holocaust.  This opens up the opportunity for the 
ITF to also deal with the genocide of the Roma, which took place at the same or similar 
locations, and was committed largely by the same perpetrators.88   
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Over the first decade of its existence, the ITF has expanded at a rapid rate and by 2008 
its plenary comprised twenty-six member states.  This meant that following a period of 
time as ‘Liaison Partners’ to already established ITF member states, Austria and the 
Czech Republic joined the organization in 2001 and Hungary in 2002.  Argentina, 
Luxembourg, Norway and Lithuania joined in 2003 as well as Latvia, Denmark, 
Switzerland and Romania in 2004; Greece, Croatia, the Slovak Republic and Belgium 
in 2005; Estonia in 2007 and Spain in 2008.89  As a result, the ITF’s membership 
includes long term members of NATO and the EU as well as those states that were part 
of more recent NATO and EU enlargements.90 Over the last decade, the ITF has also 
increased its links to transnational institutions.   For example, in October 2001, a 
Council of Europe delegate attended an ITF plenary session, in December 2004, an 
OSCE/ODIHR representative took part in an ITF meeting and in May 2006, UN staff 
members were present as ITF plenary observers.91 
 
As the ITF has become larger and more institutionalized, its activities have also become 
increasingly firmly centered on five working groups: the Academic Working Group, the 
Education Working Group, the Memorials and Museums Working Group (initially the 
Memorials Working Group); the Communications Working Group (initially the 
Information Working Group) as well as the Task Force Fund Working Group.92  These 
units are primarily responsible for putting the ITF’s objectives into practice, initiatives 
which survivor of the Nazi camps and spokesman of the British Jewish community, Ben 
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Helfgott,  has perceived as some of the, “...the most important work that is being done” 
in connection with Holocaust research, remembrance and education in the global 
arena.93   
 
The Academic Working Group (AWG) was established in July 2000 and chairs of the 
AWG have included Bauer and Juliane Wetzel (2000-2002), the Luxembourg academic, 
Paul Dostert (2006-2008) as well as the controversial U.S. Holocaust historian, Steven 
T. Katz (2008).  Katz advocates the ‘uniqueness’ of the Shoah and provoked censure 
from Genocide Studies scholars such as Native American specialist David E. Stannard 
and Roma expert,  Ian Hancock,94 when in his 1994 book, The Holocaust in Historical 
Perspective, he restrictively defined the perpetration of genocide to: 
 
…the actualization of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in its totality any 
national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are 
defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means.95   
 
The main problem with Katz’s definition of genocide is that it fits his historical analysis 
of the Holocaust, whilst bringing into question the ontological status of other genocides 
which Katz analyzes to be less ‘total’ in terms of perpetrator intention.  As a result, 
Katz’s exclusionary definition of ‘genocide’ represents one of the most problematic 
viewpoints to be found amidst the plurality of opinions within the ITF. 
 
However, notwithstanding the opinions of its 2008 chair, the institutional role of the 
AWG is to promote archival openness and scholarly research and also makes decisions 
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on academic project applications for ITF funding such as the publication and translation 
of scholarly books, the production of documentary films, the convening of university 
courses on the Holocaust as well as funding for the cataloguing of archives.96  The 
AWG prefers inter-cultural projects and will tend to give priority to funding requests 
from Central and Eastern Europe because research grants are limited in these states even 
though there is a need for archival research in these locations.  The AWG has also 
launched other projects including a May 2004 joint initiative with the Education 
Working Group entitled, ‘Special Working Group on Resistances to Learning and 
Teaching about the Holocaust’ as well as AWG involvement in the organization of the 
April 2006 Vienna conference, ‘Memory of the Holocaust: Culture of Remembrance’. 
Finally, the AWG has plans to sponsor an annual ITF academic research forum 
beginning with a gathering in Norway in June 2009.97    
 
That said it is arguable that the AWG has been primarily successful when acting 
alongside other major institutions such as the USHMM in putting pressure on various 
organizations, such as the International Tracing Service (ITS) at Bad Arolsen to make 
their Holocaust era archives fully accessible.  Affiliated to the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, the ITS archive comprises approximately sixteen miles of files 
detailing Nazi crimes and their victims.98  Following a 1955 international treaty between 
the United States, Germany, Britain, Israel, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, 
France, Greece and Luxembourg, the archive prohibited scholars owing to privacy fears 
and was stringently restricted to use by the family member’s of Holocaust victims, 
many of whom still struggled to gain full access to files relating to their respective 
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cases.99  Following pressure by groups such as the USHMM, various survivors’ 
organizations and the ITF, in May 2006, the eleven nations agreed that they would each 
ratify an amendment to the 1955 treaty that would grant scholars access to the 
archive.100  A year later, seven nations had passed the amendment (United States, Israel, 
Germany, Poland, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands), with the others intending to 
ratify and with a further agreement that digital copies of the ITS archive would be made 
available to institutions such as the USHMM and Yad Vashem.101  In relation to the 
important role of the Task Force in pressurizing the ITS to open its holdings, Cesarani 
commented in March 2009:   
 
...Paul Shapiro who was involved with the American delegation to the Task Force through the 
museum became instrumental in opening access to the documents of the International Tracing 
Service at Bad Arolsen.  And he is unequivocal that without the ITF, without the backing of the 
American government which rallied other governments to press the German authorities who 
were the dominant force in the international committee maintaining Bad Arolsen, that without 
that international pressure, then the archives at Bad Arolsen would not have been made 
accessible to the public, outside the circle of the descendants of survivors etc, or academics.  
And certainly wouldn’t have been micro-filmed, or digitised, or distributed to appropriate 
repositories around the world.  And nor would the facilities of Bad Arolsen themselves have 
been properly maintained with an assured future, all of which is now in train.  So the work of the 
International Task Force and the international co-ordination has been extremely important in the 
area of archival resources. 102 
 
After making headway with the ITS, the Task Force is now putting pressure on the 
Vatican as well as some North African countries to open their holdings to 
researchers.103  The second ITF Working Group is focused on Memorials and Museums 
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and the idea for a ‘Memorials’ working group was first mooted in September 2000.  
Later titled the ‘Memorials and Museums Working Group’ (MMWG), its chairs have 
included Stephen Smith (UK, 2002), Thomas Lutz (Germany, 2003), Teresa Swiebocka 
(Poland, 2004), Heidemarie Uhl (Austria, 2005), Dirk Mulder (the Netherlands, 2006), 
David Marwell (USA, 2007) as well as Magdalena Smidova (Sweden, 2008).  
Operating alongside and sometimes in collaboration with the other ITF ‘Working 
Groups’, the objectives of the MMWG are to establish web resources on existing 
Holocaust museums, memorials and remembrance days; encourage on-site training 
programmes; promote inter-cultural dialogues and personnel exchanges between 
Holocaust remembrance institutions as well as to work alongside government 
representatives in order to ensure the marking and preservation of mass atrocity sites, 
and finally, to help with the organization of Holocaust remembrance days.   
 
The MMWG also assesses proposals for remuneration from the Task Force fund and is 
particularly concerned to, “…deliver lasting memorials in countries facing severe 
financial constraints.”104  For example, site specific memorialization projects that the 
ITF’s MMWG has addressed include the Terezín memorial after flooding caused 
substantial damage in August 2002. Consequences of the floods included the fact that 
most of the permanent exhibitions were temporarily closed, some historical documents 
including lists of Czech Jews deported to Terezín were damaged, the wall of the Prague 
synagogue with the names of 80,000 Jews taken to Auschwitz was seriously spoiled as 
well as the water level reaching 3.5 meters in the Nazi era crematorium.105  According 
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to ITF meeting minutes for 17th October 2002, an ITF grant of $20,000 to help with 
restoration costs at the Terezín memorial, “…was adopted unanimously in principle.”106  
Although repair work remained to be completed, by December 2007, exhibitions had 
been re-opened, the prayer room from the ghetto era restored, the wooded objects in the 
cells mended as well as most of the spoiled documents and collection items repaired.107   
 
Another memorial site that is repeatedly mentioned in ITF minutes is the remains of the 
Jasenovac concentration camp in Croatia which was operated by the Nazi 
collaborationist and fascist Ustasa regime during the Second World War.  The most 
reliable estimates of those who perished in Jasenovac suggest that approximately 
45,000-52,000 of the Ustasa’s primary victims, the Serbs were killed in the camp; 8000-
20,000 Croatian and Bosnian Jews, 8000-15,000 Roma and Sinti, 5000-12,000 Croatian 
political/religious opponents as well as many Muslims, for whom there are no reliable 
figures at present.108  The collective memory of these atrocities became increasingly 
subject to distortion during the 1980s, when rising ethno-nationalism intensified the rift 
between Croatian and Serb communities within Croatia.109  These tensions were further 
exacerbated by the election of Franjo Tudjman, the leader of the ultra-nationalist 
Croatian Democratic Union Party (HDZ) in April 1990,110 as well as by the outbreak of 
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violent conflict with Croat-Serbs supported by Serbian forces during the former 
Yugoslavia’s ethno-nationalist wars in the 1990s.111  This conflict impacted on the 
public remembrance of Jasenovac with some Serb historians purposely inflating the 
victim numbers of the Ustasa regime and some Croatian ultra-nationalist historians 
deliberately underestimating the death count.112  
 
The context for references to Jasenovac in ITF meeting minutes is the fact that on 27th 
October 2000, the USHMM with support of the U.S Department of State and with the 
permission of the governments of Croatia and the Republika Srpska, assumed 
temporary custody for a year until 26th November 2001 of historical artifacts from 
Jasenovac concentration camp as well as tens of thousands of written documents and 
approximately 2000 photos, 70 oral histories and eight reels of 16mm and 35mm 
films.113  The USHMM received these archives because when fighting broke out near 
the remains of the concentration camp during the 1990s, the former deputy director of 
the memorial area had decided to move the collection to the Republic of Sprska’s Banja 
Luka archive.114  The storage facilities were inappropriate and the collection began to 
decay, until in the summer of 2000, the U.S. embassies in Sarajevo and Zagreb 
informed the USHMM of the existence of the archive.  Following assessments by 
USHMM specialists it was decided that if the collection was to be preserved, it needed 
to be catalogued and organized immediately in the United States before being returned 
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to the Jasenovac memorial.115  Another result of this process was the USHMM’s 
construction of a Jasenovac Memorial website.116  
 
According to the 27th October 2000 agreement, it was decided that once preservation 
work had been completed on the archive, the USHMM and the Jasenovac Memorial 
Council would continue to work together to maintain the collection and Croatia would 
become a ‘Liaison Partner’ of the ITF.117  Part of this co-operation related to the 
construction of a permanent exhibition and education centre at Jasenovac and resulted in 
two workshops organized by the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports in 
conjunction with the ITF:  
 
…in which the concept of the museum exhibition was presented and agreed upon at an 
international level, including how victims and crimes should be represented, and how 
educational programs tied to Ustasha crimes in Jasenovac should be conducted.118   
 
Further evidence of this working partnership can be seen in ITF minutes.  For example, 
during the discussion in Strasbourg on 17th October 2002, which preceded Croatia’s 
acceptance as an ITF member state, reference was made to the collaboration between 
the Jasenovac Memorial and the USHMM, whilst a French delegate reflected on 
Croatia’s recent efforts at Holocaust memorialization, noting that although it was 
problematic that, “…the Jasenovac Memorial attracts very few visitors”,119 it remained, 
“… the duty of the Task Force to encourage the programs undertaken, notably those 
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connected with the Jasenovac Memorial”120  Despite these reservation’s the USHMM’s 
and ITF’s collaboration with the Jasenovac Memorial was perceived as a success, at 
least by those NGOs who were involved.  For example, at an ITF meeting in Krakow in 
November 2005, delegates from Israel and the United States, “…expressed their 
satisfaction about the work already underway in Croatia, in particular in cooperation 
with the Jasenovac Memorial”,121 whilst a year earlier at an ITF meeting in Trieste on 
16th December 2004, a representative of the Auschwitz State Museum and member of 
the ITF’s Memorials Working Group reported that: 
 
Given the positive results of the project managed in co-operation with the Jasenovac Memorial 
Area in Croatia, the MWG suggested that other international advisory groups of ITF experts be 
established in order to support and advise memorial sites and museums in their new initiatives.122  
 
Aside from contributing to the preservation of memorial sites, some of the MMWG’s 
other achievements during the noughties have been in the increasingly important area of 
Internet resources.  These have included the construction of the website, ‘Cultures of 
Remembrance – a Network’ in conjunction with the Topography of Terror as well as the 
Internet site, ‘Memorial Museums’.  The website ‘Cultures of Remembrance’ gives an 
overview of different nations and their attempts to memorialize the Holocaust,123 whilst 
‘Memorial Museums’ provides a global database of the major museums, memorials and 
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monuments dedicated to the remembrance of the victims of Nazi persecution.124  
Another important achievement of the MMWG has been the support that its sub-
committee on Holocaust Remembrance Days has given to the establishment of annual 
commemoration ceremonies in different national ‘public spheres’.125   
 
For example, an OSCE/ODIHR January 2008 report in conjunction with the ITF, 
‘Holocaust Memorial Days in the OSCE Region – An Overview of Good Governmental 
Practices’, suggested that before the Stockholm Declaration (2000) eight of the thirty-
six countries surveyed had some form of annual commemoration day (the Netherlands, 
the United States, Latvia, France, Lithuania, Germany, Austria, Sweden),126 but after 
2000 the number of states with remembrance days rapidly increased to twenty-nine by 
2006.127  The OSCE/ODIHR report indicates both the national particularity and 
diversity of remembrance days both prior to and after the SIF 2000, with some days 
commemorating the Jewish catastrophe specifically and others embracing wider victims 
of Nazi atrocities and even genocides more broadly.  Owing to the Council of Europe’s 
2002 decision to set up a ‘Day of Remembrance’ in member states as well as the UN 
General Assembly’s November 2005 Resolution 60/7 which established 27th January as 
‘International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust’, the 
rapid growth in ritualized days of remembrance cannot be perceived as the sole result of 
the ITF and the implementation of the Stockholm Declaration (2000).  However, the 
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increase in national commemoration days after 2000, many of which are held on 27th 
January, does attest to the normative political and cultural relevance of the ITF’s 
objectives, particularly, but not exclusively within NATO and the EU’s sphere of 
influence.  In the future, the MMWG hopes to build on its international networks of 
expertise and act as an interface between academic research into Holocaust memory 
cultures and the practical reality of its implementation in museums, memorials and 
remembrance days in various countries.128   
 
The third component of the ITF, the Education Working Group (EWG) was formed in 
February 2001 and its chairs have included Shulamit Imber and Richelle Budd Caplan 
(Israel, 2001), William Shulman (U.S, 2002), Paul Levine (Sweden, 2003), Paul 
Salmons (UK, 2004), Karen Polak (the Netherlands, 2005), Claude Singer (France, 
2006), Wolf Kaiser (Germany, 2007), Yvonne Schuchmann (Hungary, 2008) and 
Monique Eckmann (Switzerland, 2009).129 During the first years of its operation, the 
EWG collated a number of Holocaust Education Reports from ITF member countries,130 
as well as formulating a number of multi-lingual guidelines which are available online 
and can be used in teacher training seminars across the globe on why and how to teach 
about the Holocaust.131  
 
This type of information produced by the EWG is particularly useful given the recent 
findings of Anders Lange in his Living History Forum commissioned report, A Survey 
of Teachers’ Experiences and Perceptions in Relation to Teaching about the Holocaust.  
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Focusing on Sweden, Lange sent out postal questionnaires to 10,000 teachers who 
worked in years 4-9.132  From just 5081 responses, Lange concluded that the vast 
majority of teachers felt that students were interested in the subject and that it is 
important to educate young people about the Holocaust because it is a way of drawing 
attention to issues such as racism, intolerance and genocide in the contemporary 
world.133  However, Lange also found that teachers needed more training in how to 
teach Nazi crimes and were particularly weak in their knowledge of the Roma genocide 
and the history of eugenics in Sweden.134  Co-initiated by the ITF, it is hoped that other, 
“…member countries plan to conduct similar national surveys on teachers’ experiences 
of teaching about the Holocaust.”135 
 
The EWG is also further divided up into a number of teams which look at specific 
issues such as ‘the sub-committee on the Holocaust and other genocides’, the ‘sub-
committee on special challenges in Holocaust Education’ as well as ‘the sub-committee 
on the Roma genocide’.136  One of the results of these sub-committees were a number of 
press releases issued by the ITF on the importance of promoting awareness about the 
genocide of the Roma and Sinti which was perpetrated by the Nazi regime and its 
collaborators during the Second World War.  These press releases were important 
because the remembrance of this genocide still sometimes struggles to gain political 
recognition, particularly in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe.  This 
battle for the recognition of the Roma genocide as well as national sensitivities to the 
involvement of international institutions in promoting the remembrance of this genocide 
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is illustrated in the following observation by speaker at the SIF 2000, supporter of the 
Czech Fenomén Holocaust Project and former President of the Czech Republic (1993-
2003), Václav Havel. Commenting on political rival and founder of the Czech right 
wing ODS party, President Václav Klaus’s negative response to a 2005 European 
Parliament resolution supporting Roma memorialization efforts at the former Czech 
concentration camp of Lety u Pisku, Havel noted: 
 
The Roma, rightly see this place as a memorial site, and they find it intolerable that a mega pig 
farm is standing on the spot today.  For years there has been a discussion in our country about 
whether or not the government should pay the owner of the pig farm to move his animal 
concentration camp down the road so that in the appropriate place, a burial mound, or some 
other reminder of the fact that there was a human concentration camp here once, might be built.  
Naturally, the mega pig farm still occupies the spot.  The European Parliament passed a 
resolution on the Roma and the solving of their problems that makes reference to the Czech pig 
farm and recommends that it be relocated. 
 
And that is what offended Václav Klaus: such gross interference into our purely Czech affairs!  
We’ll look after our own little Czech pigsty ourselves, and we’re not remotely interested in any 
assistance from outsiders!  And in any case – that Czech concentration camp wasn’t really much 
of a concentration camp; it was only a place to put those who didn’t want to work! 
 
When one hears this, one is overcome with a secret longing that democratic, educated, and 
cultured Europe will meddle as much as possible in our Czech affairs.  It is demonstrably in our 
own interests.137 
 
ITF press releases issued on the subject of the memorialization of the Nazi genocide of 
the Roma and Sinti, particularly in the Czech Republic  included the fact that on 13th  
June 2007, the Czech ITF Chair commended, “…the Education Working Group (EWG) 
and especially the Brno Museum of Romani Culture for working on this topic”,138 and 
asked the ITF that more teacher training, text-books and academic research be carried 
out, “…in particular in Central and South-Eastern Europe where discrimination 
against the Roma still exist.”139  The results of this commitment included ITF seminars 
for experts in Brno, Czech Republic in 2007 (in collaboration with the Museum of 
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Romani Culture) and Linz, Austria in 2008 (in co-operation with the Austrian Ministry 
of Education) as well as a teacher training seminar convened in conjunction with the 
Hungarian Ministry of Education and the Council of Europe in Budapest in 2008.140  
 
Furthermore, on 7th December 2009, the ITF issued a ‘Statement concerning Hate 
Crimes and Discrimination targeting Roma in Europe’, which drew attention to 
contemporary European anti-Roma hate crimes and reaffirmed the remit of the ITF to 
build on the EWG’s efforts and promote awareness of the Porrajmos as well as to 
combat discrimination towards Roma and Sinti in the present.141  It was important for 
the ITF to issue this statement because during the noughties, anti-Roma attacks 
including beatings, shootings, stabbings and fire-bombings had been reported in the 
Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Hungary;142 whilst the heightened emigration 
of Roma from former Soviet bloc countries to Western Europe, facilitated by the 
expanded EU contributed to an increasingly intensive crackdown against Roma and 
Sinti in Western Europe.143  These measures have included forced evictions of Roma 
and Sinti in Italy since 2000 as well as the sending of groups of Roma back to Romania 
by Germany in June 2009 and Denmark and Sweden in the summer of 2010.144   
 
However, most controversial has been French President, Nicholas Sarkozy’s 
sanctioning of the deportations of more than 1000 Roma to Bulgaria and Romania and 
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the dismantling of over 100 Roma camps between August and September 2010.145  
Sarkozy’s actions attracted media attention across Europe because of a leaked French 
Interior Ministry document which suggested that the Roma were being targeted as a 
group on ethnic foundations.  This drew the ire of EU Justice Commissioner, Viviane 
Reding, who accused the French government of breaking EU law and compared, “…the 
French treatment of the Roma with that of the Jews during the Second World War.”146  
Reding later retracted this metaphor whilst maintaining her condemnation of the French 
government’s actions.147 These examples of the precarious situation faced by Europe’s 
Roma and Sinti communities illustrates the limitations of current ITF educational 
policies in terms of Europe-wide political influence and mass popular impact, as well as 
the need for geographically broader ITF educational initiatives in this area in the future.      
 
Furthermore, one of the most important roles of the EWG is to assess applications for 
ITF funding in the sphere of Holocaust education, which includes teacher training 
conferences and student led projects.  Assessing applications for funding is quite a 
substantial task for the EWG as of an estimated 400 project proposals received by the 
ITF between 2001 and 2008, over half were assessed by the EWG.148   This situation is 
further reflected in ITF statistics which suggest that 45% of the 221 projects supported 
by the ITF fund between 2001 and 2008 comprised training programmes,149 whilst a 
further 14% of the fund had been disbursed on producing books and educational 
materials.150  By contrast, just 8% of the fund had been spent on exhibitions, 6% on 
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academic conferences, 7% on websites and databases, 7% on ‘others’, 6% on 
documentary films, 3% on writing competitions, 2% on research and 2% on the working 
groups themselves.151  The ITF fund is made up of annual contributions by its member 
states and countries from Eastern Europe are the most likely to benefit from Task Force 
sponsorship.152  In the early days of the ITF these contributions were in dollars, but 
institutional changes meant that by 2008, member countries tended to contribute 
approximately 30,000 Euros yearly to the ITF fund.153  Whilst some members of the 
ITF have raised concerns about the organization’s spend on administrative costs such as 
plenary meetings, Smith also maintains that a central problem for the ITF is that, “…the 
Task Force... is totally, absolutely, ridiculously underfunded.”154   
 
Both the achievements and struggles of the ITF fund aside, it is also notable that the 
organization has not been free from internal controversies.  Concerns have been 
expressed about the consequences of the ITF’s rapid expansion in terms of both the 
implementation of its projects as well as the power dynamics within the organization’s 
institutional structure, whilst the ITF’s discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ has 
continued to beg questions both within and outside the ITF about the organization’s 
perception of both broader Nazi atrocities and other genocides in relation to the Jewish 
Catastrophe.155  For example, whilst the EWG has made a clear effort to remember the 
Jewish Catastrophe specifically, whilst embracing wider questions about genocides and 
the particular memorialization of Roma victims, it is also notable that similar sub-
committees on other specific victims of Nazi atrocities, such as T4 fatalities were not 
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established at the same time as the Roma sub-committee.  However, the EWG’s idea 
that the main focus of ITF activities is the Jewish Catastrophe, whilst sensitively and 
carefully working towards establishing specific sub-committees on the educational 
questions posed by other Nazi victim groups could serve as a model for future Task 
Force developments. 
 
Furthermore, in terms of the organization’s rapid expansion, whilst acknowledging that 
the Task Force has achieved some important work in the post-Communist Eastern and 
Central European satellite states, former member of the British ITF delegation, Cesarani 
also expressed the following concerns: 
 
...I became very skeptical of the work of the ITF because it kept growing bigger and bigger and 
admitting members who signed up to a kind of pro-forma, the Stockholm Declaration and a few 
other bits and bobs, and threw in twenty thousand dollars or Euros into a pot, but which actually 
didn’t commit them to very much in practice.  And when it came to countries like Austria when 
Jörg Haider and his party were in government and Romania when they were re-naming streets 
after Antonescu, I just felt that this was farcical.156      
 
Indeed, as has been shown in chapter one, whilst political anxieties about resurgent 
populist and far right-wing ethno-nationalism had been one of the key causes of the 
establishment of the ITF in May 1998, it is arguable that a decade later, the populist 
radical right and far right remained key challenges to the work of the ITF, a phenomena 
that will be explored in more detail in chapter four.  For instance, the Polish Law and 
Justice Party led by Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski formed a coalition government with 
extreme right-wing parties in 2005,157  whilst a member of Law and Justice, Michal 
Kaminski had raised objections to the Polish state apology for the Jedwabne 
massacre.158  Moreover, disconcerting trends were not limited to Eastern Europe.  For 
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example, during his 2008 election campaign, Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi 
utilized popular resentment against Roma and Sinti communities;159 whilst during their 
period in opposition to the Labour government, the normally moderate British 
Conservative Party created waves of controversy when they split from the centre-right 
EPP-ED group in the European Parliament in order to form the European Conservatives 
and Reformists Group (ECR) in 2009.160  Some of the British Conservatives new allies 
in Europe included Kaminski from the Polish Law and Justice Party,161 as well as MEPs 
from Latvia’s Fatherland and Freedom Party, “…some of whose members attend a 
ceremony to commemorate members of the Latvian legion of the Waffen-SS.”162 
 
However, it was not just anxieties about project implementation that were at stake; rapid 
Task Force expansion was also a major factor motivating discussions about ITF 
institutional reform in November 2007.  Structural tensions included the fact that the 
fast growth of the ITF had meant that the decision-making process during Plenary 
Session meetings had become, “…lengthy and cumbersome”,163 whilst there were also 
concerns that decision-making inequalities needed to be addressed within some parts of 
the organization.  This was most notable in terms of the operation of the Strategic 
Implementation Working Group (SIWG), which had been established in May 2003 in 
an attempt to enhance preparations for ITF Plenary meetings and discuss potential 
future directions for the organization.164  However, as a November 2007 ITF report 
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Membership of the SIWG is limited to Member countries who have held the ITF’s presidency in 
the past.  The composition of the SIWG, led, over time, to a perception that the ITF was divided 
into an ‘inner circle’ of old member countries which were able to use the SIWG meetings to set 
the stage for future ITF policies and an ‘outer circle’ of relative newcomers barred from 
participation in the work of SIWG.  Although this was clearly not the intention of the ‘founding 
fathers’ of the ITF, the sense of an ‘in group’ and ‘out group’ detracts from the legitimacy and 
efficacy of the SIWG.  Since it is obvious that all Member countries of the ITF should be able to 
participate on an equal footing in the process of preparing and taking decisions within the ITF, it 
is imperative to address these concerns and ensure that the ITF’s decision-making processes are 
more representative.165 
 
In response to some of these structural issues, in November 2007 it was proposed that 
SIWG be replaced by a ‘Plenary Preparation Committee’ (PPC).166  This committee 
would arrange plenary session meetings and Bauer and Porat wanted the body to have a 
structure which would, “…abolish the difference in status between observers and 
members that existed in the SIWG.”167  To further aid with the administrative running of 
the ITF, a permanent secretariat was established in Berlin on 11th March 2008.168 
 
ITF plenary session meeting minutes (2002-2007) also suggest that the more 
‘universalistic’ sentiments of the Stockholm Declaration to combat, “genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia” were a site of recurring controversy, 
contestation and conflict within the organization in its early years.  For example, in a 
discussion on ‘The role of the Holocaust in education on Human Rights’ at an ITF 
meeting in Paris on 26th June 2002, the full diversity of views on this issue were aired.  
On the one hand, Bauer proposed that according to the Stockholm Declaration, 
“Holocaust education must necessarily address the issue of human rights” and Stephen 
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Smith unequivocally stated that the ITF cannot, “…be perceived as an institution 
dealing with anything other than intolerance and racism.”169  By contrast, a French 
delegate expressed concerns that; “…the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the 
conflict in the Middle East were making more difficult the work of bodies addressing the 
Holocaust.  It was necessary…to avoid tackling topical issues head on.”170  This 
sentiment was taken even further by a member of the Israeli delegation who re-stated 
the currently controversial Holocaust ‘uniqueness’ thesis: 
 
…the focus should be on the initial mandate of the ITF, this being Holocaust education.  
Account should be taken of the failure of the Durban conference, as well as the worrying rise of 
anti-Semitism, and excessive involvement in current events should be avoided.  The objective 
must be to use Holocaust education to send out a strong message to young people.  The 
Holocaust must therefore be treated as a unique event in all countries, the aim being one of 
prevention.171   
 
These debates over the extent of the ITF’s remit in relation to drawing attention to 
contemporary instances of human rights abuses continued throughout the noughties, but 
became increasingly focused on the issue of genocide.  For example, following the SIF 
2004 and Smith’s opening of the Kigali Memorial Centre, at the 16th December 2004 
ITF plenary session meeting in Trieste, the UK delegation suggested that, “The ITF 
could begin studying ways to expand its expertise and experience for the benefit of other 
post-genocidal issues such as those being faced in Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda.”172  
This proposal was built on at the next ITF meeting in Warsaw on 30th June 2005.  In a 
debate entitled, the ‘Involvement of the Task Force in other genocide issues’, the UK 
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delegation proposed, “…how to use the resources and expertise developed by the Task 
Force to contribute to offering better information on genocide and giving related policy 
making advice.”173  An anonymous British representative added that, “…to facilitate the 
involvement of the Task Force in other genocide issues”, was not to detract from the 
ITF’s central focus on the Holocaust, but simply to follow the remit of the Stockholm 
Declaration (2000) which, “…emphasized the necessity and moral duty to reflect on 
current situations of genocide.”174  The same British representative also stressed, “…the 
current situation of the genocide in Darfur, Sudan, about which the Task Force should 
be in a position of at least publically expressing concerns.”175  
 
The British group’s proposal met with agreement from some members of the Swedish, 
Norwegian, Danish and German delegations, whilst the Academic Advisor concurred 
with many of the sentiments expressed by the British representative: 
 
The Academic Advisor pointed out that such an approach is crucial for the work of the Task 
Force and that an important aspect of educating about the genocide of the Jews, the most 
extreme and unprecedented genocide, was also to discuss the context of genocide including what 
happened before and after World War II, with the Holocaust being a central point of focus.  The 
Task Force is intended to deal with lessons to be drawn from the Holocaust and therefore must 
reflect on current issues on the basis of the knowledge gained from the Holocaust.  Thus, it only 
makes sense that an international body involved with this issue does not remain silent while 
genocide and large scale massacres are being perpetrated.  The Academic Advisor suggested, 
that, as a first step, the Chair of the Task force draft a declaration about Darfur to be discussed 
by national delegations.176  
 
However, not all members of the Task Force were supportive of all parts of the British 
delegation’s policy proposal.  For example, whilst supporting the writing of an ITF 
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declaration on Darfur, an Israeli representative also wanted the organization to, “…stay 
clearly focused on the Holocaust and opposed the suggestion by the United Kingdom of 
compiling a paper describing the role that the Task Force could play with regard to 
other genocide issues.”177  Equally, a member of the French delegation: 
  
…underlined the fact that educational activities on the Holocaust must necessarily be examined 
in relation to other genocides.  However, he also stressed the specificity of anti-Semitism with 
regard to other forms of racism and also the specificity of the Holocaust with regards to other 
genocides.  He explained that these were the basic elements of the French approach on that 
matter and reaffirmed that political debate among Task Force members should focus on the 
Holocaust and that the Education Working Group should deal with the relation between the 
Holocaust and other genocides as a pedagogical matter.178  
 
The immediate results of this debate were that the Polish ITF Chair was instructed to 
draft a declaration on Darfur, and the Academic, Education and Memorials Working 
Groups were told to discuss, “…the issue of teaching about the Holocaust and its 
connections with teaching and remembering other genocides.”179  The consequence of 
these discussions was a letter dated 21st November 2005 addressed to Juan Méndez, 
Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide at the UN.  Acting on the behalf of the 
ITF as a whole, the then Task Force Chair, Professor Daria Nalecz called on the 
international community to, “…increase its efforts to halt the ongoing atrocities in 
Darfur.”180  However, for Smith, a long time member of the British ITF delegation, the 
Task Force’s statement on the situation in Darfur should have been issued considerably 
earlier: 
We came to a real crunch over Darfur, actually because it became virtually impossible to get a 
statement out of the Task Force on Darfur.  One was achieved after about 100,000 extra deaths, 
and I just don’t think that’s appropriate.  It brought me into conflict with the Task Force, I have 
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to say, because I felt that for governments to willingly join an organization on the basis that they 
wanted to ensure that ‘Never Again’ meant ‘Never Again’ and then not being able to find an 
adequate form of words over Darfur, just demonstrated that we were very unlikely to learn very 
much from the Holocaust in a political context.  And I would add to that we have not learnt from 
the Holocaust in a political context.181 
 
Although the issue of the Holocaust and its relationship to other genocides remains a 
deeply contested one within the ITF, a sense of consensus was reached with the 
publication of the ‘Holocaust Task Force Policy Plan for the next Five Years’ 
(December 2006), which emphasized that whilst the primary aims of the ITF remained 
the promotion of Holocaust education, remembrance and research as well as the battle 
against anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial, the plan also stressed that the purpose of 
the ITF was to develop ways, “…by which research, remembrance and education of the 
Holocaust, the paradigmatic genocide, can be used to prevent and address 
contemporary threats of genocide.”182  As a result, in contradistinction to those 
critiques which see the rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ as simply ‘screening 
out’ the acknowledgement of other genocides and past atrocities,183 a study of the 
institutional conflicts and debates within the ITF suggests a much more complex 
although nonetheless still highly problematic picture.  
 
 
The final part of the ITF’s remit is to battle contemporary forms of anti-Semitism as has 
been evidenced by Task Force support for events such as the OSCE co-sponsored 
conference ‘Lessons Learned: Holocaust remembrance and combating anti-Semitism’  
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held in Vienna on 10th November 2008 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of 
‘Kristallnacht’.184  Although the ITF’s rhetoric of combating anti-Semitism can 
sometimes re-iterate problematic stereotypes,185 the organization has also spoken out on 
some important issues.  For example, in January 2006, the ITF condemned the 
pronouncements of Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejab on the grounds that 
calling, “the Holocaust a myth, and in effect calling for a genocidal policy towards 
another member state of the UN, namely Israel, were an unacceptable departure.”186  
In spite of these condemnations from the West, Ahmadinejab continued his anti-Zionist 
inspired attacks on the veracity of Holocaust history, a campaign which reached one of 
its most intense points with a cruel and perverse satire on the SIF 2000 itself.   
 
On 11th December 2006, Tehran’s foreign ministry hosted a two-day event, ‘Review of 
the Holocaust: Global Vision’, which sought, “to counter an alleged lack of free speech 
in the West about the Holocaust, which Iranian officials argue is used to justify Israel’s 
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oppression of Palestinians.”187 However, far from being a meeting on democracy and 
human rights, many commentators saw this conference as actively harming the 
Palestinian cause,188 because attendees included such extremists as the infamous 
Holocaust denier, Robert Faurisson, Michele Renouf, who is based in the UK and has 
links to David Irving as well as David Duke, an ex-Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux 
Klan.189  Given these provocations, it is perhaps unsurprising that on 8th December 2006 
just a few days before the ‘Review of the Holocaust’ conference opened, the ITF issued 




One of the key outcomes of the SIF 2000 on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and 
Research was the continuance of SIFs in 2001, 2002 and 2004.  These gatherings were 
significant because they encouraged dialogues and the formation of networks of action 
between politicians, academics, NGO representatives and survivors on a range of 
important issues relating to ‘Combating Intolerance’ (2001); ‘Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation’ (2002) and ‘Preventing Genocide’ (2004).  A further key consequence 
of the SIFs was that following the ‘Stockholm Declaration on the Holocaust’ (2000), 
non-binding Stockholm Declarations were also formulated in relation to ‘Combating 
Intolerance’ (2001) and ‘Preventing Genocide’ (2004).  These declarations are 
significant in that they document and re-affirm the collective responsibilities of the 
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international community and can be used proactively by human rights campaigners.  
However, it cannot be ignored that genocides, in places such as the Congo and Darfur 
have been perpetrated immediately before, during and since the convening of the SIF 
2004.  As a result, the danger is that the Stockholm Declarations become hollow 
pledges which idealistically promise Western international commitment but fail to 
deliver, illustrating instead the strength of nation states vis-à-vis the Western  
international order, and in the process of disenchantment create little but further 
intellectual and public cynicism about Western international security agencies, 
politicians and their promises, for as Bauer has described the situation, “… we haven’t 
been able to move governments to act on their noble-sounding words, or to move from 
noble-sounding words to concrete action to prevent genocide.”191    
 
Alongside the convening of the subsequent SIFs, the second major consequence of the 
SIF 2000 was the continuing work of the ITF and its efforts to implement the chief 
tenets of the Stockholm Declaration (2000), particularly in relation to Holocaust 
research, remembrance and education.  However, assessing the impact of the ITF and 
the projects that it supports is far from a simple task given the geographical range of the 
initiatives that the ITF sponsors, the complexities of public reception in different 
national ‘public spheres’ as well as the relatively short time frame in which the ITF has 
been operational.  Despite this, it is clear that the organization has had some notable 
successes, particularly, working in collaboration with the USHMM in relation to the 
ITS and Jasenovac archives, whilst the ITF’s public statements on Ahmadinejab as well 
as those Task Force press releases which highlight the continuing discrimination faced 
by the Roma and Sinti illustrate the ITF’s willingness to take a stand on important 
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contemporary issues.  However, much more problematic is the potential for the 
hierarchization, and  in the worst cases, exclusion of genocides implicit in some but not 
all interpretations and uses of the ITF’s dominant discourse of Holocaust 
‘unprecedentedness’, whilst the time lag that it took for the ITF to issue a statement on 
the genocide in Darfur is highly problematic.  Finally, the far right and the populist 
radical right in various nation states continue to pose challenges to the implementation 
of the Stockholm Declaration.    
 
Against the backdrop of these concerns, it is difficult to assess both the success of the 
ITF’s specific projects as well as the ramifications of the post-Communist asymmetries 
of political and cultural power implicit in ITF ‘Liaison Projects’ or what Donald 
Bloxham has described as, “’enlightened’ western states…ensuring the basic tenets of 
Holocaust historiography are recognized by former eastern bloc states.”192 For whilst 
the ITF’s mission to challenge the most distortive and pernicious elements of 
Communist and ultra-nationalist Holocaust historiographies is incredibly important,193 
the policies that the Task Force supports can nonetheless be deeply controversial and 
provoke ethno-nationalist backlash in certain political contexts. For example, following 
U.S critiques of Estonia’s failures to prosecute former Nazi war criminals, an opinion 
poll commissioned by the nation’s popular newspaper, Eesti Paevaleht revealed that 
93% of Estonians opposed the 2002 creation of a ‘Day of the Holocaust’ 
commemorating the Jewish catastrophe, genocides and other ‘Crimes against 
Humanity’.194  In an effort to further analyze the consequences of the SIF 2000, as well 
as to provide an in-depth case study of the impact of an ITF ‘Liaison Project’, the next 
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chapter will turn to an analysis of the implementation and political and cultural 





Post-Millennial Holocaust Memory Work 
Implementing the Stockholm Declaration (2000):  
The ITF British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ 
 
As chapter two has suggested, post-millennial efforts to implement the Stockholm 
Declaration (2000) in Britain primarily focused on the launch of UK HMD.  However, 
as reaffirmed at the SIF 2000,  it was also the responsibility of the British ITF 
delegation to provide assistance to ‘Liaison Partners’ or prospective member states of 
the Task Force who needed to improve their public efforts at Holocaust research, 
remembrance and education before they would be permitted to join the organization.  
As a result, British ITF representatives were involved in Task Force ‘Liaison Projects’ 
with Lithuania and Estonia (alongside representatives of Sweden, Israel and Latvia) as 
well as having informal relations with countries such as Ukraine, Belarus and China 
during the noughties.1  Continuing this analysis of the causes and consequences of the 
SIF 2000, which has laid particular emphasis on the UK perspective, and  in order to 
gain a greater knowledge of  how the ITF ‘Liaison Projects’ described in chapter two 
work in practice; what conditions are essential to their success; as well as how the 
‘Liaison Project’ as a relationship of political and cultural power can be understood 
within the nexus of the challenges faced by post-Communist, ‘Westernizing’ countries 
in the Baltic States, this chapter will evaluate the successes and challenges posed to the 
implementation of the British ITF ‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania (2000-2003).   
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Before analyzing the process which led to the formation of the British/Lithuanian 
‘Liaison Project’ as well as the results of that partnership, it should be noted that the 
UK’s relationship to the Holocaust was far from flawless.  According to Kushner, a 
scholar of the collective memory of the Holocaust in the UK, the British government 
downplayed the victimization of the Jews during the mass mobilization efforts of the 
Second World War,2 whilst post-war the ‘liberal imagination’ of the British 
immigration authorities often continued to perceive Jews, “…as undesirable 
newcomers…inassimilable, both religiously and racially, left-wing trouble makers and 
poor workers.”3 Furthermore, the perseverance of this stereotype was one of the reasons 
why the British government was more willing to accommodate immigrants from 
Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, who were often perceived as more ethnically and 
culturally assimilable, sometimes in spite of their war record.4   
 
During the chaos of the end of the war in Europe, many Lithuanians, but also Latvian, 
Ukrainian and Estonian Nazi collaborators attempted to flee to the West to escape the 
re-imposition of Soviet rule and retribution for their anti-Communist resistance.5  
However, rather than being deported, many of these former war criminals managed to 
settle in America and Britain.  This was because Western courts such as the Nuremberg 
tribunals failed to adequately deal with the perpetrators of Jewish genocide in the Baltic 
States,6 and as a result Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Latvian and Estonian collaborators were 
inadequately screened and accepted into Britain under migrant labor programmes such 
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as the UK’s European Voluntary Worker schemes.7 Furthermore, the anti-Soviet 
credentials of these Baltic and Eastern European nationals’ became a valuable 
commodity to the American and British governments in the climate of espionage that 
accompanied the intensification of the Cold War.  As Cesarani has noted in his book on 
the subject, Justice Delayed: 
 
The disclosures by Kim Philby, Anthony Cavendish and CIA operatives have revealed that MI5 
and MI6 recruited anti-Soviet agents from amongst the pool of DPs, including Axis collaborators 
and known war criminals.8         
 
In spite of this situation, some Holocaust survivors did manage to settle in Britain after 
the war.  For example, in 1945, the Committee for the Care of Children from the 
Concentration Camps brought 732 child survivors from Europe to Britain including Ben 
Helfgott and Hugo Gryn, whilst a large number of survivors settled in the UK as a result 
of the Distressed Relations Scheme in which successful applicants had produced proof 
that they had close relatives in Britain as well as no surviving family members abroad.9 
However, current research suggests that the overall picture of social and political efforts 
to promote the remembrance of the Jewish catastrophe in Cold War Britain was bleak.  
Although this assessment may be subject to the potential challenge of the new 
historiography which is re-evaluating the 1950s and 1960s,10 Kushner summarizes the 
situation as follows: 
 
From the end of the war until at least the 1980s British society as a whole was, for the most part, 
at best indifferent and at worst antipathetic to recognizing that the Jews had, in fact, been subject 
to specific treatment by the Nazis.  The net result was that Holocaust commemoration and 
education in Britain was left to a small group of largely Jewish activists, including some 
survivors.11      
 
Kushner contends that in the 1980s and 1990s, this situation began to change when 
                                                           
7
 Cesarani, Justice Delayed, p. 4. 
8
 Ibid., p. 6. 
9
 Kushner, ‘Too Little, Too Late?’, p. 125 and p. 126. 
10
 See the ‘Introduction’ to this thesis. 
11
 Kushner, ‘Too Little, Too Late?’, p. 116. 
193 
 
domestic developments such as the continued campaigns for Holocaust education by 
organizations such as the ‘45 Aid Group and the Holocaust Educational Trust (HET, 
1988) overlapped with the growth of political discourses such as multiculturalism in the 
UK,12  as well as international developments such as the commissioning of the 
USHMM in 1978,13 the growth of pressure in America, Australia, Israel and Canada to 
address war crimes issues in the 1980s,14 as well as the reinvigorated post-1989 
international movement for Holocaust restitution.15  All of these factors had a ‘knock-
on’ effect in encouraging the British political establishment to engage with post-
Holocaust era issues of justice, restitution, remembrance, research and education.  The 
result of these developments combined with considerable campaigning by collectivities 
such as the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the All-Parliamentary War Crimes group 
and the HET was the establishment of the Hyde Park Holocaust Memorial in 1983,16 the 
passing of the War Crimes Act and the inclusion of the Holocaust in the British 
National Curriculum in 1991, the opening of the Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre, 
Nottinghamshire and the commissioning of the IWM’s Holocaust exhibition, both 1995 
as well as the convening of the LCNG (2nd-4th December 1997).17   Finally, alongside 
Sweden and the U.S, Britain became a co-founding member of the ITF in May 1998, 
attended the SIF 2000 and held its first HMD on Saturday 27th January 2001,  based on 
the ‘universalistic’ theme, ‘Remembering Genocides, Lessons for the Future’.18    
 
As a member of the ITF, the British delegation was not only expected to consolidate 
Holocaust research, remembrance and education at home, it was also expected to play 
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the part of a ‘lead country’ to prospective member states of the ITF, many of which 
were located in the former Soviet bloc countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic States.  Whilst chapter two has documented how discussions about the function 
of ‘Liaison Projects’, were first mooted at a March 1999 ITF meeting in London,19  a 
decade later Wallinn and Newman’s  official history of the ITF, described the purpose 
of ‘Liaison Projects’ in the following terms: 
 
The partner countries contribute money to the project in addition to subsidies granted by the 
Task Force.  Ideally, such projects are ensured long lasting support and extension by partner 
governments and the Task Force sometimes provides a portion of the financing.  Evaluation is 
provided by an international expert group within the Task Force.  The policy is therefore one of 
solidarity and action in order to ensure a solid foundation for an initial series of public actions 
which will then be more widely developed.20 
  
Examples of ‘Liaison Projects’ in the first decade of the ITF’s existence include 
Germany as ‘lead country’ to Slovakia; Israel as ‘lead country’ to Hungary; Sweden as 
‘lead country’ to Latvia; the United States as ‘lead country’ to Croatia and Argentina; 
France and Israel as ‘lead countries’ to Romania, Greece and Spain; Britain, Sweden, 
Israel and Latvia as ‘lead countries’ to Estonia as well as Britain as ‘lead country’ to 
Lithuania (2000-2003).21  In order to understand why Lithuania became Britain’s 
‘Liaison Partner’ and why it was necessary for Lithuania to form a ‘Liaison Project’ 
before it became a full member of the ITF in 2002, it is essential to have an 
understanding of the history of the mass murder of Lithuanian Jewry during the Second 
World War;  an awareness of how the Holocaust was treated in Lithuanian public life 
during the Communist era as well as the role of the Holocaust in public debates in post-
Soviet Lithuania, or the period of state independence which  immediately preceded  the 
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formation of the ITF British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ in January 2000. 
 
Lithuania and the Holocaust prior to the ITF British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison 
Project’   
 
The mass murder of Lithuanian Jews during the Second World War remains a difficult 
event for the Lithuanian nation to confront because of the enormity of the genocide that 
was perpetrated, the role of local collaborators in the killing of Lithuanian Jews as well 
as the complicating factor of the brutal legacy of Russian dominance and Soviet 
occupation, which has distorted and complicated the country’s public remembrance of 
the Holocaust in a multitude of ways.  Lithuania’s relationship to Russia as an imperial 
occupier and the movement for national independence has its’ roots deep in the 
nineteenth century and an awareness of this adds a further layer in understanding why 
Soviet dominance was so resented in the twentieth century.     One of the consequences 
of the Third Partition of Poland in 1795 was that Tsarist Russia ended up incorporating 
Lithuania into her Empire, however following the cataclysms of the First World War 
(1914-1918) and the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) Lithuanian nationalists were able to 
declare state independence on 16th February 1918.22  This successful declaration of 
independence was only qualified by the fact that Vilnius, a city shrouded in Lithuanian 
nationalist mythology, but largely populated by Poles and Jews in the early half of the 
twentieth century, was annexed to Poland in October 1920.23   
 
However, the achievements of Lithuanian independence were to be short-lived.   The 
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foreign policy alliance between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the late 1930s 
led to the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (23rd August 1939), which divided 
central and eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet spheres of future invasion and 
influence.24  Whilst the First Secret Protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (28th 
August 1939), allocated Lithuania to Nazi Germany, the Second Secret Protocol (28th 
September 1939) reversed this decision and gave Lithuania to the Soviets.25  A few 
months later on 15th June 1940, the U.S.S.R invaded Lithuania, incorporated the country 
into the Soviet Union (3rd August 1940), made Vilnius the capital of the Lithuanian SSR 
and carried out brutal mass deportations of 20,000-30,000 Lithuanians, Jews and Poles 
to Kazakhstan and Siberia between June 1940 and July 1941.26  Victims of the 
deportations included members of the Lithuanian political elite such as Prime Minister 
Merkys and Foreign Minister Urbsys.27        
 
It was against this backdrop of the Second World War and Soviet invasion and partition 
that the Nazi/Soviet alliance dissolved, and the Nazi German invasion of Lithuania on 
22nd June 1941 occurred.  The German invasion led to a wave of Lithuanian partisan 
uprisings against the Soviet army,28 as well as furious local pogroms against Lithuanian 
Jews.  For whilst some Lithuanian Jews served in the Soviet state apparatus and army, 
the Nazis and their collaborators’ violence was directed against all Lithuanian Jewish 
civilians whatever their political affiliation, religious congregation or experience during 
the Soviet occupation.  Jews were universally identified in Nazi anti-Semitic 
propaganda as well as in the consciousness of many Lithuanian Nazi collaborators with 
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Communist interests.29  An extract from the war-time diary of Jewish oncolologist, Dr. 
Viktor Kutorga is indicative of both the extreme violence of the Nazis and their 
Lithuanian collaborators as well as their widespread tendency to identify the political 
and doctrinal diversity of Lithuanian Jewry with Communist concerns.  In Kaunas on 
28th June 1941, Kutorga observed: 
 
On Vitauskas Avenue, in the open yard of the Letukis garage at 4.00pm, the Lithuanian 
‘partisans’ and the Germans gathered around forty Jews and, after spraying them with water 
from fire hoses, beat the unfortunates to death with clubs.  This scene took place in the presence 
of many German officers and a large crowd of people made up of men, women and children who 
avidly observed the terrifying picture.  No one tried to intervene; the victims (Communists, they 
were sure) died in front of everyone after two hours of suffering.30   
    
The prevalence of this pernicious stereotype served as an alibi for the ferocious mass 
murder of Lithuanian Jewry by Nazi Einsatzkommandos and their Lithuanian 
collaborators.   Sub-units of Nazi Einsatzkommando 2 operated in the Schauliai region 
and northern Lithuania; Einsatzkommando 3 conducted killing operations in Kaunas 
and western and central Lithuania and finally, Einsatzkommando 9, organized murder 
squads in the Vilnius region.31  These massacres of Vilnius Jews in the sandpits of the 
Paneriai (Ponary) Forest by Einsatzkommando 9 are also a shocking example of the 
extent of Lithuanian collaboration in what would later become known as the Holocaust.  
For example, by July 1941, Einsatzkommando 9 had recruited thousands of Lithuanian 
volunteers into its organization and between July and August 1941, hundreds of Vilnius 
Jews were shot at Paneriai by a Lithuanian volunteer unit called the Special Platoon 
(Ypatingas Burys).32  The homicidal work of Einsatzkommando 9 continued with 3700 
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Jews being shot at Paneriai in September 1941; a further 6000 being executed after the 
formation of the Vilnius ghettos on 6th September 1941 as well as 12,000 more Jews 
being murdered in the Paneriai death pits between October and November 1941.33  As a 
result, by December 1941, the Nazis and their Lithuanian collaborators had murdered an 
estimated 21,700 Vilnius Jews.34           
 
By the beginning of 1942, the Nazis and their local collaborators had killed between 
160,000 and 163,000 members of Lithuanian Jewry.35  Whilst some Jews who were 
perceived as essential workers managed to survive in the ghettos of Vilnius, Kaunas and 
Siauliai, the process of mass killing, exploitation, expropriation and plunder was far 
from over.  In early 1942, a subdivision of Special Staff Rosenberg was established in 
Vilnius and valuable Jewish antique books and religious artifacts were shipped to the 
Reich, whilst a similar process was also implemented in Kaunas.36  In September 1943, 
the Kaunas and Siauliai ghettos were converted into SS administered concentration 
camps, whilst despite the controversial efforts of Jewish Council leader, Jacob Gens, the 
Vilnius ghetto was liquidated between 23rd and 24th September 1943.37  Recently in a 
documentary interview, Gita Geseleva, a survivor of the destruction of the Vilnius 
ghetto described the brutality that she encountered:  
 
The Germans came into our house and searched.  They took everything out and threw things on 
the floor…They themselves covered the entrance to the basement.  I heard somebody say; 
“come, come here”, and then I heard the shots.  This was my parents.  I started crying but the 
others held me back.  The Germans went from one house to another.  Searching, searching and 
killing.  And then they set the ghetto on fire.38   
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Following the liquidation of the Vilnius ghetto, 4000-4500 women and children were 
deported to Sobibor where they were murdered; 1600-2000 men were sent to Estonia; 
1400-1700 younger women were expected to perform duties in the Latvian Kaiserwald 
concentration camp; whilst many older members of the ghetto population were taken 
and brutally shot at Paneriai.39  Over the course of the war, approximately 70,000 Jews 
were murdered at Paneriai, a massacre site which also witnessed the Nazi sanctioned  
killings of a further 30,000 people including Polish, Lithuanian, Czechoslovakian, 
Latvian, Hungarian, Romanian, Russian and French dissidents.40     
 
However, even in the days immediately preceding the onslaught of the Soviet army in 
July and August 1944, the Nazis continued targeting Lithuanian Jewry.  At Paneriai,  
they massacred 2000 who had been taken from the Kailis military vehicle workshop as 
well as deporting 5000-6000 Jews from the Kaunas concentration camp to Stuttof in 
East Prussia (July 1944), where some of the prisoners were murdered and other in-
mates were sent onto a number of different concentration camps across Germany.41  Of 
those Jews who survived the Holocaust in Lithuania, 7000-8000 were deportees to 
German concentration camps who were subsequently liberated by the allies in 1945;42 
approximately 1000 were aided by ‘Righteous Gentiles’ in hiding or attempted to pass 
as ‘Aryan’ citizens;43 whilst an estimated 1000 survived as a result of fighting with 
Soviet and Jewish partisans in the forests.44  It was this latter group that would prove the 
most controversial in post-Communist Lithuania, being valorized for their heroic 
resistance in Israel and condemned for siding with the Soviets by Lithuanian ultra-
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nationalists.45  However, what both of these interpretations elide, is the fact that whilst 
the majority of Jewish partisans comprised a motley crew of escaped Zionist, Bundist 
and Communist ghetto underground youth movement members, many Jews hiding in 
the forests, including some women, children and the elderly were not primarily involved 
in the conflict for the sake of ideology, but were there because it was the best way of 
surviving the genocide that was unfolding around them.46           
 
At the outset of the Second World War, Lithuania had a Jewish population of 
approximately 205,000-210,000 however, by the end of the conflict Lithuanian Jewish 
survivors of the Holocaust numbered just 9000-10,000 and Vilnius, or what was once 
known as the ‘Jerusalem of the North’ had been looted, plundered and reduced to 
rubble.47  Against this backdrop of destruction, the future of the Lithuanian state also 
hung in the balance of reconfigured post-war international relations.   Eventually, the 
Yalta Peace Conference (4th-11th February 1945) re-confirmed Soviet control of the 
territories of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, however, the result of this decision 
was Lithuanian partisan resistance to Communist power in Lithuania between 1944 and 
1952.48  In response the Soviets cracked-down against aggressive forms of ‘bourgeois 
nationalism’, ‘enemies of the people’ as well as ‘kulaks’ who were seen as opposing  
the collectivization drive in agriculture. The consequence of this was that approximately 
350,000 Lithuanians were forcibly deported to work in Soviet special camps in places 
such as Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, the Altay and the Arctic.49   
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Obtaining justice and remembrance of the Jewish catastrophe in Soviet Lithuania would 
be fraught with difficulties.  Not only did Western states such as America and Britain 
turn a ‘blind eye’ to Lithuanian Nazi collaborators, but Soviet policy towards different 
ethnic groups in Lithuania between the end of the Second World War and Perestroika 
also discouraged a reckoning with Lithuania’s role in the mass murder of Lithuanian 
Jewry.  For example, whilst Yiddish responses to the Jewish catastrophe flourished  in 
the Soviet Union after the war, it was not long before institutions which promoted 
Yiddish language, history and culture were seen as forwarding a pernicious form of 
‘bourgeois nationalism’.50  This meant that they were at odds with the Stalinist 
Russification drive against what were perceived to be forms of ideologically retrograde 
and dissident nationalisms within the U.S.S.R. and its satellite states.51  Furthermore, 
against the backdrop of the intensification of the Cold War, Yiddish was also perceived 
as doubly dangerous because some of its key proponents in Communist organization’s 
such as the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee had links to Jewish institutions in the West, 
or in Soviet terms they had a status which suggested that they were ‘rootless 
cosmopolitans’.52  
 
Equally, although the Soviet Union had initially supported the establishment of Israel in 
1948 and Czechoslovakia had supplied arms during the first Israeli War of 
Independence (1948-1949),53 the intensification of the Cold War combined with the 
increasing association of Israel with American interests, as well as the rapturous 
reception given by some Soviet Jews to a visit by Israeli ambassador Golda Meir;54 
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formed the backdrop for a paranoid Stalinist attack against ‘Zionists’ who were 
maliciously stereotyped as a perceived ‘fifth column’ of ‘fascist capitalist’ conspirators 
within the Communist empire.55 The results of this Communist crackdown against 
forms of Jewish ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘Zionism’ were anti-Semitic purges in the 
party-state hierarchy as well as the repression of political, social and cultural expression 
in Yiddish.56  By 1950 the Soviets had closed all Jewish public institutions in Lithuania, 
including the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum (which had been re-established in 
1944),57 whilst the Vilnius Great Synagogue dating back to the late sixteenth century 
and subject to bombing during the Second World War had also been demolished.58  This 
Soviet persecution of Lithuanian Jewry meant that by 1959 a Communist census 
estimated that just 24, 672 Jews were left living in Lithuania.59   
 
Post-war forms of Soviet anti-nationals policy dovetailed with the U.S.S.R’s belief that 
social cohesion in the Soviet empire would be better aided by an inclusive narrative of 
the Soviet struggle against German ‘fascist-capitalism’. The result of this was the 
widespread Soviet failure to recognize the specific crime of the mass murder of 
European Jewry under Nazism in the late 1940s and 1950s; a tragedy which also raised 
the divisive issue of local collaboration with the Third Reich in occupied states such as, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine and Belorussia.60  For example, in 1949, the Yiddish 
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inscription on a memorial specifically dedicated by Lithuanian Jews to their fellow 
Litvaks who had perished at Paneriai was altered to a Lithuanian and Russian message 
which commemorated the mass murder of Soviet Citizens.61  However, Stalin’s death in 
1953 and Khrushchev’s policy of ‘de-Stalinization’ facilitated the publication of some 
books in the 1960s which began to address the history of the Jewish catastrophe in 
Lithuania, albeit within the problematic context of Communist ideology.  For example, 
journalist Stasys Bistrickas published an account of the Paneriai forest massacres called, 
And those who were shot bear witness (1960).  Equally, documents from the Vilnius 
and Kaunas trials of Nazi war criminals (1962) were made available, whilst in 1967, 
Sofia Binkiene released a book entitled, War Without Weapons, which dealt with stories 
of Jewish rescue.62   
 
Furthermore, the writings of Lithuanian Jewish survivors were also published in this 
period, such as I Must Tell, the memoir of Mashe Rolnikaite, a teenage survivor of the 
Vilnius ghetto and Stutthof concentration camp. Rolnikaite’s memoir was published in 
Yiddish in 1963 before being translated into Russian and published in Moscow as the 
Soviet equivalent of Anne Frank in 1965.63    However the Soviet selection of survivor 
memoirs to be published was ultimately problematic for the future development of the 
memory of the Holocaust because the published accounts failed to represent a wide 
variety of Jewish experiences.  Rather in Communist ideological fashion, published 
memoirs were either predominantly authored by or alternatively primarily represented 
Jews who had either served with the Red Army, the Soviet partisans, or the Communist 
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ghetto resistance during the Second World War.64  Illustrating the troubling elements of 
this Soviet selectivity, when Rolnikaite first submitted her memoir for publication, she 
was told that it needed to be altered because it was not written from the right class 
perspective.  That is, it failed to adequately address the role of the Soviet partisans and 
it was also too positive about the Jewish Councils.65   In light of this, Lithuanian writer, 
Vytautas Toleikis, has noted how Rolnikaite’s description of the Vilnius ghetto 
resistance emphasized the heroism of the Communist members whilst ignoring the 
contributions made by Zionist and Bundist affiliates.66   
 
The 1970s and 1980s also witnessed some significant shifts in the remembrance of the 
Holocaust in Lithuania.  During the 1970s, Lithuanian émigré scholar and poet at Yale 
University, Tomas Venclova began to write about the mass murder of Lithuanian Jewry 
during the Second War.67  Equally, within Lithuania itself, Thomas C. Fox, a scholar of 
Soviet collective memory has observed that, “…in the 1970s and 1980s, an emphasis by 
Lithuanian Jews and non-Jews on the Jewish catastrophe often served as a protest, 
coded or not, against Soviet policies of repression and misinformation.”68  Despite this, 
further waves of Lithuanian Jewry left for Israel in 1971, 1972 as well as during the late 
1980s.69   
 
Against the backdrop of Gorbachev’s Perestroika (‘Re-structuring’) and Glasnost 
(‘publicity’ or ‘openess’), from the summer of 1988, the Sajudis national Lithuanian 
revival movement held popular public rallies and in March 1989, Sajudis 
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representatives were elected to seats in the newly established Congress of People’s 
Deputies.70  Rebelling against the consequences of the Soviet invasion of June 1940, the 
movement for independence gained increasing momentum in Lithuania, one of the least 
ethnically Russian as well as one of the most politically vocal of the Baltic Republics.71 
The desire for national independence was epitomized by the massive ‘Baltic Way’ 
protest that Sajudis and the Latvian and Estonian People’s Fronts organized between 
Tallinn and Vilnius on 23rd August 1989.72    These popular political developments 
eventually led to the overthrow of Lithuania’s Soviet tutelage and resulted in the re-
establishment of Lithuanian national independence on 11th March 1990.73  Although 
Soviet security forces attempted to reverse this situation, seizing the TV tower in 
Vilnius in January 1991, a move which resulted in the deaths of fifteen people,74 the 
leaders of independent Lithuania persevered and in October 1992 inaugurated a 
democratic constitution with liberal minorities and citizenship legislation.75   
 
However, in a similar way to neighboring post-Communist Poland, one of the 
consequences of Lithuanian independence, democracy and the re-orientation of politics 
from East to West was a renewed impetus from some social groups at home as well as 
certain state alliances abroad to deal with Lithuania’s relationship to the Second World 
War, the consequences of the Soviet and German occupations and in particular, the 
perpetration of the Holocaust.  This confrontation with the past came at a time when 
owing to the legacy of Nazi extermination and subsequent Soviet persecution, 
Lithuania’s native Jewish population was massively depleted.   In 1989, the Lithuanian 
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Jewish community had numbered just 12,314, but approximately half of this figure left 
for Israel between 1989 and 1994.76  The cumulative effect of these emigrations was 
that by 1999, the Lithuanian Jewish population totaled just 5500 (with 3500-4000 living 
in Vilnius) whilst approximately 60% of this figure were over the age of sixty.77      
 
Despite this demographic situation, political, social and cultural shifts meant that by the 
end of the 1980s as well as under democratic Lithuanian governments of the 1990s, a 
number of positive developments were facilitated in relation to Holocaust research, 
remembrance and education.  For example, a campaign by Jewish intellectuals at the 
Lithuanian Cultural Foundation meant that the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum of 
Lithuania was re-established in October 1989.  In part of this museum, called ‘The 
Green House’ is the Catastrophe exhibition, a display curated by Lithuanian Holocaust 
survivors such as Rachel Kostanian, which recounts the history of Jewish life in 
Lithuania prior to the Second World War, the subsequent persecution and systematic 
mass murder of Lithuanian Jews by the Nazis and their Lithuanian collaborators as well 
as providing a space for Jewish mourning, resistance and revival in contemporary 
Lithuania.   Kostanian has said that her work at the museum honours her family 
members who perished at Paneriai.78    Furthermore, reflecting on an exhibition of 
Jewish artefacts and books in Vilnius in the period immediately preceding national 
independence,79 Kostanian also stressed the importance of preserving and keeping alive 
Jewish communal culture in Lithuania, particularly after years of Nazi and Soviet 
repression: 
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Of course, the books mainly touched me, books, pictures and art.  It was something outstanding 
it was such an event in my life, the culture behind it.   The regret, the pain that we couldn’t have 
had it, that I couldn’t have had it for my son...That they made us nameless, homeless...because a 
culture is home...A culture is home, it’s roots...a name, a family name, things that we could be 
proud of.80        
 
Kostanian’s testimony attests to the fact that for many Holocaust survivors the right to 
express their Jewish identity and commemorate the Holocaust was incredibly important 
in post- independence Lithuania.  This was a feeling shared by escapee of the Vilnius 
ghetto, former partisan, and librarian at the Vilnius Yiddish Institute, Fania 
Brantsovsky, who aids survivors, teaches Yiddish and organizes tours of Jewish Vilnius 
as well as guided trails of the partisan forest bases.81  Equally, World War II conscript 
into the Soviet army, Joseph Levinson returned to his home shtetl of Veisiejai in 1945, 
to find his father, cousins and many of his neighbours massacred.  After national 
independence and in honor of the dead, Levinson relentlessly toured Lithuania, 
discovering mass graves and establishing memorials which were dedicated to those who 
perished during the Nazi onslaught.82   
 
However, for many Lithuanian survivors, some of whom face illness and financial 
hardship,  the memories of the past still evoke troubling feelings of what Italian-Jewish 
Auschwitz survivor, Primo Levi might call ‘survivor guilt’ or ‘shame’.83  For example, 
in Surviving History (2009), a documentary about the contemporary plight of 
Lithuanian Holocaust survivors,  blind Orthodox Jew, Berl Glazer commented that, “On 
the one hand it’s good that I survived, but so many others perished”,84 whilst Chasia 
Spanerflig, who made the ‘choiceless choice’ to leave her son, her niece and her 
husband’s parents in the Vilnius ghetto,  and instead join her husband with the forest 
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partisans, agonized that this decision, “stays with me and tortures me all my life.”85            
 
Other sites which commemorate the Holocaust in Lithuania include Jewish community 
member, Adomas Jacovskis’s memorial stone and Epstein’s 1991 monument to the 
70,000 Jews who were slaughtered at Paneriai,86 as well as the Kaunas Ninth Fort’s 
memorial to Jewish victims, established in 1991, which commemorates over 30,000 
Jews who were murdered there during the Second World War.87  International 
awareness about the Holocaust in Lithuania was also heightened by the 1993 opening of 
the USHMM, where one of the most prominent and moving exhibits is the ‘Tower of 
Faces’, a display  which vertically bisects the core of the museum.88  This display was 
pieced together from the photographic collection of Lithuanian Holocaust survivor and 
scholar, Yaffa Eliach, and it is a vast display of portraits of the pre-war inhabitants of 
the Lithuanian shtetl of Eishishok, the majority of whom were subsequently murdered 
during the Holocaust.89       
 
Against this backdrop of local and international interest in commemorating the 
Holocaust in Lithuania, the nation’s political establishment made some efforts to 
promote awareness of the Holocaust throughout the 1990s.  For example, on 8th May 
1990, a government decree was passed entitled, ‘Regarding the Genocide of the Jewish 
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Nation in Lithuania during the Nazi Occupation’, 90  whilst other state efforts included 
the 1994 inauguration of a yearly National Holocaust Remembrance Day on 23rd  
September, the day that the Vilnius ghetto was liquidated in 1943.91  Also significant 
was the fact that on 7th September 1998, the Lithuanian-American émigré and supporter 
of Western integration, President Valdus Adamkus established, ‘The International 
Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation 
Regimes in Lithuania’.92  
 
This Commission was significant in opening up the study of the perpetration of Nazi 
and Soviet crimes in Lithuania to the wider international academic community after 
decades of Lithuanian intellectual life being dominated by the constraints of Communist 
ideology.  Members of the International Commission included the Chairman, Emanuelis 
Zingeris (a member of the Lithuanian Seimas), the co-Chairman, Professor Liudas 
Truska (History department, Vilnius Pedagogical University), Yitzhak Arad (Yad 
Vashem), Andrew Baker (American Jewish Committee), Sir Martin Gilbert (Honorary 
Fellow, Merton College, Oxford University) as well as Professor Saulius Suziedelis 
(History department, Millersville, University of Pennsylvania). The Commission has 
supported research in relation to the history of the Holocaust in Lithuania by local 
scholars.  For example, Vygandas Vareikis (Klaipeda University) and Truska have 
analyzed pre-war Lithuanian anti-Semitism, whilst Arunas Bubnys (Genocide and 
Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania) has written on the role of Lithuanian 
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collaborators in the Holocaust.93  Furthermore, the Commission has also encouraged 
research by international academics, such as Christoph Dieckmann (PhD Freiberg; 
Lecturer History department, Keele University, UK) and Suziedelis’s investigations into 
the persecution and mass killing of Lithuanian Jews between the summer and autumn of 
1941.94   
 
However, despite these public and academic achievements, many critics have also 
argued that these government efforts were also full of significant flaws and omissions, 
particularly given Lithuania’s continuing failures to prosecute former Nazi war 
criminals and Lithuanian collaborators in the perpetration of the Holocaust.  For 
example, in 2005, Efraim Zuroff, director of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre’s Israel 
office criticized the wording of the Lithuanian government’s 8th May 1990 decree on the 
grounds that: 
 
…the Lithuanian parliament sought to differentiate between the ostensibly blameless ‘Lithuanian 
people’ and the murderers who were ‘Lithuanian citizens’, a distinction which is not supported 
by the historical record.95    
 
Equally, Zuroff was cynical of the choice of 23rd September, the date marking the 
liquidation of the Vilnius ghetto, as Lithuania’s HMD: 
 
…it is not linked to the extensive mass murders carried out throughout the country by Lithuanian 
vigilantes and Security Police during the initial half year of Nazi occupation.  This - most 
probably intentional – decision to divert the focus helps to minimize Lithuanian participation in 
the crimes of the Holocaust, a tendency clearly reflected in government policy since the 
regaining of independence.96 
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Furthermore, one of the most vocal critics of the Lithuanian International Commission 
has been Vilnius University Judaic Studies Professor and founder of the Vilnius Yiddish 
Institute, Dovid Katz.   Admittedly, Katz is a problematic commentator in that he 
forwards a definition of ‘genocide’ which fits the Holocaust, whilst excluding less 
‘total’ mass atrocities against groups in terms of perpetrator intention.97  Equally, in 
response to reactionary claims of a global ‘Holocaust Industry’, Katz has sometimes 
employed unhelpful and inflammatory rhetoric which is likely to exacerbate as opposed 
to stimulate constructive dialogue about Lithuania’s ‘memory wars’.  For example, Katz 
alleges that the Lithuanian state is sponsoring a ‘Genocide Industry’ in relation to the 
representation of Soviet atrocities.98  
 
However, despite these troubling elements, Katz has forwarded a pertinent concern in 
relation to the Lithuanian International Commission.  Namely, he has argued that the 
twinning of the Soviet and Nazi era pasts within the remit of the International 
Commission is problematic because it can be subversively interpreted and abused by 
ultra-nationalist pressure groups who seek to minimize the responsibility of Lithuanian 
collaborators in co-perpetrating the mass murder of Lithuanian Jewry during the Second 
World War.99   For whilst in principle, it is perfectly acceptable to compare and contrast 
the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships, some post-Communist, ultra-nationalists use and 
abuse the history of the Soviet and Nazi occupations in Eastern Europe and the Baltic 
States in order to write anti-Semitic and apologetic ultra-nationalist historiographies 
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which attempt to justify indigenous collaboration in the mass murder of European Jewry 
during the Second World War.  Within the Lithuanian context, these discourses often 
simplistically and inaccurately equate all members of Lithuanian Jewry as acting in 
alliance with Lithuanian Jewish Communists and the Soviet Union during the 1940s.   
All members of Lithuanian Jewry are then blamed for the Soviet occupation of 1940-
1941, and what the Lithuanian state has categorized as the subsequent genocide of the 
Lithuanian people (through Soviet deportations and the political repression of national 
life).  Revenge for these actions forms the excuse for Lithuanian collaboration with 
German forces in perpetrating the mass murder of Lithuanian Jewry during the Second 
World War.100  Katz has called this the Holocaust ‘Obfuscation’ movement,101 and an 
exponent of this type of nasty and apologetic ultra-nationalist historiography, Jonas 
Mikelinskas has claimed that the Lithuanian Jews were ultimately responsible for the 
mass murder of their own people.102     
 
Against the backdrop of these anxieties in relation to the limitations of state sponsored 
efforts, international organizations have also contributed to the remembrance of the 
Holocaust and the revival of Jewish communal life in post-independence Lithuania.  For 
example, between 1995 and 2003, B’nai B’rith in conjunction with the History Faculty 
of the Vilnius Pedagogical University organized a series of annual seminars for teachers 
on the subject of Holocaust education,103 whilst according to a July 1999 article in The 
Jerusalem Report, the Joint Distribution Committee focused:  
 
…on rebuilding Lithuanian Jewish life by helping elderly Jews with food packages and medical 
care, supporting community centers and schools, and fostering a culture of local Jewish 
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voluntarism and new leadership.104   
 
Despite these initiatives by the Lithuanian Jewish community as well as by international 
organizations such as B’nai B’rith and the Joint Distribution Committee, efforts at 
promoting Holocaust education, remembrance and research in Lithuania were also beset 
by intractable controversies and difficulties in the first decade after the state had 
declared independence.  For example, in 1996 there was the dispute over the ownership 
of 300 pre-Holocaust era Torah scrolls valued at approximately $4 million.105  This  
dispute was only resolved in January 2002 when the National Library of Vilnius 
conferred the scrolls to an Israeli delegation led by Michael Melchior, with the intent of 
distributing the scrolls to Jewish organizations throughout the world.106 
 
However, the main focus of Holocaust era controversies in the 1990s was the 
resurgence in ultra-nationalist interpretations of the Second World War and the war 
crimes issue.  After the fall of Communism, the independent Lithuanian government 
had granted amnesty to approximately one thousand Lithuanian Nazi collaborators who 
had been imprisoned by the Soviet Union.107  As many of these Nazi collaborators had 
also served in the Lithuanian partisan resistance against the Soviet Union, in some 
quarters of Lithuanian society they were hailed as national heroes.  However, this 
amnesty was at odds with wider developments within the Western international 
community.  For, whilst countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom 
had turned a ‘blind eye’ to many Eastern European and Baltic Nazi collaborators during 
the Cold War, the 1980s had heralded a changed international climate on the issue.108 
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This meant that as part of Lithuania’s integration into the West, countries such as the 
United states, Britain and Israel as well as organizations such as the Simon Wiesenthal 
Centre expected Lithuania to make efforts to ‘come to terms’ with its past by forcing 
former Nazi collaborators and war criminals to face justice.109  The perturbing side 
effect of this international campaign was that the ultra-nationalist reaction against it also 
brought residual anti-Semitism to the surface of Lithuanian public life.110  
 
Responding to demands that Lithuania face its Nazi past, between 1994 and 1995, 
President Algirdas Brazauskas made a number of diplomatic moves in the foreign 
policy arena.  In April 1994, he gave a speech to the Council of Europe which 
condemned the Holocaust in Lithuania, regretted the role of Lithuanian collaborators 
and pledged that war criminals would be found and prosecuted.111  He also stated that 
Lithuanian ‘Righteous Gentiles’ should be recognized for their courage.112  
Brazauskas’s speech at the Council of Europe was followed by a diplomatic visit to 
Israel in March 1995, in which he echoed the sentiments articulated by Prime Minister 
Adolfas Slezevicius a year earlier.113  Whilst in Israel, Brazauskas publically apologized 
for crimes committed by Lithuanians against Jews during the Second World War and 
reaffirmed his pledge to bring Lithuanian Nazi collaborators to justice.114  Part of this 
process had been set in motion with the Lithuanian High Court’s renewed emphasis on 
screening suspected Nazi war criminals, who had managed to hide their past and be 
rehabilitated into Lithuania and were still receiving full state benefits and pensions.  Of 
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the 50,000 cases assessed by 1994, approximately 1000 were stripped of their 
rehabilitation status.115      
 
However, Brazauskas’s apology also created waves of controversy at home.  For whilst 
his actions were supported by more liberal Lithuanian patriots as well as by many 
Lithuanian Jews, there was also huge hostility in some quarters of the Lithuanian 
popular press as well as from the ‘usual suspects’: far right neo-Nazi groups such as the 
Lithuanian National Socialist Unity Organization and extreme ultra-nationalist 
newspapers such as Respublikos Varpai (‘Bells of the Republic’).  The main claims 
being made by opponents of the apology was that the President was perceived to be 
humiliating the Lithuanian nation and furthering an international image of Lithuanians 
as ‘war criminals’.116  These feelings were further intensified by the issue of bringing 
charges against Aleksandras Lileikis on 6th February 1998.117  Lileikis returned to 
Lithuania from the United States in June 1996 and was an alleged Nazi collaborator as a 
result of his role as head of the Security Department of the Lithuanian Police in the 
Vilnius region during the Second World War.118  As part of the investigation into his 
war crimes, he voluntarily addressed the court for ten minutes (5th November 1998) and 
answered questions by video link (23rd June 2000).119   However, in the event,  charges 
were dropped because of an apparent lack of hard evidence and the ill health of the 
defendant, although according to the Wiesenthal Centre, there was also a lack of 
urgency by the Lithuanian authorities.120  On 26th September 2000, Lileikis passed 
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Even after the Leleikis controversy, the war crimes issue remained a deeply problematic 
one throughout the latter half of the 1990s, affecting both Lithuania’s relationship to its 
own Jewish population as well as its diplomatic relations with the West, particularly 
America and Israel.  For example, efforts to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the 
death of the Jewish spiritual leader and scholar, The Vilna Gaon in September 1997 
became embroiled in the war crimes debate  when a  movement led by a Tel Aviv based 
group of Lithuanian Jews, the Simon Wiesenthal Centre as well as other international 
Jewish organizations opposed the event on the grounds that it was, “…a cynical attempt 
by Lithuania to divert attention away from its policy of rehabilitating its criminals, even 
as it tries to attract Jewish tourist dollars.”122  However, these international calls for 
action continued to be met with resistance at home, culminating in inflammatory ultra-
nationalist claims that Jews should be put on trial for collaborating with the Soviet 
Union.123 It was against this backdrop of resurgent ultra-nationalism and deep hostility 
in some quarters of Lithuanian society towards the remembrance of the Holocaust that 
the UK attempted to launch its ‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania.        
 
The ITF in Practice: The British ‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania (2000-2003) 
 
Discussions about the possibility of a British ITF ‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania were 
first initiated in the immediate months prior to the convening of the SIF 2000.  This is 
evidenced in a letter dated 19th January 2000 from Jeremy Cresswell at the UK’s 
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Task Force National Delegation Heads, the UK 
Task Force Delegation and Mr Nick Collier at the British Embassy in Vilnius.124  In this 
letter, Cresswell described the tentative beginnings of the British/ Lithuanian ‘Liaison 
Project’:  
In line with discussions taken at the last Task Force meeting in Jerusalem, I visited Vilnius on 
17/18th January in response to expressions of interest from the Lithuanian government in 
developing a Liaison Project.  I was accompanied by Stephen Smith (Beth Shalom) who has 
himself been active in Lithuania for several years.  Among those we met were Deputy Foreign 
Minister Usackas, the new Ambassador-at-large Eidintas, Prime Minister’s advisor Matulonius 
and Emanuelis Zingeris, MP. 
 
All our interlocutors stressed the importance of Lithuania developing greater awareness about 
the Holocaust.  They reiterated the importance of Lithuania, particularly Vilnius, in Jewish 
history up to World War II.  They were very conscious of the fact that the issue of the Holocaust 
remains very sensitive in Lithuanian public life, including the media, and that there was still 
confusion in many people’s minds between the evils of the Holocaust and of Stalinism, with 
nationalist elements insisting on the latter. 125      
 
This description is particularly notable for stressing the extent to which Lithuanian 
representatives were proactive partners in instigating the ‘Liaison Project’ with the UK.  
For example, the document mentions the presence in meetings of Zingeris, a Lithuanian 
Jewish activist who has promoted the recognition of human and minority rights in 
Lithuania and the Council of Europe.126  Zingeris has also argued that Nazi 
collaborators should be brought to justice in Lithuania because the country will only be 
taken seriously on the international stage when the nation has dealt, “with this chapter 
from its war-time past”.127  However, Zingeris’s principled stand on Nazi war crimes 
issues also meant that he was marginalized and even considered ‘un-Lithuanian’ in 
ultra-nationalist circles.  Furthermore, Cresswell’s description of the Lithuanians’ 
response is also significant for frankly addressing the controversial role of the 
remembrance of the Holocaust in Lithuanian public life as well as the way in which the 
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social recollection of this tragedy frequently competes for recognition with the social 
memory of Soviet crimes.  Other issues discussed during Cresswell’s and Smith’s visit 
to Vilnius included potential projects for ITF support as well as the Lithuanian decision 
to host with the support of the Council of Europe, the ‘Vilnius International Forum on 
Holocaust Era Assets’ in October 2000.128   
 
During these meetings in Vilnius, Cresswell and Smith did not promise to develop a 
‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania rather they said that further discussions would be 
carried out at the next ITF meeting (25th January 2000), just prior to the convening of 
the SIF 2000.  However, the conclusion of Cresswell’s letter, suggests that he and Smith 
were extremely positive about the opportunity of developing a British/ Lithuanian ITF 
‘Liaison Project’: 
 
Stephen and I have concluded that while (or perhaps precisely because!) this issue is so sensitive 
and important in Lithuania, we should make efforts to develop a Liaison Project.  To do this we 
would need to help the Lithuanians to establish their own priorities.  At present, there are a lot of 
ideas around, from various NGOs and parts of the government, but no plan.129  
 
In line with Cresswell’s letter, at the ITF meeting in Stockholm on  25th  January 2000, 
progress on the first ‘Liaison Project’ with the Czech Republic was discussed and the 
fact that Lithuania but also Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria and Argentina had expressed 
hopes of forming ‘Liaison Projects’ with ‘lead countries’ was mooted.  During this 
meeting: 
It was suggested that each liaison project would have to be tailor-made in accordance with both 
the needs of the recipient country and the capacity of the Task Force to assist.130 
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Furthermore, the ITF meeting in Stockholm firmed up the respective roles of 
government and NGO representatives in prospective ‘Liaison Projects’: 
 
It was agreed that the government representatives in the Task Force would play more of a 
diplomatic – political role, but that institutions and NGOs in the Task Force countries possessed 
the real capacity and expertise to provide the assistance required.131 
 
Following further discussions within the ITF, the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ 
was launched during millennial year and in close proximity to the formation by the 
Lithuanian President in April 2000 of ‘The Working Group for the Preparation and 
Coordination of the National Holocaust Education Programme’.132  Unpublished ITF 
documents suggest that the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ comprised a number of 
different initiatives with the intention of supporting Holocaust research, remembrance 
and education in Lithuania.  For example, a letter from Cresswell dated 20th December 
2000 to Task Force representatives in Rome, Warsaw and the Hague suggested that a 
central focus of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ would be supporting a 
conference for Polish and Lithuanian teachers to be held in Cracow at a cost of 
approximately $26,148, which Cresswell hoped would be defrayed by the Task Force 
Fund.133  This proposed project built on a well established initiative by the London 
Jewish Cultural Centre (LJCC), an independent organization providing Jewish themed 
educational courses, cultural events and leisure activities to the British public.134 As part 
of its international outreach programme, the LJCC had also been facilitating teacher 
training courses in Warsaw and Cracow in association with the Anne Frank House, Yad 
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Vashem and Polish academics, since the mid-1990s .135     
 
In terms of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, the LJCC recommended that, 
“…we incorporate carefully selected Lithuanian teachers into the existing programme, 
with an additional day to deal with the complex issues of Lithuania and the 
Holocaust.”136  It was hoped that by bringing approximately 60 Polish teachers and 30 
Lithuanian instructors together a system of ‘twinning’ might emerge or in the words of 
the LJCC’s draft proposal, an opportunity, “…for teachers from both countries to 
exchange methods and suggestions”,137  as well as contributing to the formation of “a 
strong support system for teachers in the field.”138  It is also notable that the LJCC 
commented on the positive potential that teachers from the Vilnius region might be able 
to speak Polish, although, “…simultaneous translation can be provided.”139 Following 
ITF discussions in March 2001 as well as ongoing Task Force involvement in Czech 
teacher training programmes as discussed in chapters two and three, the LJCC’s 
Polish/Lithuanian teacher training project became the first program to specifically 
receive support from the ITF endowment fund.140   
 
Additionally, the work of the LJCC in the field of Holocaust pedagogy quickly 
diversified internationally.  For example, collaborating with the ITF and representatives 
of Austria and the Netherlands, by February 2002, the LJCC was convening teacher 
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training conferences in partnership with Lithuanian pedagogues in Lviv, Ukraine,141 
whilst by August 2003, the LJCC was also holding teacher training seminars in 
Belarus.142   Reflecting on these initiatives as well as the LJCC’s increasing role in 
Holocaust education in China,143 London based businessman and restaurateur as well as 
ITF representative and Director of the LJCC’s Holocaust and Anti-Racism Education 
Department, Jerry Gotel, was reported in the Jewish Chronicle as commenting that: 
 
My brief was to develop Holocaust education in Eastern Europe.  But at the same time as this 
was getting off the ground, in 2001, I was asked to lead a Holocaust education conference in 
Hong Kong.  It turned into a tremendous success, and the following year I was invited by the 
academic Xu Xiu, whom I had met in Hong Kong, to a conference he was running about the 
Jews of China – the history of Harbin, Shanghai and Kaifeng.144   
 
Furthermore, in relation to British and Lithuanian teacher training co-operation projects, 
Beth Shalom also organized seminars with the Lithuanian Teacher Training Centre, 
whilst in 2001 the UK Holocaust centre produced a two hour film for educational 
purposes on Lithuanian-Jewish history, the Holocaust and contemporary Lithuanian 
inter-ethnic relations entitled, Sunset in Lithuania.145 Alongside these teacher training 
initiatives and in line with Task Force ‘Liaison Project’ policy which had been mooted 
within the organization during the late 1990s,146 other elements comprising the 
British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ included the consolidation and extension of existing 
collaborative projects between individuals and institutions within the two states.   
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For example, British historian Martin Gilbert was a patron of the Vilna Gaon State 
Jewish Museum Friends association,147 and as part of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison 
Project’ his book, Never Again: A History of the Holocaust was translated  and plans 
were made to distribute copies , “…to all major libraries in Lithuania.”148  According 
to Cresswell, this initiative was to be completed independently of Task Force 
funding.149 Furthermore, with the encouragement of Lord Greville Janner, the British 
HET funded the Baltic Mass Graves Project, an enterprise which built on the work of 
survivors such as Joseph Levinson, and sought to signpost Lithuanian, Latvian and 
Estonian mass murder sites and index them electronically.150  Although it is not known 
whether this initiative was officially incorporated into the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison 
Project’, by 2003, over 200 mass graves had been found and marked,151 whilst in 
October 2003, the Lithuanian and Latvian Presidents attended an official unveiling 
ceremony for the signs created by the Baltic Mass Graves Project.152    
 
The planning and carrying out of these initiatives combined with the fact that on 30th 
May 2002, the Lithuanian Delegation presented the National Holocaust Education 
Programme to ITF representatives,153 meant that Lithuania was perceived to have made 
enough progress in Holocaust education, remembrance and research to become a full 
member of the ITF at the 26th June 2002 Plenary Meeting in Paris.  According to 
minutes of this Plenary Session, a British representative is recorded as commenting: 
 
…that over the two years of cooperation between the United Kingdom and Lithuania, the latter 
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had become a major actor in the domain of Holocaust education.  Liaison projects had been 
conducted on the basis of programmes of high quality in terms of Holocaust education and 
remembrance.  Lithuania has achieved a remarkable position because of the extensive experience 
accumulated and the innovative nature of the projects implemented.154 
 
Speaking after the British delegate, one of the members of the Lithuanian ITF 
delegation commented on the importance to Lithuania of Task Force membership.155 
The delegate emphasized, “…the need to ensure that the tragic past of Lithuania is not 
forgotten”,156 as well as significantly remarking that the nation’s, “… inclusion in the 
ITF comes at a time when Lithuania is opening up to the outside world.  In 2004, it is to 
become a member of both NATO and the EU.”157   The Lithuanian delegate also pointed 
to the endeavors of the Lithuanian working group, which by 26th June 2002 had 
discussed twelve projects that were now in the implementation phase, whilst, “Eight 
new projects will be presented at a later time.”158  Noting the presence of 
approximately fifty recent publications on the Holocaust in Lithuania as well as the 
discussion of the Holocaust in Lithuanian schools, newspapers and military 
establishments, the Lithuanian delegate even went as far to proclaim, admittedly 
somewhat prematurely given continued ultra-nationalist dissent that, “The Wall of 
silence in the country has now disappeared.”159 Finally, the Lithuanian delegate 
thanked the British for their support, and also drew attention to initiatives that were 
bound up in the ongoing and future activities of Lithuanian cooperation with the ITF 
generally, as well as the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ specifically: 
 
…further new projects may be set in train, notably in Vilnius, where museums and exhibitions 
are to be organized, with the possibility of ITF input.  Similarly, it is necessary to strengthen co-
operation between Lithuania and Poland.  Greater importance must be attached to common 
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projects within the framework of the ITF.160  
 
 
Following Lithuania’s accession to the ITF, the Lithuanian government, the Task Force, 
the British as well as a host of other countries and organizations attempted to support 
Holocaust education, remembrance and research through the continuing activities of the 
International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet 
Occupation Regimes in Lithuania.  For example, the result of a September 2002 
International Commission conference entitled, ‘Holocaust in Lithuania in the Focus of 
Modern History, Education and Justice’, was that it was decided that a ‘National 
Programme on Holocaust and Tolerance Education’ would be implemented.161  
Subsequently, on 25th September 2002, the International Commission completed co-
operation contracts with Yad Vashem, Smith’s Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre as well 
as the New Jersey Commission on Holocaust Education.162  Furthermore, other 
organizations which periodically co-operate with the International Commission include 
the USHMM, Facing History, B’nai B’rith and the National Fund of the Republic of 
Austria for Victims of National Socialism.163   
 
As part of the ‘National Programme on Holocaust and Tolerance Education’, the 
International Commission and its partners sought to improve and consolidate the 
‘Holocaust and Tolerance Education Network’ (comprising 56 Tolerance Education 
Centers which are integrated into museums, schools and NGOs).164  These centers 
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promote the teaching of the Holocaust; organize historical conferences and 
remembrance ceremonies as well as enlisting volunteers to maintain mass graves and 
cemeteries in Lithuania.  The ‘National Programme on Holocaust and Tolerance 
Education’ was also designed to provide teacher training seminars as well as to facilitate 
resources for the teaching of the Holocaust, especially in Lithuanian secondary 
schools.165  The Task Force is also involved in the implementation of the International 
Commission’s programme through ITF funding for some of the International 
Commission’s teacher training courses and educational initiatives, as well as via 
organizations such as Yad Vashem and Beth Shalom, which are involved in both the 
work of the International Commission and the ITF.166  Lastly, the Executive Director of 
the International Commission is also a member of the Lithuanian Task Force 
delegation.167     
 
However, the actions of the Commission and its international partners in establishing 
the ‘National Programme on Holocaust and Tolerance Education’, also met with 
considerable criticism from some Holocaust educators within Lithuania.  These 
commentators were concerned that the Lithuanian  government was not sufficiently 
engaged with the remembrance of the Holocaust as an ethical issue, but was rather 
pragmatically playing ‘lip-service’ to American, Israeli and European demands in order 
to improve the image of Lithuania in the West.168   In a different vein, Holocaust 
educationalist, Snieguole Matoniene caused uproar when she suggested that some 
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teachers only participate in Holocaust pedagogy training for careerist reasons.169  
Finally, some dedicated Lithuanian Holocaust education activists felt snubbed by the 
launch of the ‘National Programme’ and its implication that Lithuanian Holocaust 
research, remembrance and education activities were only in their fledgling stages.170  
As a result, some of these critics were cynical of the need for the network of Tolerance 
Centers as well as the international teacher training programmes provided by the 
Commission’s partners.171          
 
Beyond the launch of the International Commission’s controversial ‘National 
Programme on Holocaust and Tolerance Education’, the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison 
Project’ continued with Bardgett and Smith spending a day in June 2003 meeting 
Kostanian and Zingeris in order to discuss the key challenges facing the Vilna Gaon 
State Jewish Museum as well as conducting a similar set of meetings with staff 
members from the Ninth Fort Museum in Kaunas.  Reflecting on these discussions, 
Bardgett commented in an interview in May 2009: 
 
I went with Stephen Smith from Beth Shalom to the Jewish Museum in Vilnius and also to the 
Ninth Fort.  And we basically gave those two museums, I suppose a couple of days of intensive 
discussions and ultimately advice for them to take or leave as they chose, on how better to 
position themselves within the cultural sector because having been under Communism for quite 
a long time they were very expert in the fields of scholarly efforts in putting on exhibitions but in 
terms of fund-raising, marketing, those rather more business like museum activities there was 
quite a lot that they could learn from us about them.172   
      
Contrasting with the survivor led approach to exhibition making that had dominated 
‘The Green House’, Bardgett’s observation that one of the primary challenges facing the 
Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum was making the transition to museum management in 
a liberal market economy was also reflected in a report that the IWM curator compiled 
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on the findings of her and Smith’s visit to Vilnius.  This report noted that some of the 
key challenges facing the museum were a “lack of financial resources”, a “lack of 
space” as well as the fact that the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum was, “relatively 
low in the pecking order of Lithuanian museums, and deserving a higher profile in the 
spectrum of Lithuanian cultural and tourist attractions.”173   
 
To begin to remedy some of these problems Bardgett’s report suggested that the 
museum should try to find, “…new space for storage and exhibition activity”,174 as well 
as attempt to pay more of its staff rather than rely on volunteers, partly because many of 
these volunteers were aging Holocaust survivors who were, “…increasingly facing 
medical bills which they cannot afford.”175   Bardgett also recommended that the 
museum should consolidate its existing sources of institutional support and revenue, 
such as donations from the Howard Margol Association, partnerships with the Anne 
Frank House (Amsterdam), as well as the presence of the Gedenksdient, young Austrian 
volunteers who work at the museum instead of performing national service.176 However, 
she also suggested a number of ways in which the museum could practice a more 
“market-orientated approach to museum management.”177  
 
This approach would aim to position the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum more 
noticeably within the Lithuanian Tourist Authority and the Lithuanian Ministry of 
Culture as well as more visibly on the international tourist trail through marketing and 
partnership strategies with other Holocaust museums and heritage websites.  It would 
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also entail the promotion of the museum in Jewish Heritage brochures, in-flight 
magazines as well as at trade fairs and film festivals.178  The British report also 
suggested that the museum should aim to appoint a Marketing and Development Officer 
who could plan and implement, “a coordinated marketing strategy,”179 including an 
overhaul of the museum’s website, whilst attempts could also be made to maximize 
revenue by looking at all potential avenues of funding including grants, legacies, 
sponsorship, trading, efficiency measures, corporate hospitality and copyright fees.180  
Finally, the report expressed concerns about staff development training and the 
‘succession’ issue within the management of the museum, especially as, “Mrs 
Kostanian will eventually retire… and it will be important to ensure that her successor 
has the personal qualities and knowledge to ensure that there is no loss of zeal – 
particularly from the Museum’s volunteers.”181   
 
Whilst some of these suggestions might raise commercialization concerns, these issues 
are ultimately outweighed by the fact that if the future survival of the Vilna Gaon State 
Jewish Museum is to be safeguarded, it is essential that the institution is efficient, 
economically viable and able to invest in its Judaica and Holocaust era collections.182 
Furthermore, the museum’s economic self-management is particularly important 
because of the continuing hostility to the remembrance of the Holocaust in some 
quarters of Lithuanian society, as well as for the reason that museum funding from the 
Lithuanian state is extremely limited.  For example, Bardgett’s report notes from the 
vantage point of 2003: 
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The Museum receives a grant from the Ministry of Culture, but this is relatively low, the 
Museum being graded at the same level as houses occupied by famous writers etc, rather than as 
a repository of material on the history of one of the most significant minority groups in 
Lithuania’s history.183 
 
The British ‘Liaison Project’ report on Bardgett’s and Smith’s visit to the Vilna Gaon 
State Jewish Museum concluded with an offer by the British NGO representatives to 
return to Lithuania to discuss proposals if so desired,184 as well as forwarding the 
suggestion that a: 
“… ‘study week ’could be offered to the staff of the Jewish Museum Vilnius through a tailor-
made week-long fact-finding visit to the Imperial War Museum whose various departments 
would readily share what has evolved here as best practice.”185 
 
Although there is no evidence that this ‘study week’ materialized,  whilst increasingly 
the IWM’s Paul Salmons took over from Bardgett as the institution’s chief 
representative at ITF meetings,186 reflecting on the process of co-operation with the 
Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum during the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, 
Bardgett commented in May 2009 that, “… there was plenty of dialogue and in fact, I 
stayed in touch with Rachel Kostanian and Julia Menchinenyi, not so much recently but 
certainly for a year or so afterwards.”187  
 
Following Bardgett’s and Smith’s consultation exercises at the Vilna Gaon State Jewish 
Museum and the Kaunas Ninth Fort, British and Lithuanian collaboration in Holocaust 
memory work was further symbolized by the fact that UK HMD representatives were 
present at the 23rd September 2003 Holocaust Memorial Day in Lithuania.188  However, 
with Lithuania successfully a member of the ITF and an increasing amount of national 
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and international cooperation seemingly focused on the implementation of Holocaust 
education, remembrance and research initiatives, the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison 
Project’ was wrapped up at an ITF meeting in Washington D.C on 3rd December 2003, 
although it was also noted that informal relations on Holocaust era issues would 
continue to exist between the two states.189   
 
So how can the multiple actions that comprised the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ 
be comprehended and interpreted? At the most basic level, the launch of the 
British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ issued from the fact that it was the responsibility of 
the British ITF delegation to implement Task Force policy in promoting Holocaust 
research, remembrance and education abroad as well as battling anti-Semitism and far 
right extremism.  Furthermore, whilst being more contingent in practice, it can also be 
tentatively proposed, that the formation of the British/ Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ was 
also encouraged by three key developments which coalesced at the turn of the 
millennium.  These can be described as Britain and Lithuania’s changing relationship to 
the social remembrance of their Nazi pasts, the growing profile of British Holocaust 
educationalists and curators on the global stage as well as New Labour’s European 
foreign policy prior to the divisive impact of the Iraq War (2003), which complimented 
Lithuanian aspirations towards EU and NATO membership in the early noughties.190   
 
Firstly, a ‘British/Lithuanian’ Liaison Project could be perceived as mutually desirable 
to both states because of the intensified international emphasis on issues of Holocaust 
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justice, restitution, education, remembrance and research during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Whilst these developments sometimes competed with each other for state re-dress, the 
cumulative effect was that nation’s, particularly within the western international 
community were expected to confront their complicities and wrong-doings in relation to 
the Nazi past.191  In Britain this included allowing former Lithuanian, Ukrainian, 
Latvian and Estonian Nazi collaborators into the country during the Cold War.192  A  
British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ thus internationally symbolized not only a gesture 
towards Lithuanian atonement for the crimes of the Nazi past, but also functioned as a 
veiled British acknowledgement of the UK’s complicity in allowing former Baltic war 
criminals to ‘get away with murder’ during the Cold War.193  It can thus be tentatively 
proposed that the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, was not just about Lithuania 
dealing with its past, it was also about British responsibilities to begin to make amends 
for the mistakes of the Cold War era, in this case through contributing to Holocaust 
education, research and remembrance initiatives in Lithuania.  However, despite the 
best efforts of those involved in the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, some critics 
such as Donald Bloxham would infer, that initiatives such as ITF ‘Liaison Projects’ are 
‘too little, too late’ and at their worst smack of Western hubris and political 
hypocrisy.194 
   
Secondly, the role of the British as ITF ‘lead partner’ to Lithuania can be perceived as  
vitally facilitated by the professional confidence and experiences of international 
cooperation that many of the British educationalists and museum personnel involved 
brought to the table in 2000.  For example, the LJCC had been running Holocaust 
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teacher training programmes in Poland since the mid-1990s;195 whilst not only had 
Smith recently established the Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre in Nottinghamshire 
(1995), he had also been working with the Cape Town Holocaust Centre in South 
Africa.196  Equally, as demonstrated in chapter one, during the planning process for the 
IWM Holocaust Exhibition, Bardgett had experienced the benefits of inter-cultural 
collaboration with institutions such as the USHMM and the Auschwitz State 
Museum.197  
 
These positive experiences of international exchange may have helped to create an 
environment in which the concept of the ‘Liaison Project’ was seen as particularly 
viable and a potentially beneficial enterprise for Lithuanian Holocaust educationalists 
and curators, as well as for British specialists who would also gain something from the 
knowledge and expertise offered by their ‘Liaison Project’ partners such as Kostanian 
and Zingeris.  Furthermore, British involvement in international collaborations 
concerning the remembrance of the Holocaust as well as instances of genocide more 
broadly continued both during and after the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’.  For 
example, the LJCC continued its Holocaust teacher training programmes in Ukraine, 
Belarus and China;198 whilst independently of the ITF, Bardgett became involved in 
efforts to establish a Srebrenica Memorial Room at The Srebrenica Potocari and 
Memorial Centre in Bosnia Herzegovina;199 and Smith opened the Kigali Memorial 
Centre in Rwanda (April 2004).200   
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Thirdly, it is arguable that a British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ was also particularly 
desirable to UK and Lithuanian government ITF representatives because it 
complimented both Lithuanian and British foreign policy objectives which sought to 
reap the perceived economic, cultural and defensive benefits of twenty-first century EU 
expansion.  As part of Lithuania’s consolidation of liberal democracy and a free market 
economy, the vast majority of its moderate politicians wanted the country to join 
Western institutions such as NATO and the EU which demanded that their member 
states meet certain political, economic, social, and cultural requirements.  For example, 
whilst sidelining Holocaust era restitution issues,201 the EU made evidence of a 
commitment to democracy, human rights and the protection of ethnic minorities’ part of 
its Copenhagen Criteria (1993) for membership.202  
 
Furthermore, coalescing with Lithuanian objectives, British New Labour leader Blair 
sought to promote EU enlargement, encourage the consolidation of the European single 
market, as well as support increased transparency and democracy in transnational 
organizations, although he also remained equivocal on joining the European single 
currency and was determined to hold onto Britain’s national veto in the EU.203   Within 
this context, the  British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ formed just one small part of a 
whole nexus of political and cultural actions designed to send ‘Westernizing’ signals 
that would contribute to smoothing Lithuania’s entry into the EU and NATO.  Whilst 
Lithuania’s accession to these two transnational organizations was achieved in the 
spring of 2004, this political imperative combined with continuing Lithuanian inertia in 
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relation to Jewish restitution and Nazi war crimes issues, resulted in concerns among 
Holocaust remembrance activists as to the exact extent of the state’s commitment in 
dealing with Nazi era matters.204     
 
Furthermore, it is also arguable, although not resolutely provable from the documents 
surveyed, that from the perspective of British Foreign Office representative’s, the ITF 
‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania could also be interpreted as a form of Anglo ‘soft 
power’ which corresponded with the objectives of British foreign policy in the late 
1990s and early noughties.  Blair believed that in order to protect British national 
interests, the UK should be willing to promote and defend its values of ‘liberty, 
democracy, tolerance and justice’ abroad,205 through the means of both ‘hard’ power 
(military and diplomatic deployment) and ‘soft’ power (promoting the spread of liberal 
democratic norms through access to information, economic incentives and cultural 
discourses).206  At the administrative level in Whitehall, one of the outcomes of this 
global and European vision is what has, perhaps prematurely, been called a ‘quiet 
revolution’, whereby ministers and officials were encouraged to form stronger bilateral 
relations and policy networks with their colleagues in fellow and prospective EU 
member states.207   
 
As such, whilst the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ was primarily the product of 
intergovernmental co-operation under the auspices of the Task Force, it also over-
lapped with a heightened interest in the British government to forge international bi-
lateral relations and promote Western liberal, democratic norms abroad through cultural, 
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social and economic ‘soft power’ as well as through much more controversial military 
interventions (Kosovo, 1999; Sierra Leone, 2000; Iraq, 2003).208  However, as will be 
seen in the next section, what the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ ultimately 
demonstrated was the limits of British ‘soft power’ in promoting ‘liberty, democracy, 
tolerance and justice’ abroad.  For despite the principled engagement of British and 
Lithuanian Holocaust education and remembrance activists, the reactionary views of 
Lithuanian ultra-nationalist pressure groups would continue to pose a key challenge to 
implementing the Stockholm Declaration in Lithuania.   
 
The impact of the ITF British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’  
 
Whilst the previous section has given an overview of the activities that comprised the 
ITF British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ as well as the political and cultural contexts 
which accompanied its implementation, the final part of this chapter will assess the 
impact of the ITF British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’.  Reflecting on the overall role of 
the ITF, as opposed to the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project specifically, Kostanian 
observed in March 2010 that ITF support had been integral to the realization of Vilna 
Gaon State Jewish Museum projects such as the production and distribution of the film, 
Helene Czapski-Holzman: Story of Rescue (2006); the publication of, The Ghettos of 
Oshmyany (2008); the production of the Tolerance Centre’s exhibition, Rescued 
Lithuanian Jewish Child Tells About Shoah (2008) as well as contributing to the 
ongoing renovation of the Green House’s Catastrophe exhibition (2009).209  Equally, a 
Jewish Heritage map is now available from the Vilnius tourist board, although whether 
the production of this pamphlet was linked to Smith and Bardgett’s recommendations is 
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unknown.210      
 
However, whilst Kostanian’s observations illustrate the positive outcomes of the ITF’s 
involvement in Lithuania, other elements have been much more challenging.  For 
example, in an interview with Smith in June 2009,211 the founder of the Beth Shalom 
Holocaust Centre acknowledged the enthusiasm of the Lithuanian’s involved, but also 
voiced dissatisfaction at the limitations of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’: 
 
Problem is, I mean during the liaison process with the Lithuanians, they were very enthusiastic 
and we covered a lot of ground and we had our run ins and we had our problems and so on, but 
on the whole, they really wanted to be a member of the Task Force and wanted to demonstrate 
their willingness to be so, through their political and educational and cultural commitment to 
Holocaust issues.  What tends to happen is that once membership is gained then there tends to be 
some slippage, in practice.  Lithuania is a good example actually, I’m sure the delegation would 
point to all of its structures and so on, but the reality is, it’s not happening actually.212     
 
 
Smith compared the Lithuanian case with the implementation of UK HMD since 
January 2001,213 where despite a number of public controversies,214 Smith argues that 
the British government had exercised good practice in empowering home grown 
Holocaust experts and NGOs to deliver the commemoration day through the 
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establishment of the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust (2005) and continued government 
funding.215  However, in contrast to the implementation of UK HMD, Smith felt that a 
central reason for ‘slippage’ in the implementation of  Lithuanian projects was the fact 
that newly created state and inter-state bodies did not  adequately ‘plug into’ and utilize 
existing good practice in Lithuanian Holocaust research, remembrance and education 
NGOs.216   
 
An organization that Smith mentions in this regard is the Lithuanian NGO, House of 
Memory which was established in 2000 by Linus Vildziunas, and which worked to 
encourage nation-wide school projects and competitions excavating Lithuania’s Jewish 
heritage such as, ‘The Jews – My Grandparents and Great Grandparents Neighbours’.217  
Furthermore, House of Memory also operated in collaboration with the Lithuanian 
Ministry of Science and Education  in order to publish books on the Holocaust, establish 
school history clubs, set up museum and information centres as well as facilitating 
educational trips to former Nazi camps such as Stutthof, Klooga and Auschwitz.218  Of 
the House of Memory, Smith notes in an extract that is worth quoting at length from the 
same June 2009 interview:     
Well, I worked on a number of different areas, but to give you an example, of how perhaps 
dysfunctional some of the areas can be, prior to the Task Force I was working with an 
organization called the House of Memory which were also linked to the School Improvement 
Centre.  They were an off-shoot of the Soros Foundation, they went independent and were a very 
enthusiastic, dedicated group of people who were doing regular teacher training on Holocaust 
issues, were introducing Holocaust Education as a part of school improvement.  They were 
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doing all sorts...management and curriculum, but were regularly introducing Holocaust 
Education as a part of that.  And...they eventually became disenchanted by the political process 
which was somewhat excluding NGOs because they were so busy trying to prove that politically 
they had got it right, they weren’t incorporating the experts who were already working in the 
field, rather they were excluding them.  The result of it was they lost some traction because they 
disenfranchised some of the people who were actually doing the job.  By creating too many 
committees and too many structures, not giving access to funds, making stipulations about what 
could and couldn’t be done, when actually the good practice was being squeezed out as a result 
of it... Departments within the system saw the opportunity to do good work, I mean the idea was 
good behind creating a Holocaust Education and Tolerance programme, but when you’ve got 
people out there that are already doing Holocaust Education and Tolerance, which is to say is, 
“How do we as government bring them in?”, rather than, “How do we do our own thing and then 
lose the good practice that’s out there?” And I think the result of it is probably...I would say 
there is probably less Holocaust Education going on in sort of NGOs now than there was ten 
years ago.219  
 
These institutional inadequacies in relation to the implementation of the 
British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ also help to explain former Task Force member, 
Cesarani’s pessimistic appraisal of the UK’s role in the ITF in April 2009 that, “Britain 
was, what’s called a contributor nation, it was supplying expertise”,220  and   “If 
anything...the ITF was a drain on resources in Britain.”221   
 
Furthermore, this situation of what Smith calls ‘slippage’ in relation to the 
implementation of Holocaust education, remembrance and research in Lithuania is also 
perturbing given the continuing inertia and even direct public hostility by the ultra-
nationalist right to confrontations with Holocaust era issues in the immediate run-up to 
as well as in the wake of Lithuania’s accession to the EU and NATO in 2004.  For 
example, Lithuania has failed to pass communal or private property restitution laws,222 
whilst despite the efforts of the Wiesenthal Centre’s ‘Operation Last Chance’,223 where 
financial rewards were given to those offering information about former Nazi war 
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criminals, only Kazys Gimzauskas, a former Lithuanian Security Police Commander 
during the War and returnee from the United States in 1993 has been convicted (14th 
January 2001).  However, Gimzauskas was also deemed unfit for punishment and as a 
result served no jail sentence for his war-time transgressions.224   
 
Even more controversial has been the fact that in response to calls from the Lithuanian 
ultra-nationalist press, the Lithuanian government has opened up investigations of 
alleged war crimes committed by Soviet Jewish partisans. Whilst investigations of 
Soviet atrocity crimes are important especially given the fact that the Putin regime 
erected memorials to Josef Stalin in a sop to Russian nationalism at the turn of the 
century,225 what is concerning about the Lithuanian probe is the fact that rather than 
looking into the alleged war crimes committed by all of the Soviet partisans, the 
investigation has appeared to disproportionately focus on former Jewish partisans who 
also just happen to be engaged in excavating the history of Lithuanian collaboration in 
the Holocaust.  For example, in 2006, Yitzhak Arad, former chairman of Yad Vashem 
and a prominent member of The International Commission, was accused of war crimes 
by the Lithuanian ultra-nationalist press.226   
 
The evidence that was presented for this claim were passages from Arad’s memoir, The 
Partisan, describing how his brigade was instructed to mount a raid against Girdenai 
villagers in 1944.227  Arad describes how the villagers had been given arms by the 
Germans and had killed partisans who had come there to requisition supplies.  During 
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the Soviet raid, at least one villager was killed and houses were raised.  However, Arad 
has denied any involvement in the killing and has perceived the case to be revenge by 
ultra-nationalists for his role in presenting expert evidence during the trial of a former 
Lithuanian collaborator in the United States.228   Soon after the press allegations, the 
Lithuanian Prosecutor, Rimvydas Valentukevicius, mounted an investigation, against 
the backdrop of international outrage expressed by Israel, the Simon Wiesenthal Centre 
and American Jewish leaders.229  Whilst Lithuania’s Deputy Foreign Minister claimed 
that Arad was only being called as a ‘witness’ rather than as a ‘suspect’, the controversy 
has ultimately undermined the work of the International Commission.   This is because 
angered by the Commission’s failure to condemn the prosecution case,230 Arad has 
withdrawn from the research body as has British scholar, Martin Gilbert, whilst Zingeris 
believes that the allegations against Arad by Lithuanian ultra-nationalists were part of 
efforts to subvert and sabotage the work of the International Commission: 
 
Someone has tried to dismantle this carefully-built bridge between Lithuania, Israel, America 
and world-historical opinion.  And it’s a real tragedy…a highly counter-productive move against 
Lithuanian liberal values, against all our shared values with NATO and EU countries.231       
   
Following further allegations in the ultra-nationalist press, two other Jewish partisans 
facing investigation in 2008 included biologist and historian, Rachel Margolis, who re-
discovered the lost diary of a Polish Christian who witnessed the mass murder of Jews 
at Paneriai,232 as well as Fania Brantsovsky, a librarian at the Vilnius Yiddish Institute, 
who was questioned about Kaniûkai, where thirty-eight towns-people were killed by a 
Soviet anti-Nazi unit comprising 120-150 people in 1944.233  Brantsovsky maintains 
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that she was not present during the raid and she is no longer a suspect.234 
 
These actions have also combined with failures to halt the construction of luxury 
apartments on Vilnius’s historic Snipiskes Jewish cemetery,235 as well as the presence 
of a Neo-Nazi march through Vilnius on 11th March 2008, in which chants of ‘Jews 
out’, ‘Russians out’ were heard and Nazi salutes were witnessed.236 These events led 
Rabbi Andrew Baker, member of the International Commission and Director of 
International Jewish Affairs for the American Jewish Committee, to strongly object to 
the EU designating Vilnius 2009 ‘European Capital of Culture’.  Writing in The 
Forward, he fumed: 
 
Twisting Holocaust memory, desecrating cemeteries, ignoring anti-Semitism and refusing to 
return communal property – surely this is not the best cultural capital Europe can offer.  The EU 
should reconsider the honor accorded Vilnius.237             
 
Furthermore, a visit to three Vilnius exhibitions in July 2010 would seem to confirm the 
dominant narratives about the past which Lithuania appears to be encouraging in 
relation to constructing its contemporary sense of national identity.  Bulwarked by 
modern design and clear investment in its collection display, The Museum of Genocide 
Victims just off of the main Gedimino Avenue functions as a chilling reminder of the 
brutality of the former KGB prison as well as acting as a national shrine to anti-Soviet 
resisters and Communist deportees.238  However, the exhibition is also deeply 
problematic in that whilst representing Lithuanian victimhood under the Soviet and 
Nazi regimes respectively, it also fails to deal with the issues presented by those 
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Lithuanian partisans who were also collaborators in the mass murder of Lithuanian 
Jewry during the Second World War.239  By contrast, the Tolerance Centres ITF 
supported and hi-tech exhibition, Rescued Lithuanian Jewish Child, predominantly tells 
the story of the bravery of Lithuanian ‘Righteous Gentiles’.240  Whilst these are 
undoubtedly important tales to tell, it is left to the Green House’s Catastrophe 
exhibition to most directly confront issues relating to Nazi and Lithuanian collaboration 
in the mass murder of European Jewry.241   
 
However, whilst passionately cared for since Lithuanian independence by its curators, 
many of whom are Holocaust survivors  and although part of the British/Lithuanian 
‘Liaison Project’, in contrast to the two other displays which tell a more comforting 
narrative of Lithuania’s national past, and which are invested with modern museum 
techniques and English translation, the renovation of the Catastrophe exhibition by July 
2010 was only half complete, with one section of the display in Lithuanian, Yiddish and 
English, and other sections eschewing English translation altogether.  Given that 
English is a leading language of international discourse, the incomplete translation of 
the Catastrophe exhibition suggests that this is a story that Lithuania is still struggling 




Kostanian’s observations on the significance of  the ITF to the Vilna Gaon State Jewish 
Museum’s  projects attests to the importance of international commitment in promoting  
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the remembrance of the Holocaust in Lithuania.  However, Smith’s appraisal also 
illustrates the limits of ‘Liaison Projects’, especially when they do not adequately utilize 
existing good practice in locally based Holocaust NGOs.  Furthermore, examples such 
as the alleged efforts to sabotage the International Commission by Lithuanian ultra-
nationalist pressure groups as well as the presence of anti-Semitic historiographies and 
neo-Nazi marches all illustrate the ongoing challenges posed to the ITF’s efforts to 
implement the Stockholm Declaration in Lithuania.  Continuing this analysis of the 
causes and consequences of the SIF 2000, the next chapter will turn to a very different 
aspect of the SIF 2000, namely, how the liberal ‘universalist’ aims of the conference can 
be perceived within the intellectual and institutional context of ‘cosmopolitanism’, a 
school of thought which also contributed to how a contemporary group of thinkers, the 





The Intellectual and Institutional Context for 
Understanding the SIF 2000: The ‘Cosmopolitan’ 
Potentials of the SIF 2000 and the Limits of the ‘New 
Cosmopolitanism’ 
 
‘Cosmopolitanism’ is a term that has recurred in various forms throughout HMM.  
Sometimes it has appeared alongside and almost interchangeably in descriptions of the 
Stockholm Declaration on the Holocaust’s ‘universalist’ values of encouraging the 
prevention of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.”1  
At other times, as in Chapter two, the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ has specifically referred 
to British New Labour politician, Robin Cook’s aspirations towards an ‘ethical’ foreign 
policy at the turn of the millennium.  By contrast, in Chapter four a negative form of 
‘cosmopolitanism’ was encountered as the Soviets, like the Nazis used this word as a 
term of abuse to stigmatize their Jewish subjects.  However, despite this plurality of 
both positive and negative uses, this chapter is going to unpack a specific form of 
‘cosmopolitanism’, namely intellectual and institutional ‘cosmopolitanism’ in more 
depth.  This is because the ideas associated with ‘cosmopolitanism’ as an intellectual or 
institutional set of values advocating human and minority rights, provides a key context 
for understanding the historical lineage and broader political and cultural significance of 
the Stockholm Declaration’s ‘universalist’ rhetoric to invoke the remembrance of the 
Holocaust and acknowledge broader Nazi atrocity crimes in order to promote the 
prevention of contemporary forms of prejudice and mass killing.   
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In line with attempting to understand this ‘cosmopolitan’ context for comprehending the 
SIF 2000, the first part of this chapter will attempt to historically delineate the 
intellectual ideas and institutional developments underlying the genre of  
‘cosmopolitanism’ and as part of this analysis, will pose the provocative question as to 
whether Bauer’s complex and contradictory concept of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, 
which has also been encountered in chapters two and three, can additionally be 
understood within the nexus of ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual traditions (eg. Karl Jaspers, 
Raphael Lemkin, Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas).  The second part of this 
chapter will analyze in detail the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ scholarly interpretation of the 
SIF 2000 offered by the social scientists Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider in the Ulrich 
Beck edited, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust (2001), which was 
published in English translation as, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age 
(HMGA, 2006).2  Finally, the third part of this chapter will reveal the historical and 
political problems posed by Levy and Sznaider’s interpretation of the SIF 2000 in 
HMGA.  For although many attendees at the SIF 2000 on the Holocaust such as Levine 
and Bardgett noted the event’s overwhelming or ‘extraordinary’ qualities, it is arguable, 
that the conference was not quite so overwhelming and ‘extraordinary’ that it can be  
un-problematically  hailed as a symbol of a ‘New Cosmopolitan’ transnational age of 
‘Second Modernity’ in which the European remembrance of the Holocaust 
unconditionally functions as a, “… model for national self-critique, [which] serves to 
promote human rights as a legitimating principle in the global community, and plainly 
offers a negative example of dealing with alterity.”3     
 
For as has been seen in chapters two, three and four of HMM, if the SIF 2000 did aspire 
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to frame the remembrance of the Holocaust through liberal ‘universalist’ values that 
seemed to build a delicate bridge between American and European liberal ideals, 
promoting self-critical confrontations with national histories in relation to Nazism as 
well as articulating aspirations to encourage the prevention of, “genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia”;4   then the actual results of the SIF 
2000 and the ITF in implementing these objectives were also very much restricted, 
mediated and counter-balanced by the existing interests, tensions, contradictions and 
divisions that continue to haunt Holocaust memory politics and contemporary relations 
between regional, national and international organizations.     
 
The Representation of Nazism and the Jewish Catastrophe in the Genre of 
‘Cosmopolitanism’ before Levy and Sznaider’s Interpretation of the SIF 
2000 
  
The genre of ‘cosmopolitanism’ has a long historical lineage that pre-dates 1989, the 
‘New Cosmopolitanism’ and Levy and Sznaider’s reading of the SIF 2000.5  The idea 
was first intimated by the Ancient Greeks in the form of Natural Law theory,6 and was 
continued by legal thinkers such as Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, but it was 
most famously formulated by the philosopher, Immanuel Kant in a twelve year period, 
after the American Revolution (1776) and around the time of the French Revolution 
(1789), specifically in his Enlightenment treatise, ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
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Sketch’ (1795).7  For Kant, a rational political order is based on ‘universal’ justice 
within a state and this is achieved through the application of law and the encouragement 
of an open society predicated on free and reasoned debate.8  It is the duty of all citizens 
within a state to submit to a rationally conceived code of law, but in return citizens 
enjoy the rights of freedom (the right of individuals to act as long as those actions do 
not infringe the law and the inviolable rights of others);  equality (all men should be 
equal before the law);9 and independence (economically independent men should have 
the right to vote, although reflecting the predominant attitudes of the eighteenth century 
Kant excluded women from this political duty).10  However, for Kant these ‘universal’ 
rights could become endangered by the violent conditions brought about by inter-state 
warfare and the threat posed by states with opposing value systems. To address the 
international political question of how to begin to bring about ‘perpetual peace’ and the 
preservation of ‘universal’ rights, Kant intimated that the ‘cosmopolitan’ condition rests 
on three pillars: ‘cosmopolitan’ rights, international law and the formation of a 
federation of states opposed to war.11  For Kant the chief goal of political 
‘cosmopolitanism’ was to try and establish ‘perpetual peace’ between states and to 
ensure the ‘universalism’ of the ‘Rights of Man’ as predicated on the view that, “a 
violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.”12   
 
Theorist of ‘cosmopolitanism’, Robert Fine argues that this aspiration to fundamental 
human ‘universalism’ can also be traced in Hegel’s statement that, “a human being 
counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, 
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Protestant, German, Italian, etc.”13  Fine also believes that a ‘cosmopolitan’ attitude can 
be detected in Karl Marx’s view that capitalism would lead to the disintegration of 
nation-states and a new schema of human emancipation as well as in Emile Durkheim’s 
optimistic call for ‘world patriotism’.14   
 
These ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘universalistic’ aspirations can also be perceived as shaping 
Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959), Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), 
Jürgen Habermas’s (1926- ) and it will be explored in this chapter, co-author of the 
Stockholm Declaration, Yehuda Bauer’s (1926-) millennial reflections on the Jewish 
catastrophe and atrocity crimes perpetrated by the Third Reich and its collaborators.  
This regime’s destructiveness particularly in war-time seemed to embody both the 
atrophy of Enlightenment legal systems and aspirations towards ‘perpetual peace’ as 
well as the challenge of re-thinking the Kantian tradition of ‘universal’ rights and 
working towards the creation of a sustainable ‘cosmopolitan’ international political and 
legal order in the post-war world.  Furthermore, this desire for the movement towards a 
new international rights regime in the immediate post-war period, particularly in 
relation to human as opposed to minority or group rights, also coalesced with the public 
war-time anti-Nazi rhetoric of Allied leaders and politicians such as Franklin Roosevelt 
(‘State of the Union Address’, 1941) and Anthony Eden, who had stated in 1942 that 
Nazi anti-Jewish violence was a breach of ‘the most elementary human rights’.15  
Finally, this trend for a renewed international liberalism in the immediate post-war 
period also became more widely reflected in campaigns for civil and human rights led 
by activists such as Eleanor Roosevelt as well as in books on the issue of human rights 
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by authors as diverse as Sci-Fi fiction writer H.G. Wells, American political theorist, 
Quincy Wright, British Professor of International Law, Hersch Lauterpacht, historian, 
E. H. Carr and Catholic thinker, Jacques Maritain.16       
 
Against this international political backdrop, the writings of German philosopher and 
psychologist Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) were crucial in contributing to post-1945 
‘cosmopolitan’ discourses which directly sought to re-think the Kantian ‘cosmopolitan’ 
tradition, support the establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as 
advocate the reformulation of German national identity in the mirror of the human in the 
wake of catastrophe.  Jaspers had directly experienced life under the Third Reich.  He 
was married to a Jewish woman, Gertrude, and had felt personally affronted when his 
intellectual compatriot in German existentialism, Martin Heidegger had declared his 
enthusiasm for the newly empowered Nazi government in his 1933 Rectoral address.17    
During the period of Nazi dictatorship, Jaspers avoided political themes in his writing 
and instead concentrated on the spiritual aspects of his philosophy until he was 
dismissed from his academic post at Heidelberg University in 1937.  For his past pupil, 
Hannah Arendt, “what Jaspers represented then, when he was entirely alone, was not 
Germany but what was left of humanitas in Germany.  It was as if he alone in his 
inviolability could illuminate that space which reason creates and preserves between 
men.”
18
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Jaspers internal emigration during the late 1930s and the Second World War meant that 
in 1945, the Allies included the philosopher on the White List, or the list of public 
figures that were perceived to be untarnished by the Nazi regime and capable of aiding 
in the re-construction of West German democracy.19  As a result, in contrast to 
Heidegger’s ongoing silence in post-war West Germany, Jaspers embraced the role of 
the public intellectual dealing with the legacy of the Nazi past.20  In line with this, he 
delivered a series of lectures at Heidelberg University (Autumn/Winter of 1945/1946),21 
which became the basis of his key post-war re-thinking of German national identity in 
terms of the ‘human’, Die Schuldfrage (1946) or in English translation, The Question of 
German Guilt (QGG, 1947).   In this text Jaspers wrestled with the question of how 
Germany could begin to deal with the political, legal and moral consequences of the 
Nazi regime.22  Perceiving Nazism as an extreme nationalistic perversion of the German 
tradition and the atrophy of the ideal of the political citizen, Jaspers believed that it was 
necessary for all Germans to communicate with each other and confront their 
relationship with the Third Reich.  Jaspers identified four types of guilt: criminal 
(subject to legal prosecution), political (the citizen’s responsibility to the polis and the 
community’s obligation to make amends through reparations), moral (individual 
responsibility for wrongful actions invoking personal shame) and metaphysical, the last 
of which put forward the ‘universal’ ideal that: 
 
There exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each co-responsible for every 
wrong and every injustice in the world, especially for crimes committed in his presence or with 
his knowledge.  If I fail to do whatever I can to prevent them, I too am guilty.23   
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Jaspers focus on the significance of communication to the moral ‘purification’ of the 
German people in QGG mirrored the thinker’s important concept of Existenz, that is the 
notion that moral existence is achievable through the process of communication with 
others.24  Indeed, for Jaspers honest and frank discussion and reflection on the Nazi past 
among Germans, “…is the only way that we can save our souls from a pariah 
existence.”25  For Anson Rabinbach, this conviction meant that Jaspers was a key figure 
in the construction of, “the new narrative of the ‘European German’, of a neutral, anti-
militarist and above all ethical Germany.”26 However, despite the retrospective 
importance ascribed to QGG as one of the foundational texts of a ‘cosmopolitan’ or 
post-war self-critical German national identity which stressed that, “...we are part of 
mankind – are human before we are German”,27 Jaspers treatise was initially criticized 
by members of the public as well as intellectuals of various political stripes when it was 
first published in the mid-1940s.   
 
According to Daniel F. Penham’s classified report for the American Counter-
Intelligence Corps, Jaspers’ lectures at Heidelberg University which preceded the 
publication of QGG, were greeted with laughter and disruption by many students who 
were ex-Wehrmacht soldiers;28 Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt perhaps unsurprisingly 
condemned Jaspers for inaugurating West Germany’s guilt culture, whilst German 
right-wing nationalists castigated Jaspers for ‘national betrayal’.29  Critics from the left 
were also scathing with Theodor W. Adorno, branding Jaspers’ discourse a ‘jargon of 
authenticity’ which paradoxically risked creating an environment which ruled out an 
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honest and expressive confrontation with Nazism by German people;30 whilst 
commentators in Communist East Germany criticized the philosopher for being a pro-
NATO apologist.31   Finally, in a letter to his wife Arendt, the Communist intellectual, 
Heinreich Blücher harshly chastised Jaspers for indulging in the language of German 
‘purification’ as opposed to focusing on the plight of those who had been ‘robbed of 
their dignity’ by the regime.32 Equally, Zionist commentator Kurt Blumenfeld was 
concerned by Jaspers’ failure to admit the popularity of German anti-Semitism and the 
active widespread willingness with which many Germans participated in anti-Jewish 
actions.33     
 
In line with Jaspers’ political and philosophical positions at the end of the Second 
World War, the controversial public intellectual also embraced government by the allies 
in West Germany and argued that the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(IMT, 1945-1946) was significant in marking tentative, legalistic steps towards the 
realization of Kant’s ‘cosmopolitan’ vision for mankind.34 Jaspers argued that 
Nuremberg was significant because it demonstrated that a criminal nation-state and the 
citizens who serve it are no longer immune from prosecution if individuals within that 
state can be proved to have committed ‘Crimes against Humanity’ such as brutal 
violence against civilians, mass population expulsions and mass murder.  Jaspers also 
noted that the codification of ‘Crimes against Humanity’ meant that the excuse of ‘only 
obeying orders’ and the cult that might have developed around mass murderers was 
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stymied by their reduction in status to mere criminals.35   However, Jaspers also noted 
some serious shortcomings.  For example, the IMT was a multinational body as opposed 
to an international tribunal.  This was the result of the settlement between the 
prosecuting and judging states (America, U.S.S.R, Britain and France),36 and meant that 
crimes committed by the allies were excluded from consideration.  The result of this 
was that for Jaspers, Nuremberg was not ‘cosmopolitan’ enough in that it continued to 
bow to national sovereignty and the might of inter-state power relations.37 
 
Certainly from today’s perspective, the IMT at Nuremberg was significant in that it led 
to the prosecution and/or cross-examination of the major war criminals of Nazi 
Germany, such as Hermann Goering, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Albert Speer, Alfred 
Rosenberg, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Rudolf Höss.38 It also generated 
significant documents for post-war historians of Nazism,39 and as Jaspers recognized, it 
also broadened the remit of international law and contributed to important legal 
innovations such as the charge, ‘Crimes against Humanity’.  Furthermore, the IMT can 
also be perceived as both expressly and circuitously influencing subsequent 
‘cosmopolitan’ developments in the formulation of ‘universal’ rights and/or 
international law such as the ‘Nuremberg code’ of medical and scientific ethics (1947), 
the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (UNDHR, 1948), the United Nations 
Genocide Convention (UNGC, 1948) as well as acting as an important historical 
precedent for the establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC, 2002).40  
Finally, in addition to the significance of Nuremberg for the future development of 
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international law and human rights, Marrus has also made the not uncontested 
observation that the IMT was also important in forwarding the first documentation of 
the Jewish catastrophe to a non-Jewish audience.41  This was evident in Justice Robert 
Jackson’s ‘Opening Statement’ which dedicated a section to atrocities committed 
against Jews during the Second World War as well as in the over eight hundred 
documents and thirty witnesses presented to the court in support of these claims over 
the next twelve months of the IMT’s convening.42 
 
However, as Donald Bloxham has noted, whilst the IMT was significant in shaping a 
‘judicial’ awareness of the importance of the legacy of Nazi atrocities including the 
Jewish catastrophe for post-war developments in international jurisprudence, the 
legacies of the IMT also proved more problematic in terms of the ‘collective memory’ 
of the crimes of  Nazism in various national ‘public spheres’.43  For example, the mass 
murder of the Roma and Sinti was rarely referenced,44 whilst the IMT’s engagement 
with the specificity of the mass murder of European Jewry was far from comprehensive.  
For example, reflecting on 1945 in his memoirs, Jackson’s assistant at the IMT, Telford 
Taylor admitted that he “remained ignorant of the mass extermination camps in Poland 
and the full scope of the Holocaust did not dawn on me until several months later.”45   
 
For Bloxham, the result of this inadequate coverage of the Jewish catastrophe was the 
elision of the responsibilities of what Christopher Browning has called the ‘Ordinary 
Men’ and the promotion of the perception that the Third Reich’s brutalities were the 
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primary result of the long-term, willed actions of a fanatical and depraved Nazi elite.46  
Furthermore, the documentary style of Nuremberg combined with the realpolitik of 
Cold War international relations initially failed to provoke the kind of long-term self-
critical moral, legal and criminal reckoning with the past that a ‘cosmopolitan’ thinker 
such as Jaspers had proposed.47   For example, between 1945 and 1950, the British 
prosecuted 1000 members of the Axis who were primarily Germans, whilst the U.S 
tried over 1,800.48  However, “…by 1957-8 British and American prisons were empty, 
and those several hundreds blessed with premature liberation included the surviving 
Einsatgruppen leaders convicted in 1948.”49 
 
Despite these inadequacies of the lessons and legacies of the IMT, a key development in 
international law in the late 1940s and early 1950s was the ratification of the UNGC 
(1951), a piece of legislation whose emphasis on group or minority rights can be 
perceived as a relative rarity in a new Cold War international system dominated by the 
UN doctrine of individual human rights and scornful of the League of Nation’s failed 
inter-war efforts to preserve minority rights in Eastern Europe.50  The UNGC was also 
irrevocably shaped by the Cold War political context as well as by the intellectual 
interests and personal grief of its chief author: the Polish Jewish legal expert, Raphael 
Lemkin. Dirk Moses has shown how Lemkin’s interest in preserving forms of “national 
cosmopolitanism” was rooted in a pre-Second World War fascination with Eastern 
European ‘groupism’ (Bronislaw Malinowski) and Western traditions of international 
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law which objected to aggressive wars that exploit and harm civilians (Bartolomé de 
Las Casas, Francesco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Emeric de Vattel, 
Christian Wolff, Charles Solomon and Gaston Jéze).51   
 
Furthermore, Moses has also demonstrated how Lemkin’s later conception of 
‘genocide’ was also embedded in his outrage at Turkish massacres of Armenians during 
the First World War; the mass killings of Assyrian Christians in Iraq as well as being 
influenced by his role as a comparative law lecturer at the Free University, Poland and 
his work for various international law commissions in the late 1920s and early 1930s.52  
This is because at a 1933 meeting in Madrid, Lemkin proposed that what he called 
crimes of ‘barbarity’ (attacks against individuals because of their membership of a 
collectivity) and ‘vandalism’ (attacks against the art and cultural heritage of a 
collectivity) ought to be perceived as transnational dangers to the global social order.  
As a result, Lemkin classified them as delicta juris gentium (‘offences against the laws 
of nations’) which ought to be prosecuted under the notion of ‘universal’ jurisdiction.53  
However, given the focus on the issue of terrorism at Madrid, Lemkin’s report was not 
even mooted, and international interest in his preoccupations would only begin to 
increase after the devastation of the Second World War.54 
 
Moreover, following World War II, Lemkin’s interest in preserving forms of “national 
cosmopolitanism” and enacting a “cosmopolitan vision of world civilization” was given 
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an added personal dimension.55  This was because Lemkin discovered that his parents 
had been murdered in Treblinka and that most of his forty-nine member family had been 
killed during the Holocaust, with the exception of his brother, Elias, his sister-in-law, 
Lisa, and his brother’s two children.56  Lemkin had escaped the Nazi onslaught by 
emigrating from Europe to the United States in 1941 where he worked as a consultant 
for the Board of Economic Warfare and lectured to the U.S army in Virginia on military 
government.57  Before arriving in America, Lemkin had served in the Polish army, 
escaped to Lithuania, lectured in law at Stockholm University and travelled through the 
Soviet Union on his journey to the United States.58   
 
During this period, Lemkin had collected examples of Axis occupation laws and decrees 
as well as continuing his research into other historical examples of the mass killing of 
groups such as the Aghet or the Ottoman Empire’s CUP state sanctioned massacres of 
Armenians (1915-1916).59  The result of this enormous investigative undertaking was 
his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe:  Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposal for Redress (AROE), which was published in Washington in the latter half of 
1944.60   Illustrating the Third Reich’s radical violation of the ideal of ‘universal’ rights 
as well as the regime’s subversion of existing codes of national and international law, 
Lemkin analyzed the occupation decrees that the Nazis and their collaborators imposed 
on subordinated nations in Western Europe, such as France, the Netherlands and 
Denmark as well as on subjugated national populations living in Axis controlled 
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territories to the East of Germany such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States and 
Yugoslavia.61 As part of his book, Lemkin also provided an English reference guide to 
the meaning of Axis occupation decrees.62  Furthermore, whilst making an effort to 
comprehensively analyze the particular conditions of subjugation endured by all 
national peoples under Axis rule, in a specific chapter on ‘The Legal Status of the 
Jews’, Lemkin observed of the Nazi regime and its collaborators mass murder of 
European Jewry: 
The treatment of the Jews in the occupied territories is one of the most flagrant violations of 
international law, not only of specific articles of the Hague regulations, but also the principles of 
the laws of nations as they have emerged from established usage among civilized nations, from 
the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience – principles which the occupant 
is equally bound to respect.63 
 
For Moses, Lemkin’s representation of the Jewish Catastrophe in AROE is significant in 
showing that, “The Jewish experience is both distinctive in its extremity and part of a 
broader pattern.”64  Indeed, Lemkin’s biographer or perhaps hagiographer of his 
‘struggle for the genocide convention’,65  John Cooper has observed that one of 
Lemkin’s primary insights, “was to understand through studying these occupation 
regulations that the Germans intended to reorganize Europe on racial lines and that 
would involve the mass murder and suppression of other cultures.”66  Lemkin’s 
understanding of the significance of this brutal process of the, “…destruction of the 
national pattern of the oppressed group” and “…the imposition of the national pattern 
of the oppressor”,67 for the future development of ‘universal’ group rights within 
international law was articulated most forcefully in the chapter in AROE in which he 
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defined ‘Genocide – a new term for the destruction of nations’.68  Combining elements 
of what he had previously called ‘barbarism’ and ‘vandalism’, Lemkin described the 
meaning of ‘genocide’ in the opening paragraph of this chapter as follows: 
 
The destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group…Generally speaking, genocide does not 
necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accompanied by mass 
killing of all members of a nation.  It is intended rather to signify a co-ordinated plan of different 
actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups with the 
ultimate aim of annihilating the groups themselves.  The objectives of such a plan would be the 
disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, 
religion, the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, 
liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of belonging to such groups.  Genocide is directed 
against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of a national group.69    
 
Lemkin then went on to describe the political, social, economic, physical, religious and 
moral efforts at the destruction of ethnic and national groups perpetrated by the Third 
Reich, as well as noting the biological underpinnings of Nazi processes of genocide in 
different areas of the occupied territories: 
  
The plan of genocide had to be adapted to political considerations in different countries.  It could 
not be implemented in full force in all the conquered states, and hence the plan varies as to 
subject, modalities, and degree of intensity in each country.  Some groups - such as the Jews - 
are to be destroyed completely.  A distinction is made between peoples considered to be related 
by blood to the German people (such as Dutchmen, Norwegians, Flemings, Luxembourgers), 
and peoples not thus related by blood (such as Poles, Slovenes, Serbs).  The populations of the 
first group are deemed worthy of being Germanized.  With respect to the Poles particularly, 
Hitler expressed the view that it is their soil alone which can and should be profitably 
Germanized.”70   
 
For Lemkin, the perpetration of genocide presented, “… one of the most complete and 
glaring illustrations of the violation of international law and the laws of humanity”,71 
and in the post-war period he led a determined global campaign to have the crime of 
genocide incorporated into international law.  Although the judges and prosecutors at 
the IMT refused to accept Lemkin’s proposal that the Nazi leadership be indicted for the 
crime of genocide, his work was occasionally rhetorically employed as well as 
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discussed ‘behind the scenes’ at Nuremberg, whilst the term genocide was used by the 
Polish Supreme National Tribunal to sentence the former commandant of Auschwitz, 
Rudolf Höss to death in April 1947.72  Finally, following further political lobbying and 
public campaigning, on 9th December 1948, parts of Lemkin’s definition of ‘genocide’ 
were incorporated into the ‘UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide’.  Needing the support of twenty member states, it was finally 
ratified in 1951.73  However, although a major achievement in legally recognizing the 
‘universal’ rights of national, racial, ethnic and religious groups, like the UNDHR 
(1948) before it, which Mark Mazower has argued proved so appealing to the great 
powers because of its non-binding status which ultimately preserved state sovereignty,74 
the ratification of the UNGC and the UN Security Council’s ultimate power of veto 
over its application revealed both the nation-state dominated political shortcomings of 
the post-war ‘universal’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ rights regime as well as the historically 
conditioned construction of international law.   
 
For example, the UNGC defined ‘genocide’ as the intent to destroy national, racial, 
ethnic or religious groups in whole or in part through killing and other forms of physical 
or mental assault.  Genocide was also defined as the prevention of births within a group 
as well as the infliction of living conditions on a collective that were designed to bring 
about that group’s destruction.75 However, owing to the Cold War context and the 
construction of the UN Security Council (United States, Britain, France, China and 
Russia), the UNGC made the major omission of failing to include the category of 
political groups in its list of potential targets for mass extermination.  This meant that 
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whilst contemporary scholars of genocide such as Mark Levene have defined Stalin’s 
purge of the ‘kulak’ class (1929-1933) as a genocidal act perpetrated across the whole 
of the U.S.S.R., although most severely in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the North 
Caucasus, prosecution for the perpetration of this mass atrocity could not be invoked 
under the UNGC.76  Equally, to the disadvantage of indigenous tribal societies, the 
UNGC also failed to include forms of ‘developmental’ genocide, as well as omitting 
what Lemkin defined as ‘cultural genocide’ or ‘vandalism’, namely the “prohibition of 
the use of the national language, destruction of books, documents, monuments and 
objects of historical, artistic or religious value.”77  This was because powerful members 
of the Security Council such as the United States and France as well as representatives 
from Brazil, Sweden, South Africa and New Zealand felt that national minorities might 
start utilizing the UNGC in order to oppose what had become relatively normalized 
processes of assimilation to colonial or majority rule through violence.78  
 
If the UNGC was eventually subject to political compromise and failures of 
implementation, Lemkin’s ‘cosmopolitan’ idealism in relation to forms of national and 
ethnic group life was in some respects shared by other ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers in the 
post-war period.  For example, although Hannah Arendt tended to focus more on the 
issue of human rights as well as interpreting the term ‘genocide’ to refer to the 
Holocaust alone, Dan Stone has also noted that certain similarities existed between 
Lemkin and Arendt’s defense of the ‘plural’: 
 
Although she did not refer to Lemkin, Arendt’s definition of genocide as ‘an attack upon human 
diversity as such’, or on ‘human status’ and her resistance to ‘all totalizing definitions’ and all 
‘homogenizing politics’, is strikingly similar to Lemkin’s claim that ‘the human cosmos’ was 
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violated by the destruction of its constituent nations.79  
 
It was against this backdrop of fears for the protection of human ‘plurality’, that Arendt 
wrote The Origins of Totalitarianism (OT, 1951), a response to the recent horrors of the 
Nazi past as well as an expression of personal and public anxieties elicited by the 
potential for Cold War nuclear conflict. Equally, it is testimony to the genre defying 
political, philosophical and historical complexity of this text, that whilst Arendt’s 
“boomerang effect” hypothesis is currently informing a new wave of historical literature 
focused on the links between colonialism and genocide,80 OT can also be interpreted as 
a canonical text within the genre of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and a classic intellectual 
response to the brutalities of Nazism, including the experience of the Jewish 
catastrophe.81  Arendt was a German assimilated Jew who had studied with Heidegger 
and Jaspers at the University of Heidelberg and Marburg.  Her own personal life had 
been profoundly affected by the Third Reich.  For example, she had been personally 
close to Heidegger and had been deeply shaken by the ‘un-worldly’ intellectual’s lack 
of ‘character’ and capacity to be seduced by Nazism.82  As a result, in the same year as 
Heidegger made his ‘Rector’s address’ (1933), Arendt was arrested by Nazi authorities 
for collecting information on German anti-Semitism for the German Zionist 
Organization.  Arendt then emigrated from Germany to France where she worked for a 
Parisian refugee agency which was facilitating Jewish migration to Palestine.  She was 
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then briefly imprisoned in Gurs concentration camp before escaping to the U.S in 1941, 
where she resided until her death in 1975.83   
 
Robert Eaglestone has argued that in OT, Arendt drew on the phenomenological 
tradition of ‘deep history’, whilst reacting against Heidegger’s lack of political 
understanding,84  and attempted to analyze what she describes as, “…the subterranean 
stream of history” which  has, “…come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our 
tradition.”85 This ‘subterranean stream’ is the brutal underbelly of Western political 
Enlightenment, which oscillated between being historically visible and a hidden 
wellspring of potential violence, which contributed to but was not inevitable in shaping, 
“…the elemental structure of totalitarian movements and domination itself.”86 Arendt 
suggested, sometimes in language which has been legitimately critiqued for reproducing 
problematic Western stereotypes about both the Jewish and non-European ‘other’,87 that 
the roots of totalitarian domination can be perceived to reach right back to the practice 
of slavery, the dictatorial terror that accompanied Robespierre’s hi-jacking of the French 
Revolution,  as well as residing in various forms of imperialism, the Western capitalistic 
exploitation of the colonies and the twentieth-century breakdown of the nineteenth-
century balance of power between nation-states.88   
 
For Arendt, the unchecked violence of colonialism and imperialism, which operated 
beyond the constraints of Western nation-state sanctioned legal norms, resulted in the 
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massacres of native populations in Australia, Africa and the Americas, as well as 
facilitating the founding of concentration camps in India and Africa during the Boer 
War.89  She also pointed to post-1918 processes of national self-determination as 
paradoxically catalyzing the breakdown in the nation-state system because during this 
period, “…the supremacy of the will of the nation over all legal and ‘abstract’ 
institutions was universally recognized.”90  As a consequence, the exclusionary logic of 
prevailing political ethno-nationalism resulted in growing numbers of refugees, 
deportees as well as the civil disenfranchisement and violent persecution of stateless 
peoples such as Armenians and Jews.91  For Arendt, the terrible treatment of these 
peoples between the First World War and the end of the Second World War 
demonstrated the fundamental lacunae in national laws and European abstract ideals 
such as the ‘Rights of Man’.  Namely, that unless a person was considered to be a 
national citizen of a state, their fundamental rights as a human being were not 
automatically protected within the international arena.92    
 
Given this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that Arendt perceived the destructive 
dynamics of imperialism, the rise of ethno-nationalism, and the breakdown of the 
nation-state system as exacerbating the international rise of anti-Semitism.93 Arendt 
argued in not unproblematic representational terms that this was because the traditional 
political and financial function of Jews within the social infrastructure of modern 
nation-states as, “an inter-European non-national element” capable of inter-state 
diplomacy became redundant under the increasing influence of imperialism and ethno-
nationalism,  whilst ‘the mob’s’ resentment at perceived Jewish international financial 
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power and their assimilated non-national status in the European Diaspora increased.94  
These blinkered perceptions which reduced the heterogeneity of European Jewish 
religious, social, cultural, political and economic life to pernicious Jewish ‘world 
conspiracy’ stereotypes formed the ideological backdrop for the rise of international and 
national anti-Semitic associations which were further exacerbated by the growth of 
European ‘Continental Imperialism’ (Pan-Germanism/Pan-Slavism), or the notion that 
Central and Eastern European states needed to create land-based empires in order to 
compete with their maritime equivalents.95  Against this backdrop, these anti-Semitic 
movements became, “the catalytic agent for first the Nazi movement, then a World War 
and finally, the establishment of death factories.” 96     
 
For Arendt, terror, slavery and colonial violence shared characteristics with the brutality 
of totalitarian concentration camps because they, “…develop and crystallize on the 
nihilistic principle that “everything is permitted”….” 97  However, paradoxically 
totalitarianism also marked a radical break with both the Western tradition and its 
exploitation of the overseas colonies,98 and instead drawing on continental imperialism 
in particular, totalitarianism was a completely ‘novel form of government’ based on the 
exercise of terror and the control of the masses through dogmatic and misleading 
ideologies which purported to enact the ‘Laws of History’ (in the Nazi case, the move 
towards a racially organized society and in the Soviet example, the drive towards a 
classless utopia).  Furthermore, the Soviet gulags and the Nazi concentration and 
extermination camps typify highly specific and different strains of the ‘total 
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domination’ of totalitarianism, for not only is”everything permitted” within the sphere 
of action of the oppressor but in opposition to all utilitarian economic interests and 
outside the restraints of all nation state sanctioned legal norms and ‘universal’ ideals of 
the ‘Rights of Man’,99 “everything is possible.”100  Differentiating between the Nazi 
and Soviet systems, Arendt described the, “Soviet Union’s labor camps, where neglect 
is combined with chaotic forced labor”,101 and the Nazi camps, “…where the whole of 
life was thoroughly and systematically organized with a view to the greatest possible 
torment”,102 and where prisoners were: 
 
…divided into those whose ‘extermination’ was immediately on the agenda, as in the case of 
the Jews, or could be expected in the predictable future, as in the case of the Poles, Russians, 
Ukrainians, and into those who were not yet covered by instructions about such an over-all ‘final 
solution’.103   
 
Whilst highlighting the particularities of the Nazi and Soviet systems, Arendt also noted 
that both the Soviet labor camps and the Nazi administered concentration and 
extermination camps were archetypically totalitarian in that they treated “… human 
masses…as if they no longer existed”,104 and destructively registered the, “superfluity of 
man.”
105
  For Arendt, these common features meant that totalitarian systems embody 
the potential for ‘radical evil’.  That is, various forms of this extreme type of 
dictatorship which is epitomized by the ‘total domination’ of the masses, unrestrained 
conquest across the globe, and an infinite potential for the administration of terror in 
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concentration camps, have the capacity to destroy the dignity of ‘the human’,106 or lead 
to the, “murder of the moral person”, the “annihilation of the juridical person” and 
“the destruction of individuality.”107 Current historians such as Dan Stone have 
expressed concerns in relation to the representation of the Jewish catastrophe in 
Arendt’s work on totalitarianism that the rhetoric of the annihilation of the ‘human’ 
risks attributing, “to the Holocaust a somewhat mystical sense of grandeur, precisely 
the feeling that the Nazis wished to generate…” 108  Whilst it is important to note this 
perturbing interpretative potential within Arendt’s representational structures, there was 
little ‘mystical’ about Arendt’s political objectives.  For ultimately, Arendt’s 
representation of the Jewish catastrophe within the matrix of anti-Semitism, 
imperialism, totalitarianism and the destruction of the ‘human’ was tied to the political 
and legal project of ensuring the ‘universal’ human “right to have rights.”109  Namely, 
the right to a home protected from hostile governance, the right to the membership of a 
political community and the right to exercise political citizenship as part of that 
community.  In short, for Arendt, recent history had shown that: 
 
Anti-Semitism, not merely the hatred of Jews; Imperialism, not merely conquest; Totalitarianism 
not merely dictatorship; one after the other, one more brutally than the other have demonstrated 
that human dignity needs a new guarantee, which can be found only in a new political principle, 
in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity, while 
its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial 
entities.110 
 
Here Arendt is similar to Jaspers in perceiving the brutalities of the Second World War 
as necessitating a contemporary rethinking of Kantian ‘cosmopolitanism’ in a form 
sobered and ‘made wise’ by the weight of the devastation of 1945 as well as the fears 
                                                           
106
 Arendt, OT, p. 443; Dan Stone, ‘The Holocaust and the ‘Human’’, in Hannah Arendt and the Uses of 
History, pp. 232-249. 
107
 Arendt, OT, p. 455. 
108
 Stone, ‘The Holocaust and the ‘Human’’, p. 242. 
109
 Arendt, OT, p. 290. 
110
 Ibid., p. ix.  
268 
 
engendered by the threat of global annihilation unleashed by the technological 
innovations of the atomic Cold War age.111  This is a point which Arendt further 
elaborated in an essay published in 1957 entitled ‘Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World’.112  
In this text, she noted the importance of Kant’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ for Jaspers’ 
philosophy,113 and stated that one of the, “…central idea[s] of Jaspers’ philosophy” is 
‘limitless communication’ or, “…the faith in the comprehensibility of all truths and the 
good will to reveal and to listen as the primary condition for all human being-
together.”114 For Arendt, a ‘cosmopolitan’ understanding of the globe cannot reside in 
the ‘totalitarian’ potentials inherent in a “…a world government with a centralized 
power”,115 but instead can be discerned in an international law, limited and 
administered by, “…newly defined territorial entities”,116 which co-exists alongside 
nation states and is underpinned by Jaspers notion of ‘limitless communication’: 
 
The bond between men is, subjectively the ‘will to limitless communication’ and, objectively, 
the fact of universal comprehensibility.  The unity of mankind and its solidarity cannot consist in 
a universal agreement upon one religion or one philosophy, or one form of government, but in 
faith and the manifold points to a Oneness which diversity conceals and reveals at one and the 
same time.117  
 
However, ‘cosmopolitan’ social and political theory is far from a homogenous set of 
viewpoints and as a result it is important to note where Jaspers and Arendt differ in their 
responses to the legacy of Nazism.  For example, Arendt’s response to Nuremberg was 
more ambivalent than Jaspers.  She was concerned that the term ‘Crimes against 
Humanity’ might not promote a self-reflexive attitude about Nazism but would rather 
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stigmatize Germans and reinforce old prejudices.118 This situation would neither 
encourage Germans to reflect on their Nazi past, nor promote members of other nations 
to understand the vital warning issued by Nazism.119  Namely, that the totalitarian 
temptation was not limited to Germany and, “… it requires no particular national 
character in order to supply this new type of functionary.”120  Moreover, Arendt also 
differed from Jaspers in stressing that despite the political necessity of prosecuting 
‘Crimes against Humanity’ both at Nuremberg as well as at subsequent trials, the 
‘radical evil’ of Nazi crimes also detonated the conceptual limits of any legal or penal 
code.121  Finally, the ‘radical evil’ of totalitarianism meant that for Arendt: 
 
… attempts to build up a European elite with a program of intra-European understanding based 
on the common experience of the concentration camps have foundered in much the same manner 
as the attempts following the First World War to draw political conclusions from the 
international experience of the front generation.  In both cases it turned out that the experiences 
themselves can communicate no more than nihilistic banalities.122    
 
Jaspers and Arendt also differed in their attitudes towards Judaism as well as in their 
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responses to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.  Jaspers was interested in 
Judaism given the influence of his wife Gertrude and his former student Arendt as well 
as because of the devastating legacy of Nazi anti-Semitism.   Jaspers felt that Jewish 
monotheism was an essential contribution to Western culture; that the Jewish people 
had the right to politically assimilate themselves into nations across the globe and that 
part of their significance as a people lay in their specific religious identity and non-
national status.123  However, whilst fearing the negative possibilities of Jewish 
assimilation into aggressive forms of modern nationalism as a result of the founding of 
the state of Israel, Jaspers also perceived the establishment of this new state to hold 
fresh potentials for the development of Jewish religion and culture and felt that any 
attempt to, “…destroy Israel would mean the end of human kind.”124  
 
Whilst mirroring her mentor’s opinions in some respects, Arendt also disagreed with 
Jaspers in many significant areas.  For example, having grown up as an assimilated 
German Jew and having worked with Zionist organizations during the war, Arendt’s 
sense of her own Jewish identity primarily rested on a historical and political 
understanding of the construction and development of Jewish communities through the 
ages and their complex relationship to the gentile world, as opposed to the fascination 
with Jewish religious culture that Jaspers espoused.125  Furthermore, it was as part of 
her engagement with the history of Jewish experience in Europe that Arendt questioned 
the possibility of full Jewish political and social assimilation in the Diaspora.126 As a 
result, she believed in the importance of the establishment of a Jewish homeland but her 
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‘Jewish Writings’ of the 1940s have also suggested that she perceived Zionism as a 
problematic, “vassal of British Imperialism” and a “betrayal of the Jewish masses of 
Eastern Europe.”127  Instead, Arendt argued for Jewish representation in a European 
federation and common parliament, which might include, “…a settlement in 
Palestine…but only if attached to some such European Commonwealth.”128  The result 
of her opinions were that whilst Arendt praised the Kibbutzim, she also remained 
critical of how the founding of the Israeli state occurred; the treatment of the Arabs; 
forms of extreme Israeli nationalism as well as the role of orthodox religious parties in 
Israel’s political life.129  Furthermore, Arendt also continued to question the political 
motives and policies of some members of Israel’s subsequent governments.130 However, 
in a similar way to Jaspers, and as articulated in a letter that Arendt wrote to her 
companion Mary McCarthy, in the wake of the 1967 war against Egypt and its allies, 
Arendt  also felt that, “any real catastrophe in Israel would affect me more deeply than 
anything else.”131   
 
Both Jaspers’ and Arendt’s views in relation to Israel as well as their ‘cosmopolitan’ 
values in regards to international law became apparent in their private correspondence 
about the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem  for ‘Crimes against the Jewish people’ 
and ‘Crimes against Humanity’  (11th April -15th December 1961).   Prior to the start of 
prosecution proceedings, Jaspers was critical of the idea of the Eichmann trial on 
‘cosmopolitan’ grounds.  He argued that the Israeli government’s kidnapping of 
Eichmann from Argentina lacked legal justification, whilst he also objected to a national 
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court as opposed to an international tribunal prosecuting the former SS 
Obersturmbannfürher who had bureaucratically organized the deportation of Europe’s 
Jews to ghettos and extermination camps in Nazi occupied Eastern Europe.132  Jaspers’ 
objections to the Eichmann trial in an Israeli court rested on the fact that the Jewish state 
did not exist when the crimes were committed; the state of Israel did not automatically 
represent all members of the Jewish people; and finally, that the judgment meted out by 
a national court might be perceived as vengeance rather than justice, and as a result, 
might stimulate political backlash against Israel.133  Instead, in a letter written to Arendt 
in December 1960, Jaspers suggested that in an ideal world, the Eichmann case would 
serve as a spur for the creation of an ICC: 
 
Israel does an exemplary job of historical investigation and documentation and then closes with 
a demand addressed to humanity, which is represented formally today by the UN: Here are the 
facts.  It is a task for humanity, not for an individual national state to pass judgment in such a 
weighty case.  We have the perpetrator of these crimes in our custody and place him at your 
disposal.  What he did concerns all of you, not just us.  Create the means by which humanity can 
mete out justice (possible consequences I am thinking of are, for instance, appeals to this highest 
supranational authority from people whose human rights have been violated by their own 
countries).134 
 
    
Arendt disagreed with Jaspers and accepted the need and validity of prosecuting and 
sentencing Eichmann in Israel because an ICC did not yet exist and as many Holocaust 
survivors lived in Israel, the ‘passive nationality principle’ could be applied, or the legal 
concept that, “…the country or state to which the victims belong has jurisdiction.”135  
However, it should also be noted that in the same letter to Jaspers, Arendt added, 
“Don’t misunderstand me: I would be all in favor of an international criminal court 
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with appropriate powers.”136  Furthermore, Arendt’s chief objections to the Eichmann 
trial were expressed most notoriously in her controversial trial reports for The New 
Yorker, which were published in book form as Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the 
Banality of Evil (EJ, 1963).137 
 
Arendt’s reports were scandalous in Israel and Jewish communities across the globe 
because some critics such as the philosopher Gershom Scholem argued that by focusing 
on the term ‘banality of evil’ instead of ‘radical evil’, Arendt had not shown enough 
‘love for the Jewish people’ and had trivialized the death camps; whilst Scholem 
alongside commentators such as Martin Buber were also upset by Arendt’s harsh 
critique and judgement of Jewish community leaders.138  This was because Arendt 
argued that rather than operating within the Nazi system, the Jewish Councils should 
have done nothing, because in her view this would have disrupted the machinery of 
destruction and potentially reduced the number of victims.139  Furthermore, she 
performed the writing of this point extremely provocatively and ‘tactlessly’ in the 
following statement from EJ, “The whole truth was that if the Jewish people had really 
been unorganized and leaderless, there would have been chaos and plenty of misery but 
the total number of victims would hardly have been between four and a half and six 
million people.”140  During the ensuing controversy which Arendt experienced  as, 
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“…the smear campaign against me”,141 and in which she was perceived by her critics 
as ‘revictimizing the victims’, Jaspers and his wife Gertrude remained supportive, with 
Jaspers telling Arendt that as an overall piece of work  he found EJ both, “profound and 
full of despair”,142  and that he also sensed a more ‘universal’ tone in the book, “a 
desire for veracity and for the contemplation of man, but you do not speak explicitly 
about that.”143 
 
Despite the controversy, Arendt won praise not only from Jaspers but also from 
psychologist Stanley Milgram, whilst notwithstanding  the complaints from critics such 
as Scholem,  Arendt’s invocation of ‘the banality of evil’ actually reflected her opinion 
that Eichmann, the careerist bourgeois under prosecution was not an anti-Semitic 
psychopath but was rather, “terribly and terrifyingly normal”,144 and an example of a, 
“…new type of criminal”,145 who emerges under the ‘radical evil’ of totalitarianism, a 
person who although ultimately responsible for their actions, “…commits his crimes 
under circumstances that make it nigh on impossible for him to know or feel that what 
he is doing is wrong.”146  Moreover, one of Arendt’s chief objections to the Eichmann 
trial rested on the fact that she perceived the Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion 
and the Attorney General, Gideon Hausner as utilizing the horror stories of Holocaust 
survivors in the political interests of Jewish nationalism, rather than focusing on the task 
of prosecuting Eichmann for the specific crimes that he had committed.147  Lastly, and 
in a more ‘cosmopolitan’ vein she also critiqued the prosecutors of Eichmann for 
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focusing on national interests and failing to demonstrate an awareness of the ‘universal’ 
implications of the trial for ‘world humanity’.  For example, Arendt argued, that the 
Eichmann trial dealt with, “…the supreme crime…the physical extermination of the 
Jewish people…a crime against humanity perpetrated upon the body of the Jewish 
people.”148  Whilst this expression contained the problematic potential to place victims 
of Nazi atrocities in a hierarchy of suffering, she also stressed that the process of:  
 
…extermination against whole ethnic groups – the Jews, or the Poles, or the Gypsies – might be 
more than a crime against the Jewish, Polish or the Gypsy people, that the international order, 
and mankind in its entirety, might have been grievously hurt and endangered.149   
 
If Arendt’s expressions of what she calls the threats posed to, “international order and 
mankind in its entirety” also shares affinities with Jaspers ‘cosmopolitan’ rhetoric she 
was not the only post-war thinker to draw on the influence of the German existentialist.  
In a similar way to Jaspers, Jürgen Habermas’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ was profoundly 
affected by his personal experience as a German living as part of the Nazi regime.  
Habermas grew up in the town of Gummersbach where despite his serious cleft palate 
he was allowed to join the Hitler Youth and operated as a field nurse towards the end of 
the war.150  Morally shocked by allied footage of the concentration camps,151 Habermas 
was subsequently educated at the universities of Gottingen and Bonn and worked with 
Adorno at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt (1956-1959).152  
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Habermas shared Adorno’s skepticism towards technological progress,153 whilst 
rejecting his tutor’s overall pessimism and instead maintaining that the integrity of 
modernity resides in the self-critical functions of the ‘moral-legal’, ‘scientific-technical’ 
as well as ‘aesthetic-expressive’ value spheres acting in dialogue with secular 
humanitarian values and the democratic dynamism of the ‘public sphere’.154 The ‘public 
sphere’ is what Habermas defines as that shared arena of critical debate within a state 
that nurtures the self-reflexive individual and which is sustained by parliamentary 
institutions, discussion venues,  international and national law as well as the global and 
local print media.  However, the integrity of the ‘public sphere’ is perpetually placed 
under threat by the ‘scientization of politics’ and the increasing commercialisation of 
the mass media.155  Although Habermas’s discussion of democratic republicanism and 
the ‘public’ owes something to Schmitt’s legal theory, whilst rejecting that author’s 
anti-Semitic attitudes,156 in other respects, it is Jaspers’ ‘cosmopolitan’ ideal of the 
importance of ‘limitless communication’ that is refracted in Habermas’s view that 
communication lies at the heart of modern ethics.  As a result, in Habermas’s thought, a 
state’s ‘public sphere’ becomes a key site for the interrogation, renewal or rejection of 
national, local and global traditions.157   
 
Habermas recognized that in the absence of what Jaspers would call personal guilt, the 
questions posed by the legacy of the Third Reich were different for both his generation 
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and subsequent post-war generations.  Bearing this in mind scholars of German 
historical memory such as Wulf Kansteiner and Dirk Moses have identified Habermas 
as a member of what has been termed the ‘Hitler Youth Generation’ or the ‘generation 
of 1945’, an age group who were children during the early years of the Third Reich, 
adolescents in the Second World War as well as young actors in the post-war 
reconstruction of West Germany at a time when many former Nazis still held prominent 
positions in the nation’s industries, universities and commercial enterprises.   Although 
less talked about than the more radical generation of 1968, Moses has observed that left-
liberal journalists and intellectuals from the ‘forty-fivers’ were significant in supporting 
the democratic reconstruction of West Germany as well as subjecting national 
intellectual life to penetrating critique in response to the devastation of Nazism.158  
 
Kansteiner has observed that by the 1980s, the West German historiographical 
establishment was headed by members of this ‘Hitler Youth’ generation and had settled 
on a broad consensus which rejected the ‘totalitarianism’ thesis and perceived the 
Holocaust to be a singular event in history and the result of a German ‘special path’ of 
political development, social modernisation and anti-Semitism.159  However, by the mid-
late 1980s this consensus was aggressively challenged by the international Ronald 
Reagan/Helmut Kohl political controversy at Bitburg cemetery (1985) as well as by the 
publication of two neo-conservative histories of the Third Reich by Ernst Nolte and 
Andreas Hillgruber.   
 
Whilst Arendt’s OT had stressed both the specificity and comparability of the Nazi and 
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Soviet regimes as well as confronting, “…the unspeakable gratuitous cruelty in the 
German concentration and extermination camps”,160  Nolte and Hillgruber’s histories 
were perceived by many critics to ‘normalize’ the horror of Nazi crimes, specifically the 
Jewish catastrophe through a comparative perspective with the Soviet Union.161  For 
example, in the 1990s, Dominick LaCapra perceived ‘denial’ of the trauma of the 
Holocaust in Hillgruber’s portrayal of Eastern Front Nazi soldiers as ‘victims’,162 as well 
as in Nolte’s controversial argument that the Holocaust was an extreme version of 
Soviet terror and that the Nazis defended Western civilisation by opposing the 
Bolshevik threat.163  These events stimulated the Historikerstreit (‘Historians’ Dispute’) 
or the series of intellectual debates which raged in German newspaper articles and 
academic journals between 1986 and 1988 about the role of the remembrance of the 
atrocity crimes of Nazism in German public life.  
 
Habermas was active in the ‘Historians’ Dispute’ and like Jaspers before him was 
‘cosmopolitan’ in arguing for a rigorously self-critical German confrontation with the 
lessons and legacies of the Nazi past.  In an essay contributed to the Historikerstreit 
entitled ‘Concerning the Public Use of History’, Habermas stressed that after the moral 
catastrophe of Auschwitz, the continuing perseverance of Nazi era political, intellectual, 
local and family traditions within the contemporary horizon of German identity politics 
necessitated an ongoing process of both individual and national self-reflection and 
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communication within the German ‘public sphere’.164  For Habermas, the objective of 
this process is the production of a self-critical individual and self-reflexive German 
collective identity that is stripped of what Adorno would refer to as the violent excesses 
of ‘pathological nationalism’:  
 
After Auschwitz, we can only create national self-consciousness from the better traditions of our 
history, traditions which we must appropriate critically not blindly.  We can only continue to 
shape a national context of existence, which once allowed a unique injury to the substance of 
human commonality, in the light of such traditions which stand up to the suspicious gaze made 
wise by the moral catastrophe.165  
 
The importance that Habermas ascribes to the self-critical confrontation with the 
German national past in relation to the Jewish catastrophe is perhaps most evident in his 
defence of Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s, Hitler’s Willing Executioners (1996), a book 
which argued that the mass murder of European Jewry was the result of a specifically 
German ‘eliminationist form of anti-Semitism’ that had culminated in the realization of 
the Holocaust.166  Although Karyn Ball has noted that Goldhagen’s book has been 
widely critiqued by historians for the ‘impropriety’ of its representations of mass 
atrocity,167 as well as for decoupling the Third Reich’s mass murder of European Jewry 
from its relationship to local collaboration in the occupied territories, the broader Nazi 
war effort and the brutal violence targeted against Soviet civilians and other social, 
ethnic, religious, sexual and racial groups,168 Habermas persisted in forwarding an 
alternative perspective.  Brushing aside the complaints of historians, Habermas 
commented of Goldhagen’s confrontation with anti-Semitism that, “This critical 
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attitude towards one’s own particularity is precisely what Goldhagen’s study demands - 
and what worries some conservative critics.”169   
 
Furthermore, the legacies of Kant’s Enlightenment ‘cosmopolitan’ thinking as well as 
the experience of Europeans during the Second World War also played a key role in 
legitimating Habermas’s arguments in The Postnational Constellation (1998).  In this 
treatise Habermas argued that individual nation-states cannot combat the negative 
impacts of globalization on their own or within the matrix of traditional foreign 
relations and as a result it is  necessary for transnational bodies such as the EU to 
reform, democratize and in the process build a type of ‘constitutional patriotism’ at the 
supra-territorial level. The challenge posed by ‘constitutional patriotism’ is how to 
integrate contemporary democratic and multicultural nation-states on a lawful and 
rational foundation at the transnational level whilst simultaneously recognizing the 
essential democratic functions served by nation states, granting equal rights to all 
citizens regardless of colour, creed, race, gender, religion, ethnicity and language as 
well as working to neutralize social modalities of radical ethnic nationalism.170    
 
Whilst Habermas constructed 1945 and the horrors of Auschwitz as marking a 
watershed in the collective self-understanding of the German nation-state, within a 
European as opposed to strictly German schema, the experience of the Second World 
War also holds a key place in legitimating the critique of ethno-nationalisms inherent in 
the concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’.  For Habermas, the Enlightened universalism 
of the French Revolution and its lawful, reasoned  achievements of democracy and 
                                                           
169
 Jürgen Habermas, ‘On the Public Use of History’, in The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, 
by Jürgen Habermas, trans. Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p. 29.  
170
 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy’, in The Postnational 
Constellation, by Habermas, pp.  74-76; Fine, Cosmopolitanism, pp. 44-45. 
281 
 
“…the universalist spirit of political Enlightenment”171  remain guiding principles for 
‘constitutional patriotism’,  whilst “…the defeat of fascism” marks the most significant 
‘normative’ watershed of the twentieth century.  This is epitomized by Habermas’s 
statement that, “…the Allied victory and the German defeat of 1945 permanently 
discredited an array of myths, which ever since the end of the nineteenth century had 
been mobilized against the heritage of 1789.”172    
 
However, Habermas’s notion of ‘constitutional patriotism’ and the representation of the 
Second World War within that concept have also been questioned from a number of 
different perspectives.  For example, the prospects for ‘constitutional patriotism’ in the 
European context has been seen as over-idealistic given continuing democratic deficits 
in EU governance, whilst Habermas has also been criticized for idealizing the political 
form of the constitution and questioned as to whether its normative basis can ever be 
adequately distanced from its legitimizing roots in modern state nationalism.173  
Furthermore, Habermas can be perceived as being premature in citing 1945 as marking 
a ‘normative’ watershed in European politics. For whilst the appeal of fascist 
movements in their pre-1945 mould might have been relegated to the margins of 
European societies, a populist vein of democratic far right radicalism persists and its 
representatives continue in their efforts to influence contemporary European politics.  
This point has been highlighted in previous chapters of HMM, specifically although not 
only in relation to Haider in Austria in the 1990s and Lithuanian ultra-nationalists in the 
early years of the twenty-first century.   
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Despite these sobering assessments of Habermas’s ‘cosmopolitanism’, it is arguable that 
the Third Reich and its collaborators’ humanitarian transgressions and genocidal 
violence, including specific reflections on the Jewish Catastrophe played such an 
important role in the thought of post-1945 ‘cosmopolitan’ philosophical, political, legal 
and social science theorists because not only were thinkers such as Jaspers, Arendt, 
Lemkin and Habermas profoundly personally affected by the Third Reich, but the 
brutality of the Nazi concentration and extermination camps, mass shootings and 
organized terror can be interpreted as paradoxically demonstrating both the Nazi 
regime’s anti-liberal subversion of the positive aspirations of ‘cosmopolitanism’ 
towards ‘universal’ rights, international justice, engaged democratic citizenry and 
prosperous progressive peace as well as the ‘dark side’ of Enlightenment thinking in the 
forms of the legacy of colonialism, the legal categorical exclusions of the Rights of Man 
(1789), the potential violence that undergirds the administration and manipulation of the 
law as well as what Zygmunt Bauman would perceive as the potential indifference 
toward the ‘other’ facilitated by the mechanisms of bureaucratic modernity.174   
 
Furthermore, it is arguable that the convening of the SIF 2000 and the rhetoric of the 
Stockholm Declaration (2000) continues elements of this ‘cosmopolitan’ tradition of 
responses to the Nazi past.  This cannot only be seen in the Stockholm Declaration’s 
desire to remember the Holocaust in order to promote the prevention of, “genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia,”175  but is also arguably 
apparent in some of the narrative tropes that have been consciously or unconsciously 
used in co-author of the Stockholm Declaration, Yehuda Bauer’s, Rethinking the 
Holocaust (RH, 2001).  Admittedly, some may see this as a provocative and contentious 
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claim to make particularly given Bauer’s previous association with the Holocaust 
‘uniqueness’ thesis, a claim which chapter two has shown is more often associated by 
its harshest critics with aggressive forms of Jewish communal and/or national identity 
politics than modes of idealistic ‘cosmopolitan’ pluralism.176  
 
However, if Bauer’s shift from ‘uniqueness’ to the more ‘universalistic’ if not 
completely un-problematic rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ is to be analyzed 
seriously, then it is important to note that in a similar way to previous ‘cosmopolitan’ 
thinkers, Bauer was deeply personally affected by the Holocaust, whilst in relation to 
the prevention of future genocides Bauer states that, “we have a moral obligation, in the 
spirit of Kantian moral philosophy, to try.”177  Furthermore, Bauer can be interpreted as 
conforming to certain ‘cosmopolitan’ generic conventions. For instance, he points to the 
ambivalent significance of 1789.  Thus, in a similar way to Habermas, he views Nazism 
as the opposition of, “the major achievements of the European culture that preceded 
them, especially the legacy of the French Revolution and the Emancipation.”178  
However, like Arendt he also perceives the deeply pernicious facets of the legacy of 
1789.  This is because for Bauer elements of the Enlightenment influenced Nazism’s 
anti-Semitic ideology, “François Marie Voltaire, after all, was the one who rejected 
Christianity and saw in it a destructive force introduced into Europe by Judaism and 
the Jews, whom he despised.”179  
 
Finally, mirroring the rhetoric of the Stockholm Declaration which he helped to 
construct, Bauer also forcefully articulates the viewpoint that the genocide of the Jews 
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during the Second World War, was not only an irreducibly ‘unprecedented’ human 
event but also contained ‘universal’ elements which need to be discussed and 
understood, if we are to work towards what can be perceived as the ‘cosmopolitan’ 
goals of international peace, the rule of law and effective genocide prevention in the 
present.  Indeed, for Bauer:  
. 
...the Holocaust has become a world issue.  It has had an enduring impact on contemporary 
civilization and continues to shape, at least indirectly, the fate of nations.  For its impact to effect 
mutual understanding, widespread peace, and active, full-scale opposition to genocidal events, 
we all have to re-think what happened then.180 
 
 
However, there are also major differences between what can be perceived as Bauer’s 
historical ‘cosmopolitanism’ and the diverse philosophical, legal and political 
‘cosmopolitanisms’ of Jaspers, Lemkin, Arendt and Habermas.  For example, whereas 
Jaspers and Habermas’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ wrestles with the political, moral and ethical 
implications of the legacy of the German perpetrators, Bauer’s approach is rooted in the 
conviction that, “...it is best to look at the Holocaust from a Jewish perspective.”181  
Equally, whereas Arendt is critical of the potential “nihilistic banalities” produced by 
inter-state political initiatives based on the memory of the camps,182 Bauer believes, 
“We need the politicians for the education effort to succeed.”183   
 
Furthermore, whereas Arendt’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ can be seen as highly critical of how 
Israel was founded, and can be perceived as a crucial precursor to the work of the ‘post-
Zionist’ historians, Bauer has remained critical of how this contemporary wave of 
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scholarship has analyzed the establishment of the Jewish state.184  That said, whilst 
Bauer remains strongly biased towards the Israeli national perspective, it should also be 
noted that in a more ‘cosmopolitan’ vein he is openly critical of extreme forms of 
contemporary Israeli religious nationalism.185  For example, in February 2003, Bauer 
admirably critiqued the ethnic cleansing inciting hate speech of extremist Israeli settlers 
and stated to a group of Danish educators visiting Yad Vashem, “What we have here 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians is an armed conflict – if one side becomes 
stronger there is a chance of genocide.”186  However, according to the report in 
Haaretz, Bauer also drew attention to polls which showed the militant anti-Semitic 
attitudes of a proportion of the Palestinian population and went on to add, “Fortunately, 
both sides are very strong and good at killing each other so you realize you can’t get rid 
of each other and must come to some sort of a political solution.”187     
 
It is also arguable that there are differences in the way in which what can be perceived 
as Bauer’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ approaches the subject of the Holocaust because of his 
status as a professional historian that is, as a scholar who is concerned with the causes 
and consequences of human events and their social, political, cultural, religious or 
economic developments over time.  For example, although sharing Arendt’s belief that 
not just German but all collaborators in Nazi mass murder policies should be analyzed, 
he also rejects Arendt’s controversial appraisal of the Jewish Councils in the 1960s 
which stated that the members of the Judenrat should have done nothing, because this 
would have disrupted the machinery of destruction and potentially reduced the number 
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of Jewish victims.188   From the perspective of a historian who has analyzed specific 
efforts at Jewish survival during the Holocaust, Bauer perceives Arendt’s judgement to 
be, “inappropriate, because no Judenrat behaved in quite the same way as any other 
Judenrat.”189  Equally, whilst Bauer shares Habermas’s admiration for Goldhagen’s 
unapologetic centring of anti-Semitism as the primary cause of the Holocaust, he also 
historically critiques Goldhagen’s failure to integrate, “developments in German society 
in the nineteenth century,”190 “...the social and economic traumas that afflicted German 
society in the wake of World War I” as well as broader forms of European anti-
Semitism into his historical explanation.191   
 
That said, perhaps where Bauer can be perceived as most notably either consciously or 
unconsciously negotiating, departing or troubling  the ‘cosmopolitan’ tradition is in his 
definitions of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ and ‘genocide’.  Against the backdrop of 
the genre of ‘cosmopolitanism’, Bauer’s rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ can 
be interpreted as operating within established traditions which have sought to register 
the enormity of the Jewish catastrophe.  For whilst at Nuremberg, Jackson considered 
all Nazi ‘Crimes against Humanity’ to be ‘unprecedented’,192 this chapter has also 
shown how ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers as early as Lemkin and Arendt also definitively 
recognized the extremity of the Jewish catastrophe whilst also seeing it as part of 
broader patterns of atrocities committed under Third Reich occupation regimes (AROE) 
or totalitarian systems of domination (OT).  Furthermore, in many respects, Bauer’s 
specific invocation of the ‘unprecedentedness’ of the Holocaust also builds on direct 
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‘cosmopolitan’ precedents. For example, in EJ Arendt noted that, “Eichmann was 
accused of, an unprecedented crime...”193 and that amidst broader Nazi atrocities, the 
Holocaust was the, “…the supreme crime…” perpetrated against humanity.194 
 
Whilst the rhetoric of ‘unprecedentedness’ suggests a degree of continuity, what can be 
categorized as much more distinctive is Bauer’s splitting of Lemkin’s term ‘genocide’ 
which was later institutionalized in the modified form of the UNGC, into his definitions 
of ‘total’ destruction (‘Holocaust’) and ‘partial’ destruction (‘genocide’).195  As has 
been explored in chapters two and three, what is troubling about this splitting as well as 
Bauer’s restriction of the victims of genocide to racial, ethnic and national groups,196 is 
that it potentially excludes certain collectives, it increases the possibility for the Western 
orientated hierarchization of genocides as well as exacerbating the possibilities for 
competitive victimhood between those who have suffered and survived genocide.  
However, demonstrating Bauer’s ambivalence if he is to be perceived as a 
‘cosmopolitan’ thinker these negative potentialities also co-exist alongside the more 
positive possibilities in Bauer’s thought to remember the Holocaust, commemorate 
other Nazi atrocities and proactively work towards taking action on genocide issues.  
For example, standing by his convictions in 2006, Bauer filed a request to Israel’s High 
Court of Justice to allow him to forward a position paper on Darfur, in an effort to help 
the cause of, “...31 Sudanese refugees held under IDF administrative detention and 
being threatened with expulsion.”197      
 
Having demonstrated how the SIF 2000 and the intellectual lineage of the Stockholm 
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Declaration can be categorized as ‘cosmopolitan’ in both positive as well as in more 
problematic ways, this chapter will now critically delineate the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ 
interpretation of the SIF 2000.  This ‘New Cosmopolitan’ reading of the SIF 2000 is not 
concerned with understanding how Bauer and the Stockholm Declaration’s rhetoric of 
Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ can be historically compared, contrasted and 
categorized in relation to a ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual and institutional tradition.  
Rather it seeks to re-appropriate the events of 2000 in order to support its own 
teleological narrative of history as ‘progress’ towards what its adherents perceive as the 
transnational age of ‘Second Modernity’.  Furthermore, as part of this ‘progressive’ 
narrative towards the remembrance of the Holocaust in the ‘global age’ of ‘Second 
Modernity’, the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ problematically ignores the extent to which 
‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers in the 1940s and 1950s such as Lemkin and Arendt recognized 
the absolute specificity of the Jewish Catastrophe even within comparative contexts of 
analysis such as ‘genocide’ and ‘totalitarianism’.   
 
Moving beyond this brief sketch of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ and in order to 
comprehensively understand the intellectual context in which the SIF 2000 was 
interpreted in the early twenty-first century, the next section will explain in depth what 
makes the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ different from older forms of ‘cosmopolitanism’ as 
well as explicating the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ interpretation of the SIF 2000 offered by 
Levy and Sznaider.  Finally, it will be argued that these authors ‘emplotment’ of the SIF 
2000 within a ‘New Cosmopolitan’ narrative of ‘First’ and ‘Second Modernity’ is 
deeply problematic because not only does it risk downplaying the extent to which the 
Jewish catastrophe was specifically addressed by ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers such as 
Lemkin and Arendt in the immediate post-war period, but it also risks over-simplifying 
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the historical record of developments in the commemoration of the Jewish catastrophe 
since 1945.  Finally, it will also be argued that a central problem with Levy and 
Sznaider’s historical analysis of the SIF 2000 within the ‘progressive’ framework of 
‘First’ and ‘Second Modernity’ is that it also discourages a sober and realistic 
assessment of the continuing challenges posed to the implementation of the Stockholm 
Declaration’s imperatives to remember the Holocaust, recognize other Nazi atrocities 
and prevent forms of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and 
xenophobia,” in the present.198    
 
Levy, Sznaider and the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ interpretation of the SIF 2000 
 
The ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ can be defined as the international and interdisciplinary 
post-1989 intellectual and political movement that re-thinks and contemporizes the 
Kantian ‘cosmopolitan’ tradition and puts global governance, international law, 
peaceful inter-state relations and human rights at the centre of its world-view.199   Also 
central to the work of scholars such as Ulrich Beck, Daniel Levy, Natan Sznaider, 
David Held and Daniele Archibugi is the critique of methodological nationalism in the 
social sciences.  These thinkers also share the conviction that humanity exists in an era 
of mutual global inter-dependence and attempt to construct normative and at times 
prescriptive concepts of global justice, world citizenship and ‘cosmopolitan’ 
democracy.200  The formation of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ was influenced by a wave 
of transnational human rights developments that occurred since the twilight of 
Communism in the late 1980s.  For example, the United Nations Convention Against 
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Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (1987); War Crimes 
Tribunals in the former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994); as well as the 
establishment of the ICC (2002).201 
 
Member of the German generation of 1968 and current Professor of Sociology at the 
University of Munich and the London School of Economics, Ulrich Beck is one of the 
key representatives of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’. Beck postulates that 1989 marked 
the watershed moment between ‘First’ and ‘Second’ modernity in which national-global  
‘cosmopolitan’ parties, social movements and self-reflexive knowledge systems are 
needed to deal with the environmental, economic and military challenges posed by a 
globally inter-dependent twenty-first century ‘World Risk Society’.202  Responding to 
the transnational problems posed by the post-Cold War era, Beck has argued that, “…in 
a world of global crises and dangers produced by civilization, the old differentiations 
between internal and external, national and international, us and them, lose their 
validity and a new cosmopolitan realism becomes essential to survival.”203   
 
The intervention of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ is not only significant within the 
development of the genre of ‘cosmopolitanism’ but has also provided a key framework 
for the interpretation of the political and historical importance of the SIF 2000.  The 
most widely known ‘New Cosmopolitan’ interpretation of the symbolic significance of 
both the Holocaust and the role of the SIF 2000 within that matrix is New York based 
sociologist Daniel Levy and Tel Aviv based academic Natan Sznaider’s book, The 
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Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (HMGA, 2006) as well as their article, 
‘Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory’ 
(2002).  Perceiving the Holocaust as an attack on a stereotyped ‘cosmopolitan’ ideal of 
Diaspora Jewishness which accidently and disconcertingly corresponds with the 
negative representation of ‘World Jewry’ found in European far right propaganda, Levy 
and Sznaider’s book fits squarely within the conceptual horizon of the ‘New 
Cosmopolitanism’ and has been cited by Beck as demonstrating that, “…radical, self-
critical European commemoration of the Holocaust does not destroy, but rather 
constitutes the identity of Europe.”204 
 
Levy and Sznaider adopt Beck’s chronological framework of ‘First’ and ‘Second 
Modernity’ or the transformation from a ‘First Modernity’ rooted in industrial 
modernization and the nation state by the processes of, “…globalization, 
individualization, gender revolution, underemployment and global risks (such as 
ecological crisis and the crash of global financial markets)”,205 to a ‘Second Modernity’ 
based on trans-national mutual inter-dependence.  They have argued that since 1989 and 
the end of the Cold War, the memory of the Holocaust has become a ‘cosmopolitan’ 
symbol that functions as a transnational moral imperative to prevent racism, intolerance 
and genocide in the self-reflexive age of ‘Second Modernity’.206  For Levy and Sznaider, 
what is significant about this zeitgeist of ‘Second Modernity’ is the fact that the 
contemporary memory of the Holocaust has ‘universalistic’ implications for the West’s 
ethical imperative towards its suffering ‘other’.  In their work, the specific remembrance 
of the Jewish catastrophe during the Second World War has universal implications for 
present and future members of ‘world humanity’: 
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In a newly European ‘cosmopolitan’ memory, the Holocaust future (and not the past) is now 
considered in absolutely universal terms: it can happen to anyone, at anytime, and everyone is 
responsible.207  
 
In their article, ‘Memory Unbound’,  Levy and Sznaider focus on three national cultures 
of remembrance, America, Germany and Israel, and argue that the formation of 
‘cosmopolitan memory’ of the Holocaust is the result of three stages of historical 
development.  As has been previously addressed and will be demonstrated in more 
depth in the last section of this chapter, Levy and Sznaider argue in historically 
problematic terms that the First Stage encompassed the ‘silencing’ of the Holocaust in 
the public memory of the West in the immediate post-war period. This is because the 
authors propose that whilst the Jewish catastrophe was discussed in private, it was 
rarely named the ‘Holocaust’ nor recognized as a specific event in the official state 
remembrance cultures of West Germany, Israel and the United States.208  For example, 
Levy and Sznaider argue in their book that the ‘silencing’ of the Holocaust in West 
Germany was largely because of the pragmatic needs of democratization after the 
war.209  Equally, although the authors note that the post-war Israeli state recognized the 
Jewish catastrophe as something separate from wider Nazi ‘Crimes against Humanity’, 
pointing to significant public debates as well as legislation such as the April 1951 
parliamentary resolution establishing a remembrance day on 27th of Nissan or Yom 
Hashoah as well as the 1953 ruling which founded Yad Vashem,210 the authors maintain 
that by and large ‘silence’ surrounded the Holocaust in 1950s Israel.  For Levy and 
Sznaider, “…no unifying terminology even existed at that point” and in overall terms, 
“…almost nothing was initiated by the state in the first decades after the war to 
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commemorate the Holocaust.”211  
 
Equally, following Peter Novick,212 Levy and Sznaider also argue problematically that 
although American Jews were willing to aid survivors, they were less concerned with 
remembrance and more focused on cultural assimilation and re-building their lives after 
the war.213  They are also influenced by Novick in that they forward the notion that part 
of the reason for the seeming lack of discussion of the Jewish catastrophe in post-war 
America was the fact that the legacies of Hiroshima seemed to better encapsulate public 
fears and anxieties in the Cold War nuclear age.  Contrasting with this chapter’s 
analysis, Levy and Sznaider also propose that recognition of the Holocaust as a specific 
event in American public life was stymied by descriptions which the authors perceive as 
‘universalising’ the particular history of the Nazi mass murder of European Jewry in 
analytical terms such as ‘totalitarianism’.214 However, the authors also argue that it was 
this type of ‘universalistic’ rhetoric that laid the foundations for what they perceive as 
the Western liberal consensus politics of future orientated ‘cosmopolitan memory’ of 
the Holocaust. In line with this, HMGA represents intellectuals such as Jaspers, Arendt 
and Lemkin as exceptional ‘cosmopolitan’ avant-garde figures during the Cold War in 
the 1940s and 1950s.215   
 
The second stage of historical development that Levy and Sznaider point to in their 
article is ‘the Iconographical Formation of the Holocaust’, or the period between the 
1960s and the 1980s when national memory cultures of remembrance are perceived to 
emerge alongside mass media representations, such as the American television series, 
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Holocaust (1978).216  In their book, the authors summarize these key national 
developments in Holocaust memory cultures of what they call ‘First Modernity’ as 
follows: 
 
In Germany, the Holocaust provided a means for the left to examine its own history from a 
distanced, critical perspective and, above all to discredit the national perspective.  In Israel the 
Holocaust became a symbol for insecurity and the need to maintain a strong militarized state.  In 
the United States, it provided the basis for a newly emerging ethnic politics.217 
 
After the nation-state orientated ‘Iconographic’ era of Holocaust memory cultures, Levy 
and Sznaider perceive ‘the post-Cold war’ period to be the most significant in terms of 
the formation of ‘cosmopolitan memories’ of the Holocaust, or memories of the Jewish 
catastrophe which promote a transnational human rights agenda, restitution processes 
and national self-reflection in different local contexts.  For the authors the ‘institutional’ 
and ‘normative’ construction of collective ‘cosmopolitan’ memories are discernable in 
media reports documenting Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in the 1990s, as well as 
in the convening of the European, inter-governmental, Stockholm Forum on the 
memory of the Holocaust held in January 2000.218  Within this schema, the authors 
perceive the SIF 2000 to be significant as a, “good example for the deterritorialization 
and the institutionalization of cosmopolitan memories.”219  
 
For Levy and Sznaider, the SIF 2000 marked a key moment in, “the institutionalization 
of a European memory”,220 in which “The privileged nation of yesteryear was 
subsumed under a powerful symbolism of victim-centered cosmopolitan memory.”221   
The authors also note that the SIF 2000 contributed to the recognition of genocide as 
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one of the key risks to be addressed by the institutions comprising a self-reflexive age of 
‘Second Modernity’, whilst the type of ‘future orientated’ Holocaust memory 
inaugurated at the SIF 2000 functions for Levy and Sznaider as, “...a prime legitimating 
force for future military and non-military interventions to prevent future 
genocides…”222 As a result, in HMGA, the authors conclude that in the contemporary 
Western world: 
 
The Holocaust sets the parameters for deterritorialized memoryscapes in Second Modernity, 
provides a model for national self-critique, serves to promote human rights as a legitimating 
principle in the global community, and plainly offers a negative example of dealing with 
alterity.223   
 
A further important component of Levy and Sznaider’s argument is that since 1989 self-
reflexive national memory cultures combined with emerging supra-territorial human 
rights legal discourses have facilitated the dialectical  ‘common patterning’ or what 
Roland Robertson refers to as the ‘glocalization’ of Holocaust remembrance.  Levy and 
Sznaider describe this process of ‘common patterning’ in the following terms: 
 
…They begin to develop in accord with common rhythms and periodizations.  But in each case, 
the common elements combine with pre-existing elements to form something new.  The new, 




For Levy and Sznaider, the construction of Holocaust memory is no longer 
predominantly carried out by nation states or historians, but is instead becoming a 
‘universalized’ message of tolerance and ‘cosmopolitan empathy’ owing much to the 
American model.225  They allege that this message is accepted, negotiated or rejected in 
different local contexts and is carried across national boundaries by the global 
distributive power of the mass media,  popular texts such as Schindler’s List (1993) as 
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well as by supra-territorial alliances of governments resulting from initiatives such as 
the SIF 2000.  As a result, in HMGA, Levy and Sznaider, interpret the Stockholm 
Declaration as marking the institutionalization of a future orientated, 
“…deterritorialized, cosmopolitan memory...”,226 that works because the Holocaust, 
“…conforms so unequivocally to categories of good and evil.”227 However, this overtly 
Manichean and mass media friendly reading of the Holocaust within Levy and 
Sznaider’s work begs the question of how the discourses of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ 
could cope with documentary evidence and testimonial descriptions of the horror and 
historical heterogeneity of what Auschwitz survivor, Primo Levi has termed the reality 
of day to day survival in the moral ‘grey zone’ of the concentration camp system.228      
 
In terms of the history of the SIF 2000, Levy and Sznaider are correct to point to the 
significance of the construction of norms of remembrance at the transnational level and 
the potential impact of these norms in various national ‘public spheres’ after 2000 as a 
result of practical efforts to implement the Stockholm Declaration by the ITF and its 
affiliated governments and NGOs.  Equally, as has been demonstrated in chapter two, 
the authors are correct to note the significance of Holocaust metaphors in justifying 
NATO military intervention in Kosovo as well as the importance of the American 
contribution to the international project of Holocaust remembrance in the run up to the 
SIF 2000.  Furthermore, in terms of the expectations created by the genre of 
‘cosmopolitanism’, it is possible to perceive the rhetoric of the Stockholm Declaration 
(2000) in encouraging the prevention of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-
Semitism and xenophobia” as well as the subsequent convening of SIFs on ‘Combating 
Intolerance’ (2001), ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ (2002) and ‘Preventing 
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Genocide’ (2004) as generically ‘cosmopolitan’ in construction. That is, through the 
convening of these conferences international dialogues were forged, whilst the 
adherence of state governments to international law and the protection of ‘universal’ 
rights was encouraged through the formulation of the Stockholm Declarations (2000, 
2001, 2004), a collection of non-binding multilateral contracts.229   Indeed, in a similar 
way to other ‘cosmopolitan’ documents before them (for example, the UNDHR), the 
non-binding nature of the Stockholm Declarations (2000, 2001, 2004) meant that they 
remained non-contentious at the government level, both in terms of their volunteerism 
and preservation of state sovereignty, but also possessed the more radical possibility of 
serving as potential lobbying tools in campaigns by non-governmental activists.  
 
However, whilst elements of the SIF 2000 can be categorized as ‘cosmopolitan’ in other 
respects Levy and Sznaider’s conclusions in HMGA are deeply flawed and this is not 
just because of the reasons already mentioned or the fact that their writings can be 
perceived as demonstrating some of the most cited objections to ‘New Cosmopolitan’ 
approaches in the social sciences.  For example, some thinkers have berated the ‘New 
Cosmopolitanism’ for identifying with Western value systems of modernization and 
representations of the ‘human’  which are perceived to risk producing new exclusions 
through the elision of the specificity of difference in terms of the diversity of national, 
ethnic, gendered and sexual experiences across the globe.230  For example, 
postcolonialists might perceive Levy and Sznaider’s ‘universalizing’ of the Holocaust 
or the Jewish catastrophe as a central symbol of what they call ‘New Cosmopolitan’ 
‘Second Modernity’ as problematic in terms of its potential to elide the particularism of 
the experiences of ‘non-European’ victims of genocide.  Furthermore, and in contrast to 
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Arendt’s and Jaspers’ caution in regards to the ‘totalitarian’ potentials inherent within 
some formulations of the ‘cosmopolitan’ ideal of international jurisdiction,231 ‘New 
Cosmopolitan’ theories have also been viewed by some critics as potentially un-
democratic in their failure to ensure the popular legitimacy of global governance.232  
Finally, and crucially in relation to questions posed by the continuing perpetration of 
genocide in the contemporary world, the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ has also been sharply 
criticized as naïve and unrealistic for fetishizing the ‘universal’ human and group rights 
agenda, when this agenda continues to be violated by various state actors throughout the 
globe.233 
 
Historical Problems with the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ Interpretation of the SIF 
2000 
 
Moving beyond these general criticisms of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’, this section 
will argue that there are three main problems with Levy and Sznaider’s periodization of 
the historical development of Holocaust memory work since 1945 as well as their 
interpretation of the SIF 2000 which encompasses their conviction that the post-Cold 
War era marks a key historical turning point in the construction of ‘cosmopolitan 
memories’ of the Holocaust, a transition from ‘First’ to ‘Second’ Modernity which, 
“…provide[s] a new epistemological vantage point, one that questions the 
‘methodological nationalism’ that still prevails in much of the social sciences.”234  
Firstly, new historical research is demonstrating that there was much more extensive 
Jewish communal remembrance of the Nazi mass murder of European Jewry in the late 
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1940s and 1950s than Levy, Sznaider and Novick’s accounts would suggest, including 
examples of global inter-linked remembrance cultures which were sometimes but not 
always connected to what can be perceived as early ‘cosmopolitan’ state sanctioned 
efforts to provide financial restitution to Jewish victims of Nazi atrocity crimes.  
Moreover, further research is needed to assess whether any of these early forms of 
communal and/or transnational networks of collective remembrance of the Jewish 
Catastrophe can be seen as prototypically ‘cosmopolitan’ in not just financial but also 
ideological terms.   
 
Secondly, the role of transnational institutions such as NATO and the EU in the 
restitution movements of the 1990s as well as in the ITF and the SIF 2000 marked not 
the smooth transition to a ‘Second Modernity’ dominated by global governmental 
norms in relation to Holocaust memory as an ethical imperative for the promotion of 
‘New Cosmopolitan’ values such as international justice, human rights and genocide 
prevention, but was rather complex and contradictory.   Thirdly, Levy and Sznaider’s 
representation of the ‘progressive’ arrival of a transnational age of ‘Second Modernity’ 
risks underplaying the ongoing structural inadequacies of international bodies such as 
the UN in the face of the continuing threat that Barbara Harff argues is posed by 
potential perpetrators of genocide in war torn, ethnically divided, politically unstable, 
ideologically elite driven, economically fragile and isolated nation states.235  
 
Levy and Sznaider argue that the memory of the Holocaust was largely suppressed in 
the immediate post-war period whilst nation-state dominated memories of the Holocaust 
were constructed in the era of ‘First Modernity’ between the 1960s and 1980s.  They 
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also argue that since 1989 collective memories of the Jewish catastrophe have emerged 
which promote a transnational human rights agenda and national self-reflection in 
different local contexts in the period of what ‘New Cosmopolitans’ call ‘Second 
Modernity’.  However, this interpretation of the historical development of memory 
cultures of the Nazi mass murder of European Jewry is flawed, largely because it 
reduces the diversity of human attempts at communal remembrance to the stranglehold 
of a retrospectively imposed and deeply somber discursive pun.  That is, because what 
is now ‘normatively’ called ‘the Holocaust’ globally, was not commonly named or 
institutionalized as ‘the Holocaust’ by state agencies in the immediate post-war period, 
the collective memory of the Jewish catastrophe was therefore rendered largely ‘silent’ 
in America, Israel and Germany between 1945-1962.   
 
Recent research by scholars such as Hasia R. Diner, Roni Stauber and Boaz Cohen is 
challenging many elements of this pervasive historiographical assumption that 
underpins the work of scholars such as Levy, Sznaider and Novick, particularly in 
relation to America and Israel.  For example, Stauber has shown how issues in relation 
to the Nazi mass murder of European Jewry kept erupting in Israeli public life during 
the 1950s, whilst Cohen has chronicled the struggles of Polish Jewish survivor Rachel 
Auerbach to collect survivor testimonies for Yad Vashem during the 1950s.236  Equally,  
Diner has demonstrated how Jewish communities in various states across America used 
an assortment of terms to memorialize what has now become normatively known as the 
Holocaust in books, radio broadcasts, institutional programs, liturgies, cemetery 
markers and Warsaw Ghetto memorial days’ between 1945 and 1962.237 
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Furthermore, re-thinking the chronology of the social remembrance of the Jewish 
catastrophe in this way suggests a number of important points for how to understand the 
development of transnational dynamics in collective memory work.  Indeed, far from 
being unique to ‘Second Modernity’, or developing after nation-state dominated 
memories, transnational dynamics in the remembrance of the Nazi regime and its 
collaborators’ mass murder of six million Jews have been apparent since the end of the 
Second World War and have arisen and continue to develop in relation to national, 
regional and familial collective memories of the Holocaust.  Moreover, as early as 1953 
these efforts have sometimes but not always been directly linked to what can be 
perceived as important prototypical ‘cosmopolitan’ efforts at the government level to 
provide restitution and reparation to victims of state sanctioned atrocities.238  For 
example, although not necessarily making these memorial projects ‘cosmopolitan’ in 
content, the 1953 agreement that Israel and the Conference of Jewish Material Claims 
Against Germany (comprising 22 Jewish organizations from America, France, Canada, 
Great Britain, South Africa, Australia and Argentina) reached with the Federal Republic 
of Germany in regards to reparations was significant for commemoration reasons 
because the Claims Conference put aside some of these funds to sponsor memorial 
projects to the Jewish catastrophe in Israel and America.   
 
Significant in this regard was the fact that Yad Vashem was established in Israel in 1953 
and approximately half of its budget in the 1950s was contributed by the Claims 
Conference.239 This affected some important decisions made in the fledgling institution.  
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The initial influence of the Zionist Left had impacted on the early conceptualization of 
Yad Vashem, with plans for a Hall of Memory and a separate Hall of Heroism dedicated 
specifically to the ghetto fighters and Jewish resistance.240  However, demonstrating the 
organizational and financial clout of the Claims Conference, two halls were vetoed in 
1955 on the grounds that the Claims Conference wanted the majority of their investment 
to be spent on research, whilst representative Mark Yuvilar objected that, “As a 
European Jew I protest to a plan that would differentiate between heroes and martyrs.  
The whole concept is un-Jewish and incorrect.”241  Furthermore, it should also be noted 
that the Claims Conference did not only support Yad Vashem.  It also contributed funds 
to YIVO (Yidischer Visinschaftlekher Institut or The Jewish Scientific Institute) which 
had originated in Vilna, Lithuania, and had decamped to New York in 1940.  Staffed by 
many survivors, YIVO played a key role in archiving primary documents relating to the 
Jewish catastrophe as well as in producing exhibitions and memorial projects dedicated 
to educating the public about the recently decimated Yiddish and Eastern European 
Jewish communities.242  Monies from the Claims Conference in the mid-1950s also 
contributed to the completion of a number of YIVO research studies as well as 
facilitating a working partnership with Yad Vashem.243  
 
However, international dynamics in Holocaust memory work were not restricted to the 
workings of the Claims Conference in the 1950s.  American Jewish individuals, the 
Anti-Defamation League as well as the American Jewish Committee all financially 
contributed to Polish Jew Isaac Schneersohn’s Parisian project to construct, The Centre 
de Documentation Juive Contemporaine and Tomb of the Unknown Jewish Martyr, 
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which was consecrated in 1952 and opened to the public in 1956.244  American Jews 
also donated money to the Jewish National Fund’s initiative to plant six million trees in 
a Martyr’s Forest in the Jerusalem Hills.245  Noting the lack of signposts for visitors to 
Dachau concentration camp, the Jewish Labor Committee also put pressure on the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s, Robert McNamara, to fix the problem.  Equally, mass 
reproduced images of the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial (1948) quickly made Nathan 
Rappoport’s public sculpture a global icon of Jewish resistance.246  As such, whilst 
international dynamics in Holocaust remembrance institutions may have intensified and 
become greater in scale and government involvement since 1989, this development does 
not necessarily mark a radical historical break but instead builds on international 
patterns of admittedly incomplete government processes of compensation for Holocaust 
survivors during the Cold War era as well as immediate post-1945 inter-cultural co-
operative attempts by Jewish communities across the globe to commemorate the six 
million.247   
 
Finally, an interesting area for more detailed investigation would be to conduct further 
research into the extent to which rather than being limited to a post-war ‘cosmopolitan’ 
intellectual avant-garde or the representatives of Holocaust memory work in what Levy 
and Sznaider call ‘Second Modernity’, whether ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘liberal universalistic’ 
sentiments issuing from the remembrance of the six million can be detected in much 
earlier events than the press reportage of Kosovo (1999).  Areas for further analysis in 
this regard might include the fact that far from being a lone avant-garde ‘cosmopolitan’ 
light in the battle for the UNGC, Lemkin was supported by American Jewish 
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individuals and institutions.  Indeed, Diner has already started to note how in the period 
1945-1962, some American Jews invoked the memory of the Nazi mass murder of the 
six million in both highly specific and ‘universal’ terms to lead liberal campaigns 
against the Soviet Union, in favor of civil rights, in opposition to harsh immigration 
laws and in support of the ratification of the UNGC.248 Mirroring this sentiment figures 
such as Jacob Blaustein of the American Jewish Committee and David Ullman of the 
National Community Relations Advisory Council drew on the memory of the Nazi mass 
murder of European Jewry specifically, as well as references to other victims of 
genocide and Nazi ‘Crimes against Humanity’ in order to push for the U.S Congress to 
ratify the 1948 UNGC (a task that was finally achieved in 1987).249 
 
The second major problem with Levy and Sznaider’s delineation of historical time is 
that by representing the contemporary construction of ‘Second Modernity’ as the 
dialectical resolution of a ‘New Cosmopolitan’ world-historical turning point,250 Levy 
and Sznaider risk intimating too positive a picture of transnational agencies and 
simplifying the complex and contradictory role of Western supra-territorial alliances 
such as NATO and the EU in bringing about post-1989 developments in Holocaust 
restitution and memory work. Transnational institutions often played either a contested 
role (NATO) or marginal part (EU) in the restitution campaigns and early years of the 
ITF and the convening of the SIF 2000.  For example, during the restitution negotiations 
of the 1990s, the WJRO threatened that without adequate restitution it would attempt to 
block Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic’s integration into NATO in 1999 and 
this stance was also broadly supported by the U.S government. However the WJRO’s 
invocation of a NATO ban on enlargement was strongly objected to by the American 
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Jewish Committee as well as by many local Eastern European Jewish communities.251   
Furthermore, although the EU had made a commitment to democracy, human rights and 
the protection of minorities’ a part of its Copenhagen Criteria (1993) for membership,252 
it has been contended that the organization played only a limited role in the Holocaust 
era restitution campaigns of the 1990s.  For example, Eizenstat observed: 
 
Aside from a 1995 European parliament resolution generally encouraging property restitution, 
we received  no support from the European Union, which could have used the leverage of its 
own admission process to encourage prospective member states in the former communist world 
to adopt modern property laws and to return property confiscated during the Nazi and 
communist eras.253  
 
Moreover, the role of transnational inter-state institutions such as the EU, UN and the 
Council of Europe within the founding of the ITF and the convening of the SIF 2000 
was in fact, quite minimal.  This is perhaps most firmly illustrated by the fact that the 
role of these supra-territorial institutions as associates in the work of the ITF only really 
accelerated after the SIF 2000 and subsequent conferences on ‘Combating Intolerance’ 
(2001), ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ (2002) and ‘Preventing Genocide’ (2004).  
For example, in 2002 Education Ministers at the Council of Europe decided to support a 
‘Day of Holocaust Remembrance and the prevention of Crimes against Humanity’ in 
schools, whilst the United Nations established 27th January as ‘Holocaust Memorial 
Day’ through UN Resolution 60/7 passed on 1st November 2005.254  Equally, French 
Holocaust survivor, Henryk Pikielny, who was contesting the Polish government’s 
refusal to return his father’s Lodz factory, broke with all historical precedent by taking 
his case to the European Court of Human Rights in 2005 rather than presenting his case 
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to the American legal system.255   Finally, the swift expansion of ITF members from just 
three founding states in 1998 to 25 member states in 2007 has broadly mirrored the 
political dynamics of democratization associated with EU and NATO enlargements. 
 
However, despite these developments, the EU’s diffidence towards Holocaust 
restitution efforts persisted throughout the noughties.   For example, compounding the 
Bush administration’s looser grip on restitution issues,256 the EU also, “...lifted a 
requirement for restitution that would have blocked Poland’s 2004 admission to the 27-
country union.”257 Furthermore, as shown in chapter four, the EU persisted in making 
Vilnius 2009 European Capital of Culture in spite of Andrew Baker’s allegations of 
Lithuania’s “twisting” of Holocaust memory as well as the country’s refusal to deal 
with communal property restitution issues,258 whilst as late as June 2009, British 
member of the House of Lords, Ruth Deech, who was seeking compensation for 
property taken from her Jewish grandparents in Poland during the Nazi era, complained:  
 
Rather than declarations…the European Union should create a fund immediately to deal with 
claims…In Britain we are subject to so many European Union directives…Why can’t there be 
one on this? 259     
 
Finally, it should also be noted that in spite of some transnational efforts by agencies 
such as the UN to encourage the remembrance of the Holocaust as a touchstone for the 
promotion of human and group rights since 2005, the coupling of these objectives in 
contemporary forms of Holocaust memory work is far from clear-cut.  For example, a 
survey carried out by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the role 
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played by Holocaust museums and memorial sites such as Auschwitz-Birkenau, Terezín 
and the House of the Wannsee Conference in promoting human rights’ education 
discovered that, “Only one of the surveyed sites regards raising awareness about 
human rights as its most important objective, all other institutions focus on the 
transmission of historical knowledge.”260  Furthermore, despite what can be categorized 
as the ‘cosmopolitan’ elements of the Stockholm Declaration, the role of the ITF in 
promoting the remembrance of the Holocaust in relation to human rights was hotly 
debated within the organization during the noughties, whilst an ITF statement 
condemning the genocide in Darfur was issued, but only after a great deal of internal 
deliberation.261  Within this context, Levy and Sznaider’s conviction that twenty-first 
century ‘New Cosmopolitan’ memory of the Holocaust promotes issues such as human 
rights as well as their statement that, “The consolidating of the European Union and 
other transnational organizations also works to promote international forums of 
justice” remains both contested and an ongoing work in progress.262   
 
The third problem with the division between ‘First’ and ‘Second Modernity’ is that 
despite Levy and Sznaider’s proclamations of self-reflexivity, the almost messianic 
dialectical arrival of ‘Second Modernity’ ultimately risks masking the terrifying realities 
of both historical and contemporary inter-state and nation-state sanctioned political 
violence.  This failing is illustrated most starkly when the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ 
assumptions of Levy and Sznaider are placed in dialogue with analyst of the causes of 
genocide and critic of the political and economic structures of Western modernity, Mark 
Levene.  For Levene, not only are competitive inter-state relations towards 
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modernization one of the underlying structural causes of genocide in ‘failed’ states but 
the prevention of genocide is also stymied by contemporary inter-state relations, most 
notably the ongoing failure to reform the power of veto held by the five member states 
of the UN Security Council (America, France, Britain, Russia, China).  For Levene, the 
national interests of the Security Council have meant that: 
 
…the Western system leaders may act in the future to prevent or halt genocidal threats where 
they are sure of being able to do so with minimal military, political or economic consequence to 
themselves – in other words against very weak states – but not against, for instance, Russia, 
China, Turkey – all states with significant potential for genocide – where Western self-interest 
would dictate a strictly hands off policy.263   
 
Levene’s analysis of the role of inter-state relations in facilitating genocide as well as 
the ongoing failure of international bodies such as the UN to prevent genocide reveals 
the deficiencies within the idealism of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ and its binary 
construction of nation state dominated ‘First Modernity’ and transnational ‘Second 
Modernity’.  For one of the dangers inherent in the idealization of the ‘transnational’ 
and the relegation of the ‘national’ within the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ is that it 
ultimately contains the capacity to produce cynicism when contemporary human rights 
abuses, national hostility to refugees and acts of genocide continue unabated in what 
Levy and Sznaider have constructed as the post-1989 period of ‘Second Modernity’.264 
These shortcomings, specifically in relation to the perpetration of genocide are 
epitomized by post-1989 UN failures in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995), as well 
as by the fact that genocide has been perpetrated in Darfur province by Janjaweed 
militias with the sanction of the Sudanese government since 2003, and in flagrant 
disregard of UN directives, as well as the SIF 2004’s well intentioned efforts at 
‘preventing genocide’.265   
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It can be contended that whilst certain elements of the SIF 2000, including Bauer’s not 
un-problematic rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, can be perceived within the 
nexus of  ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual traditions, the idealistic assumptions of the ‘New 
Cosmopolitanism’ and Levy and Sznaider’s mode of understanding the SIF 2000 within 
the periodization of ‘First’ and ‘Second Modernity’ needs to be questioned. Arguably, 
this is necessary for two main reasons.  Firstly, because the proposed progressive 
movement from ‘First’ to ‘Second Modernity’ presents a problematic periodization of 
historical developments in Holocaust memory work and as a result risks obfuscating the 
extent to which the SIF 2000 built on international and possibly even ‘cosmopolitan’ 
precedents in the remembrance of the Jewish Catastrophe during the Cold War era.  
And secondly, because in order for Holocaust and Nazi era memory work to retain its 
historical integrity but also proactively encourage human rights and genocide 
prevention in the present, it is also necessary to have an honest confrontation with the 
complexities and ambivalences of contemporary power relations between international 
organizations and nation-states, rather than envisaging a theoretical but too often 
premature ideal of transnational relations and uncontested human rights promoting 
Holocaust memory work in what ‘New Cosmopolitans’ have called the post-1989 era of 
‘Second Modernity’.   
 
However, by critiquing the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’, this chapter does not seek to refute 
the formative impact that knowledge of Nazi atrocities including the Jewish catastrophe 
had on post-1945 ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers and activists nor does it negate the 
importance of all contemporary ‘cosmopolitan’ thinking in the social sciences.  For as 
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Fine has proposed what is needed in the place of the research agenda of the ‘New 
Cosmopolitanism’, is a ‘cosmopolitanism’ sobered by its own ‘worldliness’.   That is a 
‘cosmopolitanism’ which is not based on 1989 as heralding a new transnational era of 
‘Second Modernity’, but is instead focused on a radically self-critical, historically un-
blinkered and politically vigorous engagement with contemporary questions relating to 
national and transnational governance, ‘universal’ rights and international law.266  For it 
is only through such an unstinting awareness of the ongoing potential for the 
perpetration of acts of brutality within the current global system of nation-states, 
international jurisprudence and transnational governance that any attempts at 
contemporary human rights activism and genocide prevention in line with the positive 
‘cosmopolitan’ potentials of the Stockholm Declaration (2000) can be discovered, 
discussed and acted upon. 
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Through an analysis of published and un-published primary sources, the critical 
interrogation of the pre-existing secondary literature as well as the recording of oral 
history interviews with a selection of primarily British delegates to the SIF 2000, HMM 
has provided an original analysis of the causes, consequences and ‘cosmopolitan’ 
intellectual context for understanding the SIF 2000 on the Holocaust.  By specifically 
focusing on the conference at Stockholm, broader themes have been unpacked relating 
to the political, social and cultural dynamics of Holocaust memory politics within the 
international arena at the dawn of the twenty-first century.  These themes have included 
the relationships of power between Western Europe and ‘New’ Europe and how 
Holocaust era issues fit into NATO and EU enlargement processes; as well as the 
relationship between the focus on the Jewish Catastrophe, broader Nazi atrocity crimes 
and ‘universalist’ political objectives in Bauer’s rhetoric of Holocaust 
‘unprecedentedness’, a rhetoric which was significant because it formed a central 
element of the discursive construction of  the manifesto of the SIF 2000, the Stockholm 
Declaration on the Holocaust. 
 
As part of HMM’s analysis, chapter one delineated the immediate causes of the SIF 
2000 in the 1990s and in so doing suggested that whilst the inadequacies of Maastricht 
and the return of genocide to Europe were important factors, the specific choice of the 
Nazi past and the Jewish catastrophe in particular, as the central subject of the work of 
the ITF and the SIF 2000 was also the result of a number of particular challenges and 
opportunities posed to Holocaust research, remembrance and education in the post-
Communist context of the 1990s.  These included the ideal expressed by some 
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restitution advocates that whilst compensation could provide a degree of ‘Imperfect 
Justice’,1 one of the legacies of the Holocaust and the Third Reich should be nations 
taking responsibility for their complicity in the Nazi past through acts of public 
research, education and memorialization.  Chapter one also proposed that the founding 
of Sweden’s Living History campaign (1997) and the publication of Tell Ye Your 
Children…; the proven success of recent examples of inter-cultural co-operation in 
Holocaust memory work as well as pan-European liberal anxieties at the rise of the 
populist and far right and forms of Holocaust denial were also indispensable dynamics 
in contributing to the establishment of the ITF and the subsequent organization of the 
SIF 2000.  Furthermore, through chapter one’s inter-cultural analysis of the links 
between the USHMM, the IWM and the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum in the 
1990s, this chapter implies that this is a potentially productive methodology in 
attempting to understand how international ‘flows’ impact on the construction of 
national sites of memory work. 
 
Taking into consideration the reasons for the establishment of the ITF explained in 
chapter one and against the backdrop of events such as the WCHA (1998) and NATO 
military intervention in Kosovo (1999), chapter two outlined the institutional policy 
discussions and decision-making within the ITF which directly preceded the convening 
of the SIF 2000 and the writing of the Stockholm Declaration.  These decisions included 
the nomination of Bauer as Academic Advisor (May 1998), as well as the adoption of 
his complex and multi-faceted rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ as the 
dominant discourse of the Stockholm Declaration.2  Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ 
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suggests that in its ‘totality’ the particular event of the Nazi era Jewish Catastrophe is 
exceptional as well as ‘universal’ in possessing elements of comparability with other 
genocides and saying, “...something terribly important about humanity.”3  However, 
this discourse has also proven contentious because of the potential for the  
hierarchization of Nazi atrocities and genocides implicit in some but not all 
interpretations and uses of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, as well as potentially 
exclusionary in its restriction of the term ‘genocide’ to ethnic, national and racial 
groups.4 
 
Another key ITF policy formulated at this time was that of ‘Liaison Projects’.5 
Discussions about ‘Liaison Projects’ within the ITF in 1999 demonstrate just how 
sensitive the organization was to potential criticism about being perceived as an 
institution which simply imposed Western norms and values without any sensitivity to 
the particularities of different national and regional environments.  As a result, the 
original idea for these ‘Liaison Projects’ was that the ITF should only work with states 
who approached it; that projects should be long term and adaptable in implementation; 
that they should support and reinforce pre-existing diplomatic associations as well as 
being specifically tailored to the territory in question.  For example, it is arguable that 
an instance of this kind of ‘tailoring’ was the integration of the Czech Republic’s 
Fenomén Holocaust initiative within the work of the ITF’s first ever ‘Liaison Project’.           
 
However, whilst to some observers the notion of these ‘Liaison Projects’ might have 
hubristic connotations of grand Western-led projects of integration in Holocaust 
                                                           
3
 Bauer, RH, p. 67. 
4
 Ibid., p. 12. 
5
 HMM, pp. 99-101. 
314 
 
research, remembrance and education across Europe and the globe, it should also be 
remembered that although the ITF had some major international players in its midst, it 
was still a relatively young organization on the eve of the millennium and uncertain as 
to the extent to which it should expand.  For example, although later Task Force 
expansions would broadly mirror the contours of NATO and EU membership and 
enlargement processes, in 1999 the ITF was only just starting to cultivate relations with 
organizations such as the European Parliament and the Council of Europe, whilst during 
preparations for the SIF 2000, Smith retrospectively recounted how Swedish organizers 
were surprised at the number of political delegations who accepted invitations to 
attend.6  Indeed, a common theme running through interviews with specialists who 
attended the SIF 2000 was that the high level of political and intellectual involvement 
was ‘extraordinary’ and/or ‘overwhelming’. This intense level of political participation 
which felt radically new, was mirrored in the fact that the forty-six nations in attendance 
adopted the Stockholm Declaration (2000), a document which used the multifaceted and 
not unproblematic discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ as part of its promotion 
of research, remembrance and education about the Nazi era Jewish Catastrophe, the 
acknowledgement of broader victims of the Third Reich’s atrocity crimes as well as 
encouraging the ‘universalist’ ethical imperative to politically work to prevent present 
day forms of ethnic cleansing, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and genocide.   
 
In addition, this thesis has not only been concerned with how international 
developments impacted upon the ‘institutional’ construction of Holocaust 
commemoration strategies and efforts to prevent, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, 
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anti-Semitism and xenophobia,”7 but has also been interested in how these initiatives 
have been received and perceived in different international, national and regional 
contexts.  As part of this process, chapter two demonstrated how the SIF 2000 was used 
as a platform by speakers such as Hancock and Siladzic to raise awareness of broader 
Nazi atrocities as well as other genocides and human rights abuses.  Furthermore, this 
thesis has also suggested that whilst the SIF 2000 generated considerable global 
television and radio coverage, news of this ‘extraordinary’ conference in Anglo and 
American newspapers was often only reported within the context of other international 
or national stories such as the Haider controversy in Austria or the debate over Section 
28 in Britain.  This demonstrates the extent to which communicating important 
developments in Holocaust memory work at the international level through the press 
was a challenge for events such as the SIF 2000.  However, in a move towards 
remedying some of the potential ‘democratic deficits’ of event organizing and decision-
making at the global level, the Internet has made it possible for SIF conference speeches 
and presentations to be made available online.  Indeed, in terms of the subsequent work 
of the ITF, the rapid growth in influence of the Worldwide Web shaped many of the 
organization’s post SIF 2000 initiatives, from encouraging the creation of memorials 
and museum databases and producing online Holocaust education guidelines,8 to the 
ITF’s increasing interest in the use of online exhibitions to promote education about the 
Holocaust.9 
 
Contrasting with the inadequacies of Anglo-American newspapers reportage of the SIF 
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2000, in February of the same year, The Jerusalem Report tackled the events in 
Stockholm specifically, with Zuroff expressing his disappointment that the Swedish 
government did not adequately address war crimes issues, whilst he also critiqued the 
speeches of politicians from the Baltic States for failing to address instances of local 
collaboration in Holocaust era mass murders.10  Alongside this national resistance to 
acknowledging the full horrors of the Nazi past, this thesis has also noted that some of 
the SIF 2000’s other limitations included the fact that in the official speeches little was 
said about Chechnya, whilst Turkey continued to stonewall the Armenian genocide.  
Furthermore, despite Persson’s opening address at the conference, as well as the 
Stockholm Declaration’s acknowledgement of the broader victims of Nazi atrocities, 
Hancock critiqued the event in relation to the Roma, whilst there was no representative 
of a disability NGO at the conference, despite the continuing need to memorialize the 
Nazi T4 mass murder programme.11  Indeed, chapter three of HMM has suggested that 
alongside the ITF’s central focus on the Jewish Catastrophe and post-SIF 2000 work on 
the Roma genocide, and whilst bearing in mind other victim groups, T4 remembrance is 
an important area that the organization could establish special educational sub-
committees on in the future.12   
 
Additionally, it should also be noted that in line with the British perspective on the SIF 
2000 advanced by this thesis as well as in an additional effort to provide a specific 
example of the relationship between the transnational, the national and the regional, 
chapter two also delineated how one particular element which corresponded with the 
Stockholm project, namely the launch of UK HMD (26th January 2000) was received in 
the British press and what questions and controversies it stimulated in the broader 
                                                           
10
 Zuroff, ‘Missed Opportunities at Stockholm’.  
11
 HMM, p. 131. 
12
 Ibid., p. 178. 
317 
 
British public.  Indeed, in relation to the public ‘reception’ of the SIF 2000, what the 
British debate over the launch of UK HMD most pertinently illustrated is how 
developments at the international level, sometimes struggled to be directly 
communicated to the public at the national level.  For example, with the exception of a 
couple of reports in The Guardian and The Jewish Chronicle, little was said in the press 
commentaries and letters pages about the international context in which the 
establishment of UK HMD had occurred. Instead, media commentators and members of 
the public articulated a degree of ambivalence about UK HMD, with the centre-right 
often expressing fears that Holocaust commemoration would disrupt victorious national 
narratives of World War II, whilst pressure groups such as the Armenians as well as 
critics left of New Labour articulated concerns that the liberal ‘universalistic’ 
representation of the Holocaust in UK HMD was not self-reflexive enough about 
Britain’s Imperial past and foreign policies in the present, nor varied enough in its 
emphasis on the Jewish Catastrophe to encompass the plural narratives of suffering 
embedded in British society. 
 
Against the backdrop of the SIF 2000’s extraordinary spectacle as well as the questions 
the conference raised both purposely and inadvertently in relation to societies taking 
responsibility for their Nazi era pasts and human rights records in the present, the final 
three chapters of this thesis were concerned with analyzing the longer term 
consequences of the SIF 2000 including what institutional efforts have been made to 
implement the Stockholm Declaration’s objectives of promoting Holocaust research, 
remembrance and education globally as well as acknowledging broader Nazi atrocities 
and political efforts to prevent present day, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-
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Semitism and xenophobia.”13 Equally, these chapters were also concerned with how 
these efforts to apply the Stockholm Declaration have been perceived in various 
international and national contexts; the consequences of the post-Communist 
asymmetries of political and cultural influence couched in ITF ‘Liaison Projects’; the 
way in which these initiatives relate to processes of NATO and EU accession; and 
finally, the wider  ‘cosmopolitan’ institutional and intellectual context for understanding 
the Stockholm Declaration’s ‘universalistic’ rhetoric to invoke the remembrance of the 
Holocaust and acknowledge broader Nazi atrocity crimes in order to encourage the 
prevention of contemporary forms of prejudice and mass killing.   
 
In line with these objectives, chapter three evaluated the work of subsequent Stockholm 
conferences and the ITF in implementing the Stockholm Declaration’s objectives of 
promoting Holocaust research, remembrance and education as well as encouraging 
political efforts to prevent, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and 
xenophobia.”14  It demonstrated that whilst the subsequent Stockholm conference series 
was important in stimulating networks of action and producing a series of international 
declarations (2000, 2001 and 2004) which can now be proactively utilized by human 
rights activists, the credibility of these conferences was also contradicted by a number 
of omissions.  For example, international relations experts, Leitenberg and Power noted 
that speeches by politicians at the SIF 2004 hardly mentioned the recent genocides in 
the Congo and Darfur.15  
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Furthermore, chapter three also demonstrated that whilst the ITF was important in terms 
of its campaign alongside the USHMM to open the Bad Arolsen archives; its issuance 
of public statements on Holocaust denial in Iran and European anti-Roma prejudice; as 
well as in supporting numerous Holocaust research, remembrance and education 
projects across its twenty-three member states, particularly in the post-Soviet zone; 
there were also a number of more problematic elements, such as the ongoing 
hierarchizing and exclusionary potentials within some but not all uses of the ITF’s 
official discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, as well as the challenges posed to 
Holocaust research, remembrance and education by far right and ultra-nationalist 
backlash in some member states.  Furthermore, within the context of the ITF, observers 
such as Smith have noted that there was a highly problematic time lag before the 
organization issued a letter addressed to the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of 
Genocide (21 November 2005),16 which called on the international community to, 
“…increase its efforts to halt the ongoing atrocities in Darfur.”17  As a result, what 
chapter three highlights is the ongoing political challenges posed to genocide prevention 
in the international arena, as well as expressing the hope that in the future, the ITF will 
use its position of public influence to speak out promptly on these issues.   
 
Whilst chapter three suggested that the impact of subsequent SIFs and the ITF since 
2000 has been complex and full of both successes and challenges, particularly in 
relation to genocide issues, chapter four was concerned with providing an intercultural 
case study of one of the ITF’s specific efforts to promote Holocaust research, 
remembrance and education through its ‘Liaison Projects’, a type of policy that was 
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demarcated in detail in chapter two.  Following the SIF 2000 and in association with the 
Lithuanian government, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office launched its ITF 
‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania.  This initiative was recognized as potentially 
controversial by its proponents because whilst Holocaust remembrance is central to the 
identity of many members of Lithuania’s small Jewish survivor population as well as 
becoming associated by a moderate liberal political elite with accession into 
organization’s such as the EU and NATO; the fact remains that Lithuanian national 
remembrance of Communist oppression is often seen as a more pressing public priority, 
whilst in terms of the legacies of the Third Reich, many Lithuanian ultra-nationalists 
remain hostile to accepting the role of Lithuanian Nazi collaborators in co-perpetrating 
the Holocaust alongside German occupation forces during the Second World War.   
 
Against this backdrop, chapter four demonstrated how the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison 
Project’ utilized pre-existing links with Lithuania, whilst British academics as well as 
leaders from organizations such as Beth Shalom, the IWM and the LJCC facilitated 
teacher training seminars, book distributions and museum advisory sessions with 
various Lithuanian Holocaust education, remembrance and research organizations.  
Reflecting on the work of the ITF in Lithuania, survivor and curator, Kostanian has 
viewed many of its programmes as an important source of support for small 
organizations such as the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum.18  Indeed, Smith’s specific 
evaluation of the successes and limitations of the British ITF ‘Liaison Project’ suggests 
that these types of initiative are at their most effective when they directly link up with 
local, dedicated Holocaust commemoration specialists; whilst the example of  Lithuania 
also implies that contemporary backlash against Holocaust commemoration by ultra-
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nationalist pressure groups remains one of the major challenges posed to the successful 
institutional implementation and public reception of Holocaust research, remembrance 
and education programs.  As a result, further analyses of the outcomes of other ITF 
‘Liaison Projects’ are needed, to see if common patterns emerge.  If so, this data could 
be utilized to improve the effectiveness of international collaborations in the future, 
possibly by ensuring that Western NGOs always work closely with pre-existing and 
dedicated partner Holocaust and Nazi era research, remembrance and education 
organizations in the region under consideration.      
 
Turning away from the specific questions posed by ITF ‘Liaison Projects’, chapter five 
explored the key context of ‘cosmopolitanism’, or intellectuals and institutions which 
advocate human and minority rights, for understanding the broader historical and 
political significance of the SIF 2000 and the ‘universalistic’ rhetoric of the Stockholm 
Declaration (2000) to invoke the remembrance of the Holocaust and acknowledge 
broader Nazi atrocity crimes in order to encourage the prevention of contemporary 
manifestations of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and 
xenophobia.”19  Chapter five explored these themes in three separate but inter-linked 
sections.  The first section offered a close analysis of ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers such as 
Jaspers, Lemkin, Arendt and Habermas, and provocatively suggested that in contrast to 
the critiques leveled at Bauer’s earlier notion of Holocaust ‘uniqueness’, which are 
discussed at length in chapter two, his discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ 
which is explicated in the Stockholm Declaration and Rethinking the Holocaust can be 
located within the genre of Kantian ‘cosmopolitan’ responses to the Nazi past, a 
position that is reinforced by reports in Haaretz during the noughties which have 
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documented Bauer’s defense of Sudanese refugees as well as his critiques of religious 
extremist Israeli settlers in the West Bank.20   
 
That said, if Bauer is to be read in this way, it must also be acknowledged that he 
renders the ‘cosmopolitan’ tradition problematic, particularly as a result of the 
hierarchizing and exclusionary potentials inherent within his splitting of Lemkin’s term 
‘genocide’ into his definitions ‘Holocaust’ (‘total’ destruction) and ‘genocide’ (‘partial’ 
destruction) as well as his restriction of the term ‘genocide’ to ethnic, national and racial 
groups.21  However, within the broader findings of this conclusion to HMM, it is 
arguable that what is particularly significant about understanding both the 
‘cosmopolitan’ potentials and problems within Bauer’s discourse is that it disrupts crude 
narratives by scholars such as Norman Finkelstein, who have suggested that Israeli 
political interests and American Jewish organizations have advocated the ‘uniqueness’ 
of the Holocaust since the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict and have exploited European 
restitution cases at the turn of the millennium for the national, political, institutional and 
commercial benefit of the American-Israeli alliance.22  For although, Bauer does co-
operate with American and European politicians; tends to be biased towards the Israeli 
perspective and is not as critical of Israel’s history as Arendt or the post-Zionist 
historians; whilst his not un-problematic discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ 
certainly privileges the Jewish Catastrophe; it is also notable that his passionate 
promotion of Holocaust research, remembrance and education; his support for the ideals 
of law, order and democracy; his critiques in Haaretz of the ‘hate speech’ of radical 
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religious Israeli settlers, as well as his defense of Sudanese refugees,23 all suggests a 
much more nuanced intellectual and Western political agenda to the kind described by 
critics such as Finkelstein in The Holocaust Industry. 
 
By contrast, the second part of chapter five looked at a different element of the context 
of ‘cosmopolitanism’ for understanding the wider significance of the SIF 2000 on the 
Holocaust.  This encompassed the Ulrich Beck inspired ‘New Cosmopolitan’ 
interpretation of the SIF 2000 offered by Levy and Sznaider, which saw the 
representation of the Holocaust at the SIF 2000 as a symbol promoting international 
law, ‘universal’ human rights and genocide prevention in what these authors perceive to 
be the post-1989 transnational age of ‘Second Modernity’.24  However, whilst this 
chapter acknowledges that there is certainly a degree of validity in Levy and Sznaider’s 
representation of the historical and political significance of the SIF 2000 and the role of 
Holocaust memory in promoting human and minority rights at the turn of the 
millennium, in the third part of this chapter, HMM additionally argues that there are also 
serious weaknesses within Levy and Sznaider’s interpretation.  This is for three main 
reasons.25  Firstly, because the new historiography on the remembrance of the Jewish 
Catastrophe in the 1950s renders problematic Levy and Sznaider’s chronology of the 
development of the remembrance of the Holocaust in the West from 1945-2000.  
Secondly, because despite what can be seen as the more ‘cosmopolitan’ elements of 
Holocaust memory work, the response of both transnational institutions in promoting 
Holocaust remembrance and Holocaust remembrance organizations in promoting 
human rights, has been both ambivalent and contradictory.  For example, despite what 
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can be perceived as the ‘cosmopolitan’ elements of Bauer’s and the Stockholm 
Declaration’s rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, the role of the ITF in 
promoting the remembrance of the Holocaust in relation to human rights was an issue 
which was fiercely debated within the organization during the noughties.26  And thirdly, 
because far from living in a transnational age of ‘Second Modernity’ where 
international organizations respond effectively to nation-state perpetrated acts of 
genocide, more often than not, the continuing perpetration of state sanctioned acts of 
atrocity reveals the inherent contradictions and limitations of the international order vis-
à-vis the global system of nation states.     
 
Thus, in contrast to Levy and Sznaider’s more idealistic vision of the SIF 2000, this 
case study of the historical causes and consequences of the events at Stockholm has 
indicated a considerably more complex picture.  It has shown important restitution 
processes which nonetheless could only offer, Some Measure of Justice;27 it has 
demonstrated the ‘cosmopolitan’ potentials as well as competing intellectual and 
institutional debates over Bauer and the Stockholm Declaration’s complex and 
multifaceted term, Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’; and it has also articulated continuing 
concerns over the role of political actors and institutions in promptly speaking out and 
effectively acting to prevent genocide.  Furthermore, through analyzing efforts at 
applying the Stockholm Declaration via the ITF’s British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, 
HMM has also started to explore some of the complexities of political and cultural 
power surrounding Holocaust research, remembrance and education in post-Soviet 
national contexts of European integration.  For example, whilst it appears to be true that 
in line with Tony Judt’s argument about the political importance of the remembrance of 
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the Holocaust to European identity at the turn of the millennium, and as Jens Kroh has 
noted, membership of the ITF became increasingly perceived by many ‘Liaison States’ 
as an “informal criterion for accession to the European Union”;28 the example of 
Lithuania also demonstrates the EU’s ambivalence towards restitution issues as well as 
the obstacles posed by ultra-nationalists to initiatives in Holocaust research, 
remembrance and education.  Accordingly, the outcomes of the ITF’s 
British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ have illustrated both the ongoing fragility of the 
remembrance of the Holocaust within continental integration processes as well as the 
continuing political, social and cultural challenges posed to national confrontations with 
the Nazi past and Holocaust era issues.     
 
Finally, although this thesis has highlighted the importance of American and Israeli 
contributions to European initiatives to commemorate the Holocaust, HMM has also 
delineated a complex picture that rejects the crude and conspiratorial allegations of ‘The 
Holocaust Industry’,29 as well as qualified claims that events such as the opening of the 
USHMM (1993), the release of Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List (1993) and the 
organization of the SIF 2000 heralded an unqualified global boom in Holocaust memory 
work.30 Instead, HMM has suggested that despite the Holocaust’s high political, 
intellectual and media profile in certain national contexts at the turn of the millennium, 
specific and serious factual initiatives in Holocaust research, remembrance and 
education have often remained contested and unequal in their distribution across the 
world.  As a result, despite the important, determined and ongoing efforts to redress 
these research, remembrance and education imbalances by organization’s such as the 
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ITF, whose mission has been re-affirmed by the Terezín Declaration (30th June 2009);31 
the intensity of the challenges faced have meant that this situation has often remained 
particularly acute in some of the former Soviet bloc countries, such as the Baltic States, 
where despite international efforts and government pledges, ensuring the establishment 
and institutional sustainability of Holocaust research, remembrance and education 
remains both a source of public controversy and an ongoing struggle for local survivors, 
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